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Prior to the 1870s bloated corpses, splintered masts, and floating cargoes often littered 
the isolated beaches of the Eastern United States, becoming a tragic but nearly ubiquitous sight. 
For those in peril upon the seas, the icy grip of death often consumed sailors with little hope of 
rescue.  For centuries, the shifting sands of the North Carolina Outer Banks claimed hundreds of 
vessels, earning its nickname “the Graveyard of the Atlantic.”  It was on these narrow strands of 
barrier islands that, between 1874 and 1915, the United States Life Saving Service (USLSS) 
established twenty-nine stations along the North Carolina shoreline, becoming a major 
component of the area’s cultural landscape.  This thesis examines the development of the USLSS 
on the North Carolina coast and will specifically focus on the role of risk management and the 
Service’s overall effect on wrecking patterns.   
This thesis utilizes two distinct theoretical approaches regarding the study of risk and its 
affect on society, Anthony Giddens's Theory of Structuration and Stephen Crook’s risk 
management strategies. Through the utilization of these two theoretical frameworks, one can 
examine the element of risk as a measurable entity that commanded considerable importance in 
 the development of the USLSS and the subsequent effects on local wrecking patterns. Through 
the use of statistical and geospatial analysis, this thesis identifies quantifiable measures of risk in 
the operations of the USLSS and gauges the effects of risk on local wrecking patterns within a 
fifteen-mile radius of Oregon Inlet, NC.    
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the 1870s bloated corpses, splintered masts, and floating cargoes often littered 
the isolated beaches of the Eastern United States, becoming a tragic but nearly ubiquitous sight. 
For those in peril upon the seas, the icy grip of death often consumed sailors with little hope of 
rescue.  For millennia, their only chance of surviving a wreck or disaster lay with the solemn 
duty of his fellow seafarers to provide assistance.  While foundering upon the high seas often 
meant imminent death, the prospect of wrecking upon the shore also held little hope for any 
assistance.  The shifting shoals and isolated barrier islands of the North Carolina Outer Banks 
provide an example of the dangers of an unpredictable and isolated shoreline.  Since vessels first 
explored the area, the waters off the coast of North Carolina have been identified as a dangerous 
area.  Becoming the final resting place for numerous vessels, the area quickly earned its 
nickname “the Graveyard of the Atlantic.”   
While many wrecks occurred offshore, the vast majority occurred within sight of land, 
often only a few hundred yards from the relative safety of the beach.  A lack of organized life-
saving efforts in the early history of the United States insured that many sailors and passengers 
perished attempting to swim the treacherous breakers to the shore, often within view of local 
residents.  These souls arrived lifeless corpses, to be buried anonymously amongst the dunes.  
Unfortunately, this scenario occurred nearly continuously along the North Carolina coast well 
into the nineteenth century until the development and deployment of the United States Life-
Saving Service (USLSS).  The USLSS, operating along the North Carolina coast between 1874 
and 1915 as the predecessor to the modern Coast Guard, became the first federally funded life-
saving organization in the United States.  Operating under the unofficial motto that: “you have to 
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go out, but you don’t have to come back,” the members of the USLSS provided a small beacon 
of hope piercing the otherwise dark abyss of an often angry sea (Bennett 1998:2). 
This study will analyze, through both historical and archaeological research, the effects of 
the USLSS on the North Carolina coast between 1876 and 1915.  Specifically, this study will 
address the role of the perception of risk in both the development of the USLSS along the Outer 
Banks and the subsequent effect on local wrecking patterns.  A secondary and equally important 
component of this study seeks to determine any potential effect of the USLSS stations on the 
presence of wrecks and whether or not the sailor’s knowledge of the locations of individual 
stations along the shoreline may have actually influenced the formation of concentrations of 
shipwrecks along the coast.  Given the choice, many captains may have placed the lives of their 
passengers and crew in the hands of a nearby USLSS station as opposed to taking their chances 
in deeper water.  A third component will also seek to identify specific challenges and events 
occurring along the North Carolina Outer Banks, such as the wrecks of USS Huron and 
Metropolis, and their possible affects on the development of the USLSS. 
This chapter will first introduce the site selection process and previous research on the 
subject.  Next, the two socio-cultural paradigms that provide the theoretical framework for this 
endeavor, Anthony Giddens’s Theory of Structuration and Stephen Crook’s Ordering of Risk, 
will be defined and discussed.  Following the establishment of the theoretical foundations of this 
survey, the study’s overall objectives and significance will be identified along with the primary 
and secondary research questions.  Finally, the research methodology guiding the survey as well 
as the thesis structure will be outlined in some detail.   
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The Graveyard Under the Microscope: Site Selection  
 Since vessels first plied the waters off the North Carolina coast, the area has earned the 
nickname “Graveyard of the Atlantic.”  Spanning 301 of miles in length, this stretch of coastline 
has become the final resting place for thousands of vessels since European contact (Stick 1952, 
NOAA 1975).  While the study of the entire North Carolina coastline would be intriguing, the 
undertaking at this point would be daunting and is better approached with this exploratory study.  
Thus, to generate a more manageable dataset, a smaller but significant stretch of coastline near 
Oregon Inlet was chosen as a suitable research area to highlight the early development of the 
USLSS along the North Carolina coast. 
Oregon Inlet was formed as a result of a major hurricane on September 7, 1846.  The 
inlet, earning its name from the steamboat Oregon when it successfully traversed the Inlet in 
June 1848, quickly became a major thoroughfare for both coasting and sea-going vessels (Watts 
1992:24, 28; Krivor 2003:1,10-11).  This new waterway provided vital access to the Atlantic 
Ocean from the Pamlico Sound and Roanoke Island.  Despite the existence of this new channel, 
its currents, shallow depth and shifting sand bars made navigation difficult as the area became 
known for being hazardous to vessels.  When the U.S. Coast Survey first mapped Oregon Inlet in 
1849, three wrecks had already occurred within the inlet, attesting to the hazards of the new 
passageway (Watts 1992:28).  While these early losses garnered the interest of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, budgetary confinements prevented any improvement to the channel until 
1950 (Watts 1992:36).  Congress did however provide for the construction of a lighthouse 
located just to the south of Oregon Inlet on Bodie Island in 1847 (completed in 1848).  After the 
original lighthouse fell into disrepair, another appropriation was made for a second, much larger 
lighthouse located just north of Oregon Inlet that began operations in July 1859 (Watts 1992:30).   
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 As the American Civil War engulfed the nation, the areas near Oregon Inlet were left 
largely unscathed by battle.  While retreating Confederate forces did destroy the lighthouse at 
Bodie Island, very little action occurred within the immediate vicinity of the inlet.  This can be 
attributed to the fact that the inlet, now lacking the aids to navigation that were vital to traversing 
the shoals, was deemed too dangerous to approach.  As a result, the remainder of U.S. Naval 
operations focused on the capture of Hatteras Inlet and the subsequent attack on Roanoke Island.  
Despite the lack of interest in Oregon Inlet, several vessels were lost in its vicinity including 
Oriental (1862), Crocus (1863), and Ashland (1865) (Stick 1952:247; Watts 1992:33). 
  After the conclusion of the American Civil War, the use of Oregon Inlet and the dangers 
of utilizing it gradually increased.  While the lighthouse on Bodie Island was rebuilt in 1871, the 
inlet still proved difficult to navigate.  The mounting losses of both vessels and life in the vicinity 
of Oregon Inlet eventually garnered the interest of the federal government.  In response to these 
losses, the northern coast of North Carolina became the location of some of the first USLSS 
stations in the state.  In 1874 the head of Life-Saving Operations, Sumner Increase Kimball, 
placed seven new stations along the northernmost sections of the North Carolina Outer Banks 
including one at Jones Hill, Little Kinnakeet, Chicamacomico, Bodie Island, Kitty Hawk Beach, 
Nags Head, and Caffey’s Inlet.  Additional stations were constructed in the area during the 1878-
1879 season following the disasters of the steamships USS Huron (1878) and Metropolis (1879) 
and as needed throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries (FIGURE 1.1).   
 Oregon Inlet, well known for its shifting shoals and dangerous navigation, was largely 
avoided prior to the existence of both aids to navigation and the USLSS along the North Carolina 
coastline.  This, combined with the fact that the USLSS has had a presence in the area from the 
Service’s establishment within the state, makes Oregon Inlet an ideal candidate for research. 
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FIGURE 1.1.  Maps depicting the construction of USLSS stations along the North Carolina coast 
in 1874 and 1878 respectively (Mobley 1994:29, 81) 
For the purposes of this study, an area was chosen within a 15-mile radius of Oregon Inlet 
spanning from the town of Nags Head in the north to Chicamacomico in the south.  This research 
area encompasses six USLSS stations constructed between 1874 and 1882 (FIGURE 1.2).     
 While the approximate locations of each USLSS station are documented as degree, 
minute, and second readings of latitude and longitude, within each of the Annual Reports of the 
Life-Saving Service as well as in many contemporary coast pilots, charts, and other documents 
available to mariners at the time, the exact position of each of these stations would be required 
for entry into a GIS for this study.  Therefore, in the summer of 2010, all but one of the former 
USLSS stations was physically located.  Each site was then photographed and its position plotted 
utilizing a Garmin handheld GPS unit.  All readings were taken using the World Geodetic 
System (WGS) 84 datum.  Some remnants of many of the stations remained in their original 
locations while only one, the station at New Inlet, could not be located due to shoreline erosion. 
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FIGURE 1.2.  Google Earth image adopted by author to show the approximate locations of 
USLSS stations within the established research area.   
Previous Research 
Despite the Service’s perceived importance amongst the maritime community, relatively few 
holistic works have been completed on the topic. Previous works generally focus on extremely 
narrow aspects of the Service such as the design of life-saving apparatus, major wrecks involving the 
USLSS, station construction and architecture, or the heroic acts of individuals or crews (Stackpole 
1972; Bennett 1976; Osborne 1981; Gonzalez 1982; Friday 1988; Noble 1989; Canfield and Allan 
1991; Mobley 1994; Stonehouse 1994; Claflin 1998, 1999, 2001; Weatherford 1999; Pinyerd 2000; 
Trapani 2002; Field 2003).  Very few works focus specifically on the development of the USLSS as 
an organization (York 1983; Noble 1987, 1994) and even fewer apply an interdisciplinary approach 
to their research (Bennett 1976, 1998; Shanks and York 1996; McKinnon 2010).  Of these works, 
the vast majority rarely includes attempts to apply interdisciplinary approaches to their analysis.  
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While these works generally contribute to the overall knowledge base regarding the history of the 
USLSS, they often lack a holistic approach that could shed light not only on the individual stations, 
keepers, and crews of the USLSS, but how society perceived maritime risk and how the United 
States government responded to it.   
Theory 
 Given the history of the USLSS along the North Carolina coastline, it is apparent that 
hazards and how risk is managed directly affected the development of the Service along the 
coast.  This study will use two distinct theoretical approaches regarding the study of risk and its 
effect on society; Giddens’s (1984) Theory of Structuration and Crook’s (1999) ideas regarding 
ordering risk and risk management strategies. Through the utilization of these two frameworks, 
one can examine the element of risk as a measurable entity that commanded considerable 
importance in the development of the USLSS and the subsequent effects on local wrecking 
patterns.   
This approach was pioneered in Brad Duncan’s honors thesis Signposts in the Sea: An 
Investigation of the Shipwreck Patterning and Cultural Seascapes of the Gippsland Region, 
Victoria (2000).  While working with wreck patterns of merchant ships in the Gippsland region 
of Australia, Duncan successfully developed a method for identifying cultural seascapes and how 
risk affects them.  This study will apply a heavily modified version of Duncan’s methodology to 
identify the affect risk played on the development of the USLSS along the North Carolina coast. 
 Objectives, Importance, and Research Questions  
This study compiles both primary and secondary sources documenting the many disasters 
occurring within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet, NC between 1876 and 1915 creating a reference 
dataset that provides invaluable insight into the numbers and types of vessels wrecking in the 
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area.  Furthermore, plotting the historic locations of each disaster occurring within the research 
area aids in understanding both the extent of wrecking activity and any changes in wrecking 
patterns over time.  These changes in disaster activity can be attributed to the concept of risk in 
both the development of the USLSS along the North Carolina Outer Banks and its subsequent 
effects on wrecking patterns.  Giddens’s Theory of Structuration and Crook’s Risk Ordering 
strategies, when applied to historical data maintained by the USLSS and current archaeological 
surveys, introduces new ways to interpret the history of the Service and potentially influence 
future cultural resource management practices in coastal regions.   
Just as no one historical event could define a society, no one particular disaster can define 
the relationship between the USLSS and the communities of the Outer Banks.  As such, it is 
important to view the USLSS for what it was—a part of the local community and a major 
component to the area’s cultural landscape.  As the Service developed along the North Carolina 
coast, it created an interconnected line of Life-Saving stations that served as a catalyst for 
development in the region while highlighting issues relating to maritime salvage and government 
involvement along the Outer Banks.  While many Life-Saving stations were once viewed as a 
desolate and solitary intrusion onto the undeveloped beachfront, by the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries they had become the cornerstones of many fledgling communities in the area.  As 
families, churches, and schools converged upon these areas, local communities quickly became 
tied to the life-saving culture of the area assisting in rescues, sheltering survivors, and burying 
the dead.  It is this local connection that is often overshadowed and lost to the annals of history 
that can only be rediscovered through the study of the development of the USLSS along the 
North Carolina Outer Banks and the area’s local heritage.      
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 Just as the USLSS acted as the backbone to many early beach communities along the 
North Carolina Outer Banks, the Service held equal influence along coasts around the country.  
From the birthplace of the USLSS along the coasts of New Jersey down to the houses of refuge 
along the Florida panhandle and from the ventures of the Service along the then poorly charted 
waters off the west coast to the life-boat stations along the coasts of the fresh water oceans that 
make up the Great Lakes, the USLSS stood watch in stormy and uncertain seas.  In each of these 
locations, the Life-Saving stations and houses of refuge often acted as beacons in the night and 
salvation in times of peril while establishing themselves as important components of the area’s 
cultural landscape.  The records pertaining to operations of the USLSS in these communities 
serve as an immensely valuable dataset that can help shed light on the cultural landscapes and 
maritime history of any area in which the USLSS had a presence.   
While the annals of the USLSS are often filled with harrowing tales of rescue and could 
undoubtedly be studied in numerous ways, this research applies historic and geospatial analysis 
in terms of the role risk may have played in their development and evolution over time.  The 
specific research questions addressed in this study include: 
 Primary 
- What relationship, if any, does the role of risk management play in the 
creation, development and evolution of the USLSS on the North Carolina 
Outer Banks? 
- What relationship, if any, did the physical presence of the USLSS have on 
local wrecking patterns along the North Carolina coast? 
 
Secondary 
- Can contemporary ideas involving risk and socio-cultural theory be 
effectively applied to historical events? 
- According to the archaeological and historical record, was the USLSS 
proactive or reactive in their responses to wrecks?  
- What effects did major incidents with high losses of life such as the sinking of 
USS Huron and Metropolis have on the development of the Service? 
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- Is there a correlation between training/funding and reported loss of life on 
wrecks responded to by the men of the USLSS? 
 
Research Methodology 
 In order to study the effect risk has on both the development of the USLSS and the 
correlating effects on wrecking patterns, this study proposes a three-pronged approach in its 
research design.  First, historical research was conducted to identify the histories of the 
individual USLSS stations and wrecks within this established study area.  This research will 
focus specifically on the establishment, funding, training, and organization of the USLSS system 
along the North Carolina Outer Banks and the rescues performed by these stations.  Second, the 
archaeological component of this investigation will be to determine the known location for each 
USLSS station and each shipwreck within the study areas and enter those coordinates into a 
geographic information system (GIS).  Finally, analysis will involve incorporating both historical 
and archaeological data into the GIS system in order to identify any correlations that may be 
present.   
Thesis Structure 
 The generalist approach of this study requires research be conducted through various 
means in order to accurately determine the role of risk in the development of the USLSS and the 
subsequent effects of risk on local wrecking patterns in the vicinity of Oregon Inlet.  Chapter 
Two, Identifying Risk, discusses the concept of risk and defines the two primary avenues of 
socio-cultural theory used in this work.  Discussion of these paradigms lays the foundation for 
this study by defining risk and the ways in which it may affect society.  While this chapter 
explores the potential roles of risk in society, it does not explain how to go about quantifying and 
measuring that risk.  This concept is, however, discussed in Chapter Three. 
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 Chapter Three, Measuring Risk, discusses the various avenues of research conducted in 
order to quantify and measure the effects of risk on the development of the USLSS and local 
wrecking patterns.  This chapter specifically references the archives, websites, and publications 
utilized in order to conduct the historic research performed in this study.  This chapter also 
discusses the integration of historic data into a geographic information system (GIS) for 
additional geospatial analysis.  While this chapter details the steps and procedures used to 
conduct historical research, it does not discuss any findings, which will be examined in Chapters 
Four, Five, and Six.   
  Chapter Four, Ship Ashore: Formation of the USLSS documents the development of the 
USLSS from a string of volunteer organizations to the first federally funded shore-based life-
saving service in the United States.  Chapter Five, Identifying National and Regional Trends, is a 
statistical breakdown of figures recorded by the USLSS between 1876 and 1915 that may be 
indicative of risk in shipping.  This chapter will then provide a basic understanding of both 
national/regional trends in shipping disasters as well as a general idea of the Service’s 
operational scope.   
Chapter Six, Local Wrecking Patterns, culls information regarding disaster activity 
occurring within the research area directly from contemporary regional datasets maintained by 
the USLSS that were examined in Chapter Five.  This data, while never analyzed by the USLSS, 
holds vital information concerning local wrecking patterns within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet, 
NC and sets the stage for geospatial analysis performed in the following section.  
 Chapter Seven, X Marks the Spot; Geospatial Analysis of Historic Data, discusses the 
application of data pertaining to local wrecking patterns into a GIS system.  The purpose of this 
procedure is twofold.  First, it allows analysis of historic data that would otherwise be difficult 
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through traditional research methods.  Secondly, the chapter provides a visual representation of 
the geographical extents and movement of wreck data over time.  This portion of the analysis is 
vital in understanding the effects of risk on local wrecking patterns.  In this chapter, the primary 
research questions posed by this study are answered and the secondary questions addressed.  
These conclusions, along with the study’s limitations and avenues for future research, are 
discussed in the final chapter. 
CHAPTER TWO: MEASURING RISK 
One of the primary goals of maritime archaeology is to identify convincing linkages 
between the physical association represented by shipwrecks and the social institutions that 
helped create them (Gould 2011:24).  While the development of the USLSS along the North 
Carolina coast represents only one of a number of factors contributing to the area’s overall 
cultural landscape, studying the establishment and subsequent evolution of the Service 
thematically can shed light on patterns significantly contributing to both the area’s physical and 
cultural landscape.  Thematic studies are most often described as generalist, approach shifting 
archaeological interest from the “site” to the “idea” and is often characterized by their focus on 
behavioral issues and avoidance of singular sites (Richards 2005).  Despite the fact that thematic 
surveys have been successfully used in terrestrial investigations, there are several difficulties in 
approaching thematic studies in maritime contexts. 
This chapter will address these difficulties while establishing the theoretical framework 
used for this study starting with a discussion of the merits of a generalist approach to thematic 
studies.   It is here that the many issues affecting these studies in maritime archaeological 
investigations will be outlined and addressed.  Next, the concept of risk in society will be 
introduced and developed as it pertains to the development of the USLSS and wrecking patterns 
along the North Carolina coast.  It is at this point that the two primary socio-cultural approaches 
forming the theoretical framework for this study are introduced.  The next section discusses the 
first of these ideas, Giddens’s Theory of Structuration defining the basic principles and 
terminology while the final section of this chapter discusses the Crook’s work on risk 
management strategies.   
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An Argument for a Generalist Approach 
Current academic interest regarding the United States Life-Saving Service tend to focus 
on relatively narrow aspects of the Service’s history and is generally restricted to works 
depicting the tales of notable wrecks, rescues, station architecture, or individual rescuers along 
with some general histories of the Service while neglecting other holistic approaches. One 
notable exception is Jennifer McKinnon’s 2010 dissertation in which she applied the 
anthropological concept of “liminality” (defined as the study of transitional uses) to the 
archaeological investigations of several USLSS houses of refuge along the Florida coast.   While 
there are some exceptions to this trend, the historiography of the USLSS consistently excludes 
generalist approaches that may yield valuable academic information that is otherwise unavailable 
through current research.   
 There are two possible explanations for this possible academic neglect.  The first is the 
tradition of both maritime historians and maritime archaeologists to focus on individual sites.  
The study of maritime cultural resources provides invaluable insights into the communities that 
created them and are often considered direct reflections or byproducts of the culture/society at 
the time (Lenihan 1983:50; Richards 2005, 2008; Gould 2011).  These reflections may, however, 
be too complicated to be determined from the study of a single wreck.  The incorrect analogy 
describing a shipwreck as a closed archaeological site has promoted a particularist approach in 
maritime archaeology and has effectively limited academic interest in pursuing broad and 
comparative approaches (Murphy 1983:66).   
The generalist approach utilized in this study is an attempt to transition away from a 
particularist approach focusing on individual sites as opposed to attempting to define larger scale 
trends and patterns) that is traditionally advocated in the field of maritime archaeology.  This 
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approach is a product of the development of maritime archaeology as a discipline with what 
some may consider murky theoretical foundations.  The discipline’s early history and the reasons 
behind the prevalence of the particularist approach are well documented (see Gould 1983; 
Lenihan 1983; Murphy 1983; Watson 1983).  It is argued by many that studies guided by 
particularist principles, those focusing on a particular wreck or set of wrecks, may not be the 
most productive manner in which to research shipwrecks (Watson 1983:32).   
These particularist studies, while vital in the collection of comparative data and the study 
of individual sites, do not allow for regional observations regarding shipwreck patterning or 
general observations examining the human behavior behind wrecking activity to be made.  By 
utilizing a generalist approach to answer questions about society, maritime archaeologists have 
the capability to “inform and enlarge our general view of man’s relationship to his maritime 
environment” (Gould 1983:5).  There has been a belief that relatively few generalist studies have 
proven the theoretical validity of their arguments as evidenced by the lack of well-designed 
projects with published results (Watson 1983:36).  Generalist approaches however, may assist in 
the process of conceptualizing the cause and effect relationships between human processes and 
the development of maritime archaeological sites (Richards 2008:2). 
 There is, however, growing interest in applying more generalist approaches to traditional 
maritime history in an attempt to better understand the human element that helped to create it, 
especially in wreck-prone areas such as the North Carolina Outer Banks or the Great Lakes 
(Murphy 1983:85; Richards 2008; Wagner 2010; Bright 2012; Jones 2012).  This idea advocates 
the study of not only a single individual site, but also the external factors that aided in its 
formation as a site.  Larry Murphy supports this approach in his work on utilizing shipwrecks as  
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indicators of human behavior; 
Archaeology of shipwrecks should not merely [be] the embellishment of the maritime 
historical record, but the elucidation of otherwise unattainable aspects of human 
behavior.  The combination of shipwreck archaeology with the methodologies of other 
disciplines will result in the authentic reconstruction of behavior patterns, and will permit 
the formulation of generalities regarding maritime life-ways and social processes 
(Murphy 1983:62). 
 
In their work on theoretical approaches in maritime archaeology, Lawrence Babits and Hans Van 
Tilburg advocate a three-stage approach in maximizing the academic potential of maritime 
archaeological sites, stating that  
First, they [maritime sites] are sites and must be exploited to the fullest informational 
extent possible; second, sites of a given locality or type must be interrelated with each 
other to provide both interpretations and predictive modeling; finally, sites must be 
presented within interdisciplinary and regional, if not global perspectives to allow 
determinations of importance and provide better understanding of each individual site 
(Babits and Van Tilburg 1998:2). 
 
The generalist analysis of maritime archaeological sites, both individually and as groups, can 
provide researchers with information that may otherwise be unobtainable through more 
traditional survey of individual sites.   
There is, however, a second and equally limiting factor in conducting research into the 
United States Life-Saving Service along the North Carolina coast.  This factor could be merely 
defined as a marked lack of interest amongst the academic community.  This, however, would be 
a gross oversimplification of a more complex tradition in both maritime history and particularly 
in maritime archaeology in which there is commonly less interest in researching lesser known 
wrecks or phenomena.  This is often due to the fact that maritime archaeology, particularly 
shipwreck archaeology, is considered the archaeology of the event, in which a vessel or site is 
considered a “time capsule” that represents a relatively closed site (or a site with minimal post-
depositional intrusions).  This site type is a rare occurrence in terrestrial archaeology.  The events 
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that lead to the creation of maritime archaeological sites are often catastrophic in nature (battles, 
storms, ice, fires, and explosions) or involve prominent historical figures (naval officers, pirates, 
and life-savers) that often capture the imaginations of the general public (both contemporary and 
modern) while romanticizing the history of a particular site to the extent that archaeological sites 
can be “valued” more for their popularity or ability to attract media attention (and therefore 
donor dollars) rather than their historical significance.   
Research of the United States Life-Saving Service may be a victim of differential 
treatment due to its lack of popularity with modern historians.  The first Life-Saving Service 
operated under the direction of the United States Revenue Marine (USRM) within the 
Department of the Treasury from 1848 until 1878 when it was reorganized as an independent 
entity within that department.  While the men of the USLSS were often hailed as gallant soldiers 
of the surf during their time in the Service, their deeds were lost to historians after the USRM 
and the USLSS combined to form the United States Coast Guard (USCG) in 1915 (Krietemeyer 
2000:8).  Both the USCG and its seagoing predecessor, the USRM, often held the interest of 
historians with romanticized tales of Arctic exploration, or the Revenue Marine’s participation in 
foreign naval engagements which often outshone the domestic rescues performed by the men of 
the Life-Saving Service.  As such, academic interest has remained focused on the development 
of the nation’s seagoing and military organizations.  This disparity is even more pronounced with 
smaller organizations within the United States Government such as the Steamboat Inspection 
Service or the Navigation Service that are deemed vital for the development of the country, yet 
lack the enthralling appeal of a oceangoing military service. 
In his work on human behavior and ship graveyards, Nathan Richards notes that vessel 
abandonment was a similarly under-researched and under-appreciated subject most likely due to 
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particularist and site-specific research methodology combined with a lack of academic interest 
(Richards 2008:4-6).  While similar surveys on vessel abandonment’s had been completed by 
that time, none had become as well developed and lacked the interest required for continued 
funding or research.  He also argues that a comparative approach to maritime archaeological sites 
combined with broad theoretical foundations may provide further opportunities to research 
undervalued sites.  The same can be said of the current state of research regarding the United 
States Life-Saving Service.  Within the volumes of history written on the USLSS, the vast 
majority narrowly focuses on notable individuals, events, or the development of the Service as a 
whole.  It is here, that it can be argued that this approach can be utilized in explaining how the 
concept of risk, and how human beings react to risk, was influential in the establishment, 
development, and evolution of the United States Life-Saving Service along the North Carolina 
Outer Banks.      
Defining Risk 
 To most, risk is simply identified as the potential for a negative or undesirable outcome 
that is usually synonymous with the terms hazard or danger (Fox 1999:1).  For the purposes of 
this study, however, a better definition of risk may be the, “systematic way of dealing with 
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernity [modern society] itself” (Beck 
1992:21).  Beck’s definition provides a more insightful definition of the term, in that it explains 
the actual purpose of risk in society.  Risk can be seen as a driving force in many of the decisions 
individuals make throughout the course of their day-to-day lives.  Whereas the concept of risk 
may be most familiar only as a factor in personal decision-making, it can be much more 
influential in larger systems throughout society.  For example, risk may be so influential that it 
affects the development and evolution of archaeological landscapes.  This concept of risk, and 
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strategies to manage that risk, can be identified as a major factor in the establishment, 
development, and evolution of the USLSS along the North Carolina coastline.  Furthermore, it is 
possible that the concept of risk within both the USLSS as an organization and the maritime 
community operating off the North Carolina coast was influential enough to be apparent in the 
archaeological record. 
In his 2000 honors thesis Signposts in the Sea: An Investigation of the Shipwreck 
Patterning and Cultural Seascapes of the Gippsland Region, Victoria, Brad Duncan developed a 
methodology to examine the behavioral responses to risk in the development of a socio-
economic seascape in southern Australia.  In his endeavors, Duncan uses the two previously 
mentioned theoretical paradigms to frame his work; Giddens’s Theory of Structuration and 
Crook’s risk management strategies.  Each of these theoretical paradigms will be discussed in 
detail below.  
Structuration Theory Defined 
 In his 1984 work The Constitution of Society, sociologist Anthony Giddens outlines his 
Theory of Structuration.  Structuration Theory, like many other theories in the social sciences, 
attempts to explain how human beings make decisions within the structure of their own society 
while emphasizing reflexive, or circular (cause and effect) relationships between the individual 
(often referred to as the “actor” or “agent”) and various structures within a given society.  This 
particular sociological paradigm can be seen as being similar to other social theories which 
posited a recursive relation between social structure and agency, Marxism being one of the most 
well known.  Giddens’s Theory of Structuration however, unlike Marxism, views self-interest as 
more deeply embedded within culture and agency as invested in the individual, rather than in 
classes or in interest groups (Trigger 2006:469).  It is this fact, combined with Giddens’s 
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argument that structures within societies are reflexive in nature, that Giddens’s Theory can be 
effectively applied to the development of the United States Life-Saving Service.   
Agent and Agency 
 Karl Marx (1852:15) wrote, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing 
already, given and transmitted from the past.”  While many of Marx’s own theories would be 
driven by the effects of industrialization, capitalism, and the inequalities of class society his 
quote unequivocally describes Giddens’s Theory of Structuration.  In describing Giddens’s 
theory, it is best to start from the smallest, yet most influential element of his idea, the individual.  
Giddens argues that all human beings (agents) are knowledgeable in that they know a great deal 
about the conditions in which they live, and most of the consequences of the actions the perform 
in their day to day lives.  The term “agent” has been defined as “one who exerts power or 
produces effect” while “knowlegability” refers to everything that the actor believes about the 
circumstances of their action (Giddens 1984:375).  Here, “agency” concerns events of which the 
agent is the perpetrator, in the sense that at any given point in that individual’s decision-making 
process, that individual made a conscious decision and could have acted differently (Giddens 
1984:9).  Giddens further argues that while agents are free to make decisions governing their 
day-to-day activities, their decisions are bounded by both what he calls “the unconscious” and by 
the unacknowledged conditions or unintended consequences of their action (Giddens 1984:282).     
Consciousness 
How individual actors come to make a decision, the subsequent effects of that decision, 
and how that actor uses the effects of that decision in future decision-making forms the core of 
Structuration Theory.  In order to understand how individual actors make informed decisions, 
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one must have an elementary knowledge of psychoanalytic theory and the conscious mind.  
Giddens’s concept of consciousness varies somewhat significantly from those of traditional 
psychoanalytic thought.  In his work, Giddens identifies three distinct types of consciousness that 
affect the development of Structuration Theory.   
The term “conscious” traditionally refers to the ability to register a range of surrounding 
stimuli (Giddens 1984:44).  When discussing states of consciousness and unconsciousness, most 
immediately associate these terms with the above definition.  This, however, is not true when 
discussed within the social sciences, and especially when discussing psychoanalytic theory.  
Giddens notes that there are times in which individuals are aware of the situations going on 
around them in such a way that they are able to relate their activity to those situations (i.e. being 
able to perceive and modify their behavior to react to external stimuli).  Giddens sees this as an 
example of reflexive monitoring of conduct by human agents in what he calls “practical 
conscious.”  Giddens defines practical consciousness as “what actors know (believe) about social 
conditions, including the conditions of their own action, but cannot express discursively” 
(Giddens 1984:375).  In other words, actors are knowledgeable of their actions, yet they cannot 
articulate their actions verbally.  In contrast, “discursive consciousness” is described as what 
actors are able to say regarding their social conditions, particularly the conditions of their own 
action.  Simply stated, the difference between practical and discursive consciousness is simply 
the ability to verbally articulate one’s own actions.    
The term “unconscious” in psychoanalytic theory refers to the inability to “give verbal 
expression to the promptings of action” (Giddens differentiates the terms unconscious as the 
biological state from “the unconscious” that acts as a boundary limiting the human decision-
making process.)  He goes on to state that “the unconscious” can only be understood in terms of 
22 
 
memory and perception where perceptions are to be understood as a format whereby the 
temporality of experience is continually processed. This is different from the concept of memory 
which can be described as those perceptions unconsciously selected by the agent to be committed 
and later be recalled and used in future decision-making (Giddens 1984:45).   
Giddens argues that while practical consciousness involves recall to which the agent has 
access in the durée of action, the unconscious refers to modes of recall to which the agent does 
not have direct access.  This is due to the fact that Giddens indicates that there is a psychological 
mechanism preventing the agent from incorporating this information into future decision-
making.  He identifies these barriers as the agent’s various defense mechanisms and repressions 
by which anxiety is controlled and prevents discursive formulation.  This concept is important to 
understand, as risk management strategies could be considered one of these anxiety-limiting 
defense mechanisms.  One of the most influential of these defense mechanisms is the 
“routinization” of social life.  Giddens defines routinization as the habitual character of the vast 
majority of social activities which is both produced and supported by a sense of ontological 
security or a sense of confidence that the social worlds are as they appear to be (Giddens 
1984:375-376).   He argues that it is through the study of day-to-day life that an integral analysis 
of the reproduction of institutionalized practices, including the reflexive monitoring of those 
institutions, can be completed.      
Consequences and Reflexivity 
   Giddens defines consequences simply as events that occur through the acts of the agent.  
There are, however, two primary types of consequences that hold vastly different meanings in 
Structuration Theory.  Agency, as discussed previously, refers not to the intentions people have 
in doing things, but rather, their capability of doing those things in the first place.  He claims that 
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action is not a series of unrelated events, but rather a continuous process in which reflexive 
monitoring controls actors throughout their day-to-day lives.  Agency, therefore, places equal 
importance on both the intended and unintended consequences of an agent’s actions (Giddens 
1984:8-9).   
 Giddens defines an intentional act as one that its perpetrator knows, or believes, will have 
a particular quality or outcome and where such knowledge is used to achieve this outcome 
(Giddens 1976:76).  While many may argue that actions speak louder than words in regards to 
the intended effects of intentional action, what is to be said of the unintended consequences of 
intentional conduct and how does that affect the perception of risk and future decision-making 
processes?   Giddens (1984:12) argues that one of the primary aims of identifying “latent 
functions” (unintended consequences) is to show that apparently irrational social activities may 
not be so irrational after all.  The identification of both the intended and unintended 
consequences of a given situation is immensely important in recurring processes of evaluation 
known as “reflexive monitoring” that affects decision-making. Reflexive monitoring is a chronic 
function of everyday action that involves the continual examination not just of the individual but 
of others as well (Giddens 1984:5-6).  This process dictates that action is not a string of discrete 
acts, but a continuously evolving process, which, through the evaluation of both the intended and 
unintended consequences of intended actions, continuously affects the decision-making process.   
Structures, Systems, and Structuration 
While the manner in which individual actors function within society has been defined, 
how their conduct can reproduce the structural properties of larger collectives must be 
determined.  In other words, what effects do individuals have in reproducing cultural activities 
within social groups?  The term “collectives” is not necessarily synonymous with societies 
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because, as Giddens notes, societies are not necessarily identified as unified collectivities.  These 
collectives could also be seen as individual social systems within societies that possess their own 
rules and resources established within it.  The rules and resources that organize social systems, 
also known as “structures”, are recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems and 
exist only as memory traces, but are instantiated in action (Giddens 1984:377).  While structure 
describes the rules in which social conduct is performed within society, a system is described as 
the reproduced relations between actors or collectivities, organized as regular social practices 
(Giddens 1984:25, 377).   
The USLSS served as a form of structure within the maritime community (a collective) 
that provided rules and guidelines for social conduct performed within that particular collective.  
Through reflexive monitoring, the USLSS was able to collect, interpret, and utilize data on 
disaster activity to refocus its efforts as needed.  This process was repeated annually through the 
publication of the Service’s Annual Reports and could therefore be identified as a system in 
which relations between actors or collectivities are organized as regular social practices.    
  Giddens describes structure as both the medium and the outcome of the conduct it 
recursively organizes (i.e. it is both the mechanism and the product of social behavior).  In other 
words, structure refers to the explicit standards within a collective or society that is replicated 
only through the action of agents.  This is also known as the “duality of structure” and is a key 
component of Structuration Theory.  Language is an excellent example of the duality of structure 
within society.  No one chooses their first language, but it is generally passed on from the parents 
and instilled throughout childhood.  That being said, the grammatical rules of any one language 
constitutes an excellent example of a structure within a collective because it is both produced 
through teaching, experience, or repetition and is subsequently recursively reproduced through 
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its utilization.  An example of this can be seen in the usage of the terms ‘soda’ and ‘pop’ used to 
describe a carbonated beverage within different regions within the United States.  Each term, 
while referring to the same beverage, is learned through the structure within a collective (in this 
case, the child’s parents which make up a familial unit) within a particular geographic locale.  
The child’s subsequent utilization of one term or another can not only possibly indicate the 
geographic locale from which they originated, but it also reiterates the validity of either term 
within the language simply through its repetition.  Once either term ceases to be used within day-
to-day activity, however, it will soon be forgotten and will eventually fade into memory at which 
point it will only be in existence as long as it can be recalled in some way shape or form.  Once 
the term, or at least the meaning of the term, is no longer used in daily activity and can no longer 
be recalled through memory or through any other historical means, will forever disappear from 
existence much like the dead languages of the ancient past. 
 Giddens developed his Theory of Structuration as an attempt to address some 
fundamental problems in social theory by challenging previously established theoretical 
positions with his own unconventional ideas.  According to Giddens, society is structured 
through a series of rules and resources with which an agent (or actor) interacts.  Giddens goes on 
to define “rules” as practices that can be performed without being directly motivated.  Examples 
of rules can be seen in the mundane day-to-day conduct that is performed by individuals on a 
routine basis that create a structure or norm within society.  Giddens refers to resources as the 
bases of power to which the agent has access and has the ability to manipulate or influence the 
course of interactions with others (Giddens 1984:258).  Resources, therefore, act as a means to 
alter or transform social events.  These relationships imply that while the agent is constrained by 
the established norms of society through various rules, the agent has the ability to act freely (to a 
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certain degree) within these rules to enact change within them.  As such, Giddens’s Theory of 
Structuration provides an account of the constitution and evolution of social life through social 
praxis.  Social praxis can be defined as the nature, conditions, and consequences of historically 
and spatio-temporarally situated activities and interactions produced through the agency of social 
actors (Cohen 1989:1-2).  Agency, defined simply as human action, in turn alters preexisting 
social structures in an example of reflexive feedback.  
 Within his Theory of Structuration, Giddens argues that while individuals are constrained 
in their decision-making capabilities by various cultural, societal, and environmental conditions, 
an individual’s reaction to a given situation would also contain a given amount of personal 
choice (Giddens 1984:332-334).  These individual agents, while maintaining the freedom to 
make decisions regarding the conduct of their day-to-day lives, do so within the constraint of 
both the structures of his or her society, and their locale.  Society, and the structures within it, are 
reflexive in nature and are in a constant process of reevaluation and evolution.  As agents act 
within society, structures are in place to gather, process, and disseminate information that will 
then be used in future decision-making and thus transform the very structures that created it.        
Crook’s Risk Management Strategies 
 In his article entitled “Ordering Risks,” Stephen Crook advocated that societies identify, 
assess, and manage risk through a series of what he calls “orderings” and management strategies.  
Here, Crook defines orderings as, 
General frames or matrices within which models of order are projected and contested… 
the ordering practices collected under and oriented to orderings share with modes of 
‘regulation’ and techniques of ‘government’ the characteristic that the ‘orders’ they 
project are never finally achieved (Crook 1999:163). 
   
While Crook admits that his ideas regarding orderings are incomplete, he acknowledges 
that each ordering he has identified resonates with defining themes in contemporary socio-
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cultural analysis and distinctions between them appear to match empirically observable divisions 
within advanced societies (Crook 1999:164).  Crook identifies three main ordering strategies 
within his work that can be easily recognized as examples of Giddens’s ideas of structure thus 
helping to frame his ideas regarding regimes of risk management. 
Crook argues social dimensions of risk are revealed through the idea of “regimes” of 
identification, assessment, and management.  Crook defines regimes as extremely broad, 
historically contingent networks for the ordering of risk.  Examples of these regimes can be 
found in the discussion of reflexive monitoring that were a key element in the discussion of 
Giddens’s argument. Here, he identifies three primary, though not exhaustive, regimes of risk 
management and goes on to outline the main characteristics along with their main relations in 
modern societies. 
Two of Crook’s management strategies, “ordered” and “neo-liberal,” are specifically 
relevant to the discussion of risk and the USLSS.  Ordered risk management strategies focus on 
state attempts to regulate and eradicate risk within society (Crook 1999:170).  They generally 
attempt to limit the social exposure to risk through the prohibition or restriction of access to that 
hazard (Duncan 2000:29).  Crook notes that within an organized regime, the activities of the 
scientific and technical experts, inspectors, enforcement, and legislators do not simply process 
observed risk, but through surveillance and discipline, they routinely identify, assess, and 
manage risk (Crook 1999:171).  In other words, only the risks that are perceived through an 
established system can be managed.  Again, organized risk management provides yet another 
example of reflexive monitoring within a structured society.  Conversely, neo-liberal risk 
management strategies work to provide individuals with the means to identify and assess risk, 
but leaves them the ultimate decision of the acceptable amount of risk associated with a given 
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activity with that individual.  While government or regulatory organizations may still be heavily 
involved, their roles lay in the dissemination of information regarding risk rather than preventing 
exposure to it.   
An example of these two approaches can be seen in the prohibition of alcohol during the 
1920s.  The US government sought to reduce the risk of drinking alcohol by removing the option 
to consume it from the public.  This management strategy soon gave way to the neo-liberal 
management strategy of today in which the government disseminates information regarding the 
risks of consuming alcohol, but ultimately leaves the decision to consume it to the individual.  
Understanding the implications of each of these risk management regimes is vital when 
discussing risk, decision-making, and wrecking patterns along the North Carolina coastline.     
Conclusions 
While both Giddens’s Theory of Structuration and Crook’s ideas concerning risk 
management strategies are both commonly referenced when discussing the role of risk in socio-
cultural theory, these theories may also be applicable to questions regarding risk management in a 
historical or anthropological context.  Duncan identified both Giddens and Crook as being 
complementary to one another in providing a framework with which to examine the use of a 
maritime environment for signs of dynamic social structuring at least partially determined by risk 
mitigation strategies while recognizing the ability of members of that society to directly influence its 
structure (Duncan 2000:29-30).  While Duncan utilized this theory to examine the evolution of a 
maritime cultural landscape through an economic filter, his idea to apply Giddens and Crook to a 
maritime landscape may be even more insightful if applied to the development of the USLSS given 
the amount and prevalence of risk inherent in its day-to-day operations.   
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 Social systems are dynamic and subject to constant change. Giddens’s and Crook’s ideas 
both concern the manner in which both individuals and systems identify, assess, and manage risk 
in daily life.  These theories also identify reflexive mechanisms in which information regarding 
risk can be evaluated and reintroduced as a component of decision-making processes.  These 
theories, therefore, have implications in describing the role of risk in both the development of the 
USLSS and local wrecking patterns along the North Carolina Outer Banks.  As an inherently 
reflexive organization, the information gathered in the Service’s reports were analyzed and 
disseminated throughout the maritime community, actively molding that community’s concept of 
risk.  The manipulation of that community’s concept or risk, in turn, affected the decision-
making processes of those navigating in the area and, therefore, directly influenced the 
development of local wrecking patterns.
    
 CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
In order to successfully determine the role risk played in both the development of the 
USLSS along the North Carolina coast and its subsequent effects on local wrecking patterns, a 
research methodology encompassing the study area’s unique culture, history, and resources was 
required.  Given the fact that at the height of its operations, the USLSS operated a total of 29 
life-saving stations along the North Carolina coast, the scope of this survey was first narrowed to 
allow for the collection of a manageable dataset.  Once a research area was established at Oregon 
Inlet, historical research was conducted to gather location and statistical information regarding 
both the disasters occurring within the study area and the USLSS assets rendering assistance.  
The general development of the USLSS is also examined in regards to the Service’s application 
of technology in life-saving operations and the creation, management, and utilization of its own 
records in decision-making.  Next, the locations of shipwrecks occurring within the field of 
USLSS operations along with the positions of individual life-saving stations were recorded as 
shapefiles within a GIS.  The final portion of the study entailed the statistical and geospatial 
analysis of these maritime disasters within the research area to identify any correlations with the 
development of the Life-Saving Service along the North Carolina coast.    
Historical Research 
Historical research for this study was conducted with two main objectives in 
mind.  First, the USLSS, as an organization, is discussed focusing on both the construction, 
development, and evolution of individual stations as well as the development and application of 
new technologies within the Service that may have affected life-saving operations.  Secondly, 
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historical research was conducted to identify each vessel in distress that required assistance 
within the study area. 
Primary Sources 
 The United States Life-Saving Service was initiated as a department within the United 
States Revenue Marine under the direction of the Treasury Department in 1871.  In 1873 the 
entire Service was overhauled as a set of rules, regulations, and standard operating procedures 
for the new organization were developed.  This new organizational structure was originally 
outlined in the Annual Report of the Chief of the U.S. Revenue Marine Bureau for the Fiscal 
Year Ending June 30, 1873 showing the Operations of the Revenue Marine and the Life-Saving 
Service in 1874.  These promulgations set forth the standard operating procedures for the first 
life-saving stations constructed along the North Carolina coast.  The USLSS did not begin to 
publish their own annual reports until 1876, two years before becoming an independent entity 
within the Treasury Department.  These reports, which were produced annually between 1876 
and 1915, have been digitized and posted by both the U.S. Life-Saving Service Association and 
Google Books and provide a detailed account of the operations of the Service.  Each report 
provided specific details regarding the construction, replacement, and improvements to stations 
built each fiscal year, new technologies tested and adopted for use within the Service, and 
detailed statistics regarding the expenditures of the Service, and the vessels requiring assistance.  
The vast majority of the information contained within these annals is organized by districts and 
includes systematic analysis of statistics for each district as well as cumulative information for 
the entire Service. 
 Along with gathering information regarding USLSS operations, these annals provide a 
primary source documenting the evolution of the Service.  This information was then used to 
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create a timeline of events that may have affected life-saving operations along the North Carolina 
coast.  By knowing when new technologies such as telegraph and telephone lines, the use of the 
international signal codes at stations, and more advanced life-saving apparatus were 
implemented, a comparative analysis may be undertaken to determine any correlation between 
the implementation of a new technology and local wrecking patterns.  
 Once a viable research area was established, a list of disasters occurring within the 
operations of the USLSS was determined by scouring the Annual Reports of the United States 
Life-Saving Service from 1876 to 1915.  From these records, it was determined that 133 vessels 
received assistance from the USLSS in some way within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet between 
1876 and 1915.  These records provide diagnostic information for each vessel in distress 
including tonnage, homeport, value of vessel and cargo, persons on board, lives lost, and the 
general locations of each disaster.  In addition to this invaluable information, the Service often 
kept more detailed information on vessels in both individual wreck reports and station logbooks 
as recorded immediately following a disaster.  The vast majority of these documents are held in 
several archive facilities across the country.   
 Archival holdings pertaining to the USLSS are stored within local, regional, and national 
archives throughout the United States.  After some searching, it was determined that while 
documents were reported to be held at National Archives I at Washington D.C., the National 
Archives at Philadelphia, PA and the National Archives at Atlanta, GA, this was not the case.  
The only significant collections pertaining to the USLSS along the North Carolina coast were 
housed at the Atlanta archive.  Research there focused on Record Group 26.4, Records of the 
United States Life-Saving Service 1791-1944, and more specifically, Record Group 26.4.2, 
Records Relating to Operations.  It was here that logbooks for each of the six stations 
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documenting daily life, vessels sighted, wrecks, and weather conditions as reported from each 
station was located. Individual log entries were recorded as they related to vessels reported in 
distress within the Service’s Annual Reports.  Due to time constraints, logbooks could not be 
copied in their entirety, however, large portions of both the Chicamacomico and Nags Head 
stations were copied (to 1890 and 1880 respectively) for reference.   
 Also located at the National Archives in Atlanta were several copies of wreck reports 
filed by both the USLSS and the United States Lighthouse Service (USLHS).  These 
standardized reports, detailing the cause, location, and actions taken at each wreck, were a 
required part of the reporting requirements developed early in the organization.  These 
documents are considered vital as they provided raw data for the utilization of the USLSS while 
also providing the most detailed information regarding both the causes and location of a wreck.   
 A thorough search of local archives produced even more records of both the USLSS and 
the wrecks occurring within their operations along the North Carolina coast.  A survey of wrecks 
files at the North Carolina Underwater Archaeology Branch in Kure Beach, North Carolina 
yielded additional information on several of the wrecks reported within the Service’s annual 
reports.  Additional wreck reports and financial information regarding the pay of surfmen, 
keepers, and other expenditures were located in the Lifesaving Stations of the Outer Banks 
Collection at the North Carolina Outer Banks History Center in Manteo, NC.   
 A search of several online outlets revealed additional information.  Additional primary 
source material was located through a search of several online collections in East Carolina 
University’s Joyner Library and the United States Coast Guard Historian’s Office.  These two 
sites provided access to several sets of congressional documents that were used to track the 
legislative history of the development of the USLSS while also providing general information 
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regarding the histories of individual stations.  Several online databases, including the ProQuest 
Congressional Documents Collection, the G.W. Blunt White Library, the Haithi Trust Digital 
Library, and the Cornell University Making of America Collection all supplied additional 
primary source material.  The bulk of this material consisted of popular contemporary articles 
that used the Annual Reports of the Service to convey daring stories of the daring rescues made 
by members of the Service while also promoting the Service and arguing for increased support.  
The vast majority of these articles, while teeming with the harrowing stories of wreck, rescue, 
death, and destruction, were often little more than simple regurgitation of the information found 
in the Service’s Annual Reports, wreck reports, and other official documentation.         
Both the information found within the Annual Reports of the Life-Saving Service and 
collected from the digital and physical archival sources allow for the systematic collection of 
both qualitative and quantitative information regarding the establishment, development, and 
evolution of the USLSS along the North Carolina coast.  These documents however, are the main 
primary source documents for the USLSS in North Carolina.  These sources have been 
repeatedly used by many authors to form the bulk of the secondary sources produced on the topic 
that will be outlined below. 
Secondary Sources 
As previously discussed, the historiography of the USLSS generally focuses on extremely 
narrow aspects of the Service such as the design of life-saving apparatus, major wrecks involving the 
USLSS, station construction or architecture, or the heroic acts of individual USLSS men or crews.  
Despite this trend, there are a number of notable exceptions.  The first, Sand Pounders: An 
Interpretation of the History of the U.S. Life-Saving Service, Based on its Annual Reports for the 
Years 1870 Through 1914 (1998) by Robert F. Bennett.  Bennett’s work offers a general summary of 
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the major events recorded within the USLSS Annual Reports.  Published between 1876 and 1915 
and averaging several hundred pages in length each, the Annual Reports represented a massive 
repository of primary sources.  Bennett’s work served as an invaluable finding aid for the 
multivolume Annual Reports.  Bennett does provide some statistical analysis while discussing some 
of the possible effects of risk in the development of the Service, but falls short of making any 
definite conclusions regarding trends or patterns in wrecking activity.   
Another equally vital research tool was William D. Wilkinson and Timothy R. Dring’s book, 
American Coastal Rescue Craft: A Design History of Coastal Rescue Craft Used by the United 
States Life-Saving Service and the United States Coast Guard (2009), which provides invaluable 
insight into the technical specifications and capabilities of the shore-based rescue craft used by the 
USLSS along the North Carolina coastline.  In addition to the technical data, Wilkinson and Dring 
also provide a comprehensive list of both the shore-based life-saving stations of the USLSS and the 
USCG as well as a list of the craft assigned to each station throughout its history.  This information 
provides vital knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of each station located in the study area.   
A final notable example of a secondary reference using a more holistic approach to 
researching the USLSS is Jennifer McKinnon’s The Archaeology of Florida’s US Life-Saving 
Service Houses of Refuge and Life Saving Stations (2010).  In her work, McKinnon explores the 
development and utilization of USLSS houses of refuge established along the Florida coast by 
documenting and comparing the material culture assemblages and their associated 
landscapes/seascapes of individual houses of refuge with one another.  Throughout this 
archaeological investigation, McKinnon reviews and applies the archaeological concept of 
“liminality” in order to explain the dwellings’ multiple roles throughout time as the area’s use 
evolved.  This study provided valuable insight to the utilization of USLSS houses of refuge over 
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time while extracting additional information through the application of generalist approaches that 
may have not been realized through traditional historical study.  While McKinnon’s research focuses 
on the archaeological investigations of a select few houses of refuge along the Florida coastline, a 
relatively small component comprising total USLSS operations, her dissertation provides an 
outstanding example of the potential fruits of generalist approaches to researching the USLSS. 
Cartographic Resources 
 In order to create a visual representation of the locations of USLSS stations along the 
North Carolina Outer Banks and the subsequent effects on wrecking patterns, historic geospatial 
data was entered into a GIS system (ArcGIS 10).  A large amount of geographic information was 
incorporated into a larger GIS as individual layers.  Geospatial information extracted from the 
Annual Reports, wreck reports, and other contemporary historical documents describing the 
exact historical location of disasters occurring within the operations of the USLSS along with 
various charts to accurately represent the dynamic geomorphology of the North Carolina Outer 
Banks throughout the existence of the USLSS on its shores.   
Charts 
 Given the relatively small geographic size of the study area, cartographic research was 
relatively simple.  While modern representations of the North Carolina coastline were found 
through a number of GIS data clearinghouses such as the NC One Map Geospatial Portal 
(http://www.nconemap.com), more important was locating historic charts that provide historical 
descriptions of wreck sites to better facilitate mapping their potential locations for future 
statistical and geospatial analysis (See FIGURE 3.1 and FIGURE 3.2).   
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FIGURE 3.1.  Historical chart detailing the northern portion of the research area (NOAA 
Historical Chart Collection, From Currituck Beach to Oregon Inlet, Chart No. 138, 1879 
corrected to 1909). 
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FIGURE 3.2.  Historical chart detailing the southern portion of the research area (NOAA 
Historical Chart Collection, From Oregon Inlet to Cape Hatteras, Chart No. 139, 1880). 
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Historical charts of the region were also located through the National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Office of Coast Study’s Historical Map and Chart Image 
Catalog (http://www.nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/csdl/ctp/abstract.htm).  It was here that several 
historic charts were located for the Oregon Inlet area dating from the mid 19th to early 20th 
centuries.  Contemporary charts of the area were also located through the North Carolina Maps 
digital collection (http://www.lib.unc.edu/dc/ncmaps/?CISOROOT=/ncmaps).  This online 
collection is a collaborative effort of the North Carolina State Archives, Outer Banks History 
Center, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-Chapel Hill).  This collection 
included several scans of the original, printed maps and charts of North Carolina prior to 1923 
and held some maps and charts of the area within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet.  Upon request, 
several of these cartographic documents were provided by UNC-Chapel Hill to the author via 
DVD in .jpg format for incorporation into the GIS for the research area. 
Additional cartographic material was located within multiple documents relating to 
several surveys of Oregon Inlet completed in 1992 and 2003 by Tidewater Atlantic Research, 
Inc. and Panamerican Consultants, Inc. respectively (Watts 1992; Krivor 2003).  These two 
surveys were completed as a compliance requirement for possible construction of a replacement 
bridge crossing the inlet and provided a historical background of the immediate area while 
identifying submerged archaeological sites within the project area.  These two reports contained 
numerous cartographic records dating back to the 16th century and showed that the coastline in 
the vicinity of Oregon Inlet, while dynamic, has (with the creation and destruction of several 
inlets in the area) changed little over the past 150 years.  These charts were digitized and 
georeferenced for use as a layer within the GIS for utilization in geospatial analysis. 
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Pilot Guides 
 In addition to historical charts of Oregon Inlet and the surrounding areas, historic copies 
of pilot guides offer a view into one of the primary decision-making tools utilized by the masters 
of vessels traversing the eastern seaboard of the United States.  These guides offered specific 
sailing directions based off local landmarks, and measurements collected by the U.S. Coast 
Survey to provide safe navigation for commerce traveling through the area.  If so, this 
information could then be transformed into a layer within the GIS to be used in geospatial 
analysis. 
Meteorological Data 
 One cannot begin to discuss wrecking patterns occurring off the North Carolina Outer 
Banks without first discussing the roles of regional climate and severe weather related to disaster 
activity.  In her work discussing the development and evolution of the disaster landscape of the 
North Carolina Coast, Jennifer Jones (2012) discussed the roll of severe weather including major 
storms, nor’easters, and hurricanes on the coastal communities of North Carolina.  Jones 
identified each of the major storms affecting the North Carolina coast throughout history.  
According to her research, major storms affecting the state’s coastline occurred during all but 18 
of the 41 years that the USLSS existed as an organization along the North Carolina Outer Banks 
(1874-1915).  In other words, severe storms and hurricanes were generally seen as a commonly 
occurring phenomenon along the North Carolina coastline.  As such, the possibility for severe 
weather could be seen as simply another component of the risk involved with navigating the 
waters of the “Graveyard of the Atlantic.”  While years with particularly bad storms cause a 
spike in disasters during a particular year, it can be argued that because of the frequency of 
storms along the North Carolina coastline, meteorological and climate data should be considered 
41 
 
a contributor to wreck statistics, but not the sole influence upon wreck patterns in the area.  As 
such, for the purposes of this study, major storms that influenced major peaks or valleys in 
disaster statistics will be noted on a case-by-case basis, but general meteorological data will be 
considered a component of the general decision-making process used by mariners to mitigate 
risk in their operations.   
Analysis 
 Analysis of the data collected throughout this project revolved around three main 
components.  The first phase of analysis involved the statistical examination of the data collected 
with a focus on elements specifically relating to the measurement of risk and its affects on 
operations within the study area.  The next step in data analysis entailed the construction of a site 
plan within a GIS detailing the physical development of the USLSS throughout the research area 
as well as the location of each disaster occurring within the Service’s area of operation as 
reported within the Annual Reports.  The final analytic component of the study compared 
geospatial wreck data to prominent trends involving the influence of risk in wrecking patterns 
along the North Carolina coastline.   
Statistical Analysis: Data Collection and Database Construction  
Operating as an independent government organization for more than thirty-seven years, 
the USLSS instituted a massive and constantly evolving record keeping system that can be 
analyzed in numerous ways to answer various questions about the Service.  There are, however, 
specific elements that can be examined to determine the potential effects of risk on the 
development of the USLSS and the subsequent effects on wrecking patterns along the North 
Carolina Outer Banks.  The statistical analysis portion of this investigation involves two main 
components.  The first involves a thorough examination of both the statistics compiled within the 
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Annual Reports of the Service and the vessels requiring assistance from the USLSS within the 
vicinity of Oregon Inlet.  The second portion involves the design and construction of an Access 
database in order to query the data and identify any observable trends.   
As part of its original regulations in 1873, the USLSS utilized several standardized 
supplemental forms to provide more detailed information regarding particular operations.  It was 
in the Annual Reports that the USLSS compiled both district and aggregate statistics concerning 
the finances and operations of the Service each fiscal year.  It is here that information regarding 
the number of wrecks, total value of vessels, total value of cargo, total value of property loss, and 
lives lost within the operations of the USLSS were compiled and analyzed.  The same 
information was recorded for the disasters occurring within the confines of each district as 
organized by the superintendent of the Life-Saving Service.  The area from Cape Henry, VA to 
Cape Fear, NC comprised USLSS District Six beginning in 1874 when the completion of 
additional stations required the creation and renumbering of the districts.  After 1901, the USLSS 
along the North Carolina coast became part of District Seven and remained so until the 
incorporation of the USLSS into the United States Coast Guard in 1915. 
In addition to the compilation of aggregate wreck data, the Annual Reports of the USLSS 
also contained statistical analyses of historic data that the Service then used to identify major 
trends in disaster activity.  It was this statistical analysis that dictated the placement of new 
stations, the reorganization of districts, the implementation of new technology, and the 
establishment of new operating procedures for the USLSS.  Unfortunately, the analysis 
performed by the USLSS often limited itself to analyzing statistics on a national or regional 
scale.  While this analysis provided excellent information regarding national and global trends in 
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merchant shipping, it provided little insight into local shipping and wrecking patterns.  The 
USLSS did, however, provide a useful template for analysis used in this research.      
In addition to these basic statistics, each edition of the Annual Reports also contained a 
detailed analysis of wrecks occurring for both the current fiscal year and years past.  This 
analysis was essentially a compilation of the statistics from the reports of both wrecks and 
casualties to vessels occurring on or near the coasts and rivers of the United States.  This report 
also included the known wrecks and casualties occurring to American vessels both at sea and 
along the coasts of foreign countries.  While select statistics from these documents provided a 
vital insight into national trends in shipping and maritime commerce, most were not useful for 
the limited scope of this study.   
 One of the most useful primary sources for this study was USLSS Form 1806, also 
known as the ‘Wreck Report’ (FIGURE 3.3).  While each year of the Annual Report published 
by the USLSS contained a detailed tabular account of each wrecking incident occurring within 
the span of its operations, the official wreck report used by the Service provided a standardized 
and more thorough account of both the location and responses to individual wrecks as well as 
narratives explaining the nature and cause of the said wreck.  Furthermore, where the annals of 
the Annual Reports contained information pertaining to the total amounts of vessels, cargo, and 
lives saved and lost, wreck reports contained information regarding the USLSS action to each 
disaster including exact location and cause of the disaster, response times, and life-saving 
equipment utilized in conducting the rescue.  These documents proved vital in determining both 
the exact location and nature of a vessel in distress as well as providing information regarding 
how USLSS crews went about their operations along the North Carolina Outer Banks and how 
efficiently they operated in the field. 
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FIGURE 3.3.  A copy of a USLSS Form 1806, also known as a “Wreck Report,” documenting 
the wreck of E.S. Newman in 1896.  (North Carolina Outer Banks History Center). 
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For the purposes of this study, statistical analysis was limited to datasets that could 
potentially be indicative of risk-taking behavior in the maritime community.  Through initial 
survey of the primary documents produced by the USLSS between 1876 and 1915, three fields or 
categories could be identified that were indicative of risk.  The first of these categories examines 
the role of money and finances played in the development of the USLSS and specifically 
discusses the role of funding and its effects on the efficiency of the Service.  The second 
discusses the effects of incidents involving loss of life as an indicator of risk in the Life-Saving 
Service.  The third and final category of data identified as being potentially indicative of risk-
taking behavior concerns the physical development of the Service (operational tempo) and its 
effects on wrecking patterns.  Data within these three categories were examined for evidence of 
patterning in both national and regional datasets as well as for the disaster activity occurring 
within the confines of the established research area.   
 Tabulated shipwreck data was extracted from primary sources such as the Annual 
Reports, wreck reports, and similar correspondence and placed into either an Excel or Access 
database (depending on the data type), for further processing.  Additional statistical analysis 
could then be conducted on each of the stations and associated wrecks identified within the study 
area.  This was completed by querying the GIS for elements such as loss of life, amount of 
property lost, vessel type, vessel age, crew(s) responding, distance from shore at time of disaster, 
and cause/nature of disaster.  The attribute tables for these queries could then be exported back 
into an Excel spreadsheet where data could be arranged to determine any patterns or trends.  
These spreadsheets could then be converted into various graphs and charts for an attractive and 
easy to understand display.   
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Mapping the Graveyard: GIS Creation and Spatial Analysis 
Despite growing support for survey-based archaeological investigations, individual 
wrecks are often only examined in relation to the circumstances of their destruction while 
ignoring more widespread trends that may have influenced regional wrecking patterns.  Once 
located, these vessels are often only placed on paper charts if they are deemed a hazard to 
navigation or hold some recreational or cultural value (FIGURE 3.4).  In order to create maps 
and charts that could be effectively utilized in further analysis, several GIS shapefiles were 
created to illustrate various components affecting the development of the USLSS in the vicinity 
of Oregon Inlet and each of the individual wrecks occurring in the area.  The end product of this 
multi-step process was a geo-spatial visualization of wrecking patterns in the vicinity of Oregon 
Inlet between 1876 and 1915. 
 The first step in the creation of this GIS involved the location of each of the six USLSS 
stations located within the study area and recording their positions with a handheld Garmin eTrex 
GPS unit using the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84) datum in degrees, minutes, seconds.  
The remnants of all but two of the original USLSS stations could be located with certainty and 
their positions recorded. The stations at New Inlet and Pea Island could not be precisely 
relocated due to the effects of shoreline erosion.  Despite this, the general position of the Pea 
Island station was known, and while there were no definite physical remains of the station, this 
approximate position was recorded. Coordinates for the New Inlet station were estimated by 
converting the latitude and longitude provided in several copies of the Annual Reports. The 
coordinates for these stations were then converted from degrees, minutes, seconds to degrees 
decimal minutes and entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and imported into ESRI’s 
ArcMap program as a point shapefile. 
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FIGURE 3.4.  A popular map showing the approximate historical positions of hundreds of 
vessels lost of the North Carolina coastline.  This map was based on Outer Banks historian David 
Stick’s research and made for National Geographic in 1970.  
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Another shapefile downloaded from the NC One Map geospatial clearinghouse representing the 
current North Carolina coastline was added for reference.  
Next, historic charts acquired through the NOAA Historic Charts and the North Carolina 
Maps websites were georectified using both the positions of several permanent structures with 
known locations that could be identified along with marked latitude and longitude on each chart 
as references.  Structures utilized as control points for georeferencing included each of the six 
USLSS stations located within the research area as well as the 1871 Bodie Island lighthouse.  
The boundaries of each island were then digitized through a process known as “heads up” or “on 
screen” digitizing in which an overlapping data layer is created on top of a scanned image and is 
manually edited, or in this case traced, to create a new data layer in which only the information 
extracted from the original scanned image is present.  By tracing the outer edges of each land 
mass represented on historical charts, a georeferenced representation of the historic North 
Carolina coastline including the research area from 1876 to 1915 was created.     
 Additional digitization of historic charts contributed data concerning bottom bathymetry 
as well as the locations of inlets, anchorages, and harbors utilized during foul weather.  
Information regarding shipping and sailing instructions was extracted from several pilot guides 
throughout the 19th and early 20th century and were represented via a simple polyline feature in 
ArcMap.  Information regarding the paths and intensities of major land falling hurricanes were 
also added as a data layer acquired from the GeoData.gov United States Maps and Data website 
(formerly known as the Geospatial One-Stop).  Each of these sources provides insight into the 
development of the USLSS along the North Carolina coast and the factors affecting decision-
making within the maritime community.    
49 
 
The next step was to plot the approximate locations of vessels in distress.  While the 
Annual Reports reported only the approximate position of a disaster in reference to the distance 
and direction from the primary station responding to the call for help, wreck reports completed 
by each station often contained more detailed information regarding a vessel’s position, 
including more specific geographic references and the approximate distance from shore at the 
time of disaster.  This information could then be used to estimate the approximate position of the 
vessel that requiring assistance from a USLSS station.  This estimated position was then 
recorded into a preexisting Access database that contained all relevant information regarding the 
incident as reported by the USLSS   Once complete, this database was then imported into 
ArcMap as a point shapefile representing each of the vessels requiring assistance as documented 
via the Annual Reports. 
 Additional information regarding each of the stations, the dates of their establishment, 
equipment, and capabilities were also entered into an Excel database that was then imported into 
the GIS as various layers to aid in the visualization of any themes or trend in wrecking patterns.  
The implementation of new technology such as the utilization of telegraph and telephone lines 
could easily be added as simple polylines connecting individual stations while advancements in 
life-saving apparatus that increased the effective range of operations, such as the implementation 
of the Lyle gun over the wreck mortar, could be visualized using the buffer tool in ArcMap.   
Once each of the various shapefiles were completed, it was possible to move on to the second 
analytic component of the study, which consisted of spatially analyzing the events within the 
research area.  
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 One of the primary objectives of this study was to identify what, if any, the role of risk 
played on local wrecking patterns along the North Carolina Outer Banks.  While historical 
analysis may shine some light as to the role of risk in the development of the USLSS, 
understanding the role of risk on wrecking patterns requires an alternate approach.  The simple 
and most direct way to understand this relationship may be found in the creation of visual aids, 
such as a GIS.  The creation of several maps depicting the locations of both USLSS stations and 
the vessels that required assistance within their fields of operation help to visualize and examine 
any prominent trends over time.  Attribute tables within the GIS of the study area were queried in 
order to derive information relevant to this investigation.  These queries were largely based on 
geospatial elements such as the vessel’s distance from shore or a particular USLSS station, the 
vessel’s intended destination, and the vessel’s homeport (to determine if local knowledge of the 
area may have played a factor).  Queries were also based on disaster-specific information 
regarding both the vessels in distress and the stations responding to them.  While many of the 
maps created by this portion of the analysis will incorporate traditional historic charts, the results 
would not be apparent without digital visualization. 
For the purposes of this study, geospatial analyses were performed primarily to define the 
extent of both wrecking incidents and USLSS operations within the research area while 
identifying physical changes and trends in wrecking patterns.  This was accomplished through a 
series of four specific geospatial analyses.  First, the extent of both disaster activity and USLSS 
operations was identified.  Once the extent of disaster activity was defined, analysis was 
performed to map wrecking densities in the research area to determine areas with higher 
concentrations of disaster activity.  Next, an analysis identifying the centers of activity was 
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performed to identify the overall movement of wrecking activity over time.  A final analysis 
examined changes in the shape and size of the extents of wrecking activity over time.  
Conclusions   
 By taking a generalist approach to studying the development of the USLSS along the 
North Carolina Outer Banks, this study allows an examination of the Service from a broader 
perspective.  Incorporating the statistical analysis of historical data into a GIS allows for the 
study of data that is not traditionally analyzed in the historiography of the Service, which was 
routinely presented in the form of tables and statistics.  The approach taken in this study allows 
this data to be visualized and used in further analysis.  This visualization and subsequent analysis 
may potentially identify trends in shipping and disaster that would not otherwise be apparent 
through traditional research.  In the past, analysis has identified trends only on the national or 
regional scale since the needs of the Service dictated larger scale management plans.  By 
focusing on a confined study area, this research looks for wrecking patterns locally.  
While the geospatial analyses performed for the purposes of this investigation are 
extensive, they are not exhaustive.  The potential queries and research questions that could be 
applied to this data are numerous.  Care was taken only to examine data with specific research 
questions in mind so as to not fall victim to mere curiosity and spend an indefinite amount of 
time querying the data set for random bits of information or searching for trends not relevant to 
the purposes of this research.  That being said, the potential of this data cannot be understated.  
When generalist research methodologies are applied, the vast amount of contemporary statistical 
data provided by the USLSS serve as an invaluable source of information that can be used to 
answer any number of research questions in any location in which there was a USLSS presence 
along the coasts, lakes, and rivers of the United States
  CHAPTER FOUR: SHIP ASHORE! FORMATION OF THE USLSS 
 The history of shore-based life-saving operations in the United States spans more than a 
century and is characterized by romanticized tales of devastating disasters and survival.  To fully 
appreciate the history of shore-based life-saving along the North Carolina Outer Banks, one must 
first have an understanding of the development of various life-saving services around the globe.  
These organizations developed many of the methods, standards, and operating procedures that 
the USLSS would adopt.  By doing so, this Service exemplified the need for similar 
humanitarian services along dangerous and isolated shores around the world.  Within the United 
States, the development of the USLSS slowly evolved from a string of volunteer efforts to assist 
sailors stranded upon the nation’s coasts.  These early humanitarian efforts, while affective, 
exemplified the need for the development of a government-funded life-saving service.   
 Fueled by a number of major disasters, the USLSS was reorganized in 1871 and 
aggressively expanded, becoming operational along the North Carolina Outer Banks in 1874.  
The isolated barrier islands of the North Carolina coast facilitated the development of what has 
been referred to as a “wrecking culture” that heavily influenced the development and 
methodologies of shore-based life-saving operations within the Tar Heel State.  The early history 
of the Service along the North Carolina coast contains the stories of several major disasters that 
influenced the overall development of the USLSS including the wreck of the Nuova Ottavia 
(1876), which well exemplified the effects of politics in the efficiency of the Service.  The 
disastrous wrecks of the USS Huron (1877) and the steamship Metropolis (1878), both occurring 
only months apart along the North Carolina Outer Banks with a high loss of life, became the 
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driving force in the expansion and reorganization of the USLSS as an separate agency in 1878 
(Sherman 1878).     
 The importance of studying the history of shore-based life-saving for the purposes of this 
study is monumental.  From its earliest inception in China in the 1730s to the development of the 
USLSS as an independent entity in 1878, the global development of shore-based life-saving 
exhibits traits of reflexive monitoring in terms of its establishment, development, and subsequent 
ideological evolution.  This is particularly true of the development of the USLSS along the North 
Carolina coast, where several major wrecks, combined with the unique cultural, political, and 
practical challenges of working along the state’s isolated shores, helped to shape the USLSS as a 
whole.  This section will discuss in detail the development of shore-based life-saving services 
from a global to local arena while focusing on the establishment and evolution of the USLSS 
along the North Carolina Outer Banks.   
The History of Shore-based Life-saving 
 While human beings have always relied on their fellow mariners to provide assistance 
when in distress, formal life-saving organizations as they are known today were not established 
until the early eighteenth century.  One of the earliest known life-saving efforts was the 
Chinkiang Association for the Saving of Life, which was established in China around 1708 
(Shanks and York 1996:1; Wilkinson and Dring 2009:xi).  This group was organized by a 
committee of private benefactors to place a number of rescue craft along the shores of the 
Yangtze River at Chinkiang.  This early group, while only servicing an inland waterway, 
established the idea for an organized life-saving effort along the open seacoast.  After the 
establishment of the Chinkiang Association, several other privately sponsored life-saving 
organizations and benevolent societies formed in China.  These privately funded organizations 
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provided money for both life-saving equipment and stipend for volunteers on a per rescue basis 
(Shanks and York 1996:1).  In addition to these privately funded volunteer organizations, the 
Imperial Chinese government also developed its own publicly funded life-saving service.  These 
life-saving stations were established in 1737 along the Min River and several of its tributaries 
and were publicly funded through the taxation of both rice and land.  This effort thus constituted 
the first government sponsored shore-based life-saving organization in the world (Shanks and 
York 1996:1).   
 In contrast, life-saving efforts in the Western Hemisphere did not form until much later in 
the eighteenth century.  Up to that point, efforts focused more on developing ways to prevent 
vessels from wrecking ashore (Wilkinson and Dring 2009:xi).  Both the Dutch and English 
formed life-saving services in 1767 and 1774 respectively.  It should be noted that the English 
did not utilize lifeboats in their rescue attempts until 1824 and could, therefore, be classified 
simply as shore-based assistance prior to that point (Shanks and York 1996:1).  These 
organizations borrowed heavily from their Chinese counterparts to develop their own standards 
and methodologies.  Despite their conception and use abroad, it was not until 1785 that the 
Massachusetts Humane Society was established as the first life-saving organization in the United 
States (Wilkinson and Dring 2009:xi)     
The History of Shore-based Life-Saving in the United States 
The development of the USLSS evolved from a string of volunteer efforts to assist sailors 
stranded upon the coasts of the United States.  Founded in 1785 and chartered in 1791, the 
Massachusetts Humane Society was the first shore-based life-saving organization in the United 
States.  This organization identified its mission as, “…the recovery of persons who meet with 
such accidents as to produce in them the appearance of death, and for promoting the cause of 
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humanity by pursuing such means from time to time as shall have for their object the 
preservation of human life and alleviation of its miseries” (Mobley 1994:7).  While the 
organization did not start to use lifeboats in their rescue attempts until 1807, the Humane Society 
actively worked to rescue and resuscitate shipwreck survivors pulled from the surf (Shanks and 
York 1996:3).  The Massachusetts Humane Society eventually constructed several boathouses 
and houses of refuge along the most dangerous portions of coastline throughout the state.  The 
boathouses contained a lifeboat and other supplies that could be used by local volunteers to aid in 
the rescue of individuals on nearby shipwrecks.  In contrast to the boathouses, houses of refuge 
were simply unmanned structures stocked with food, clothes, and other supplies made available 
to shipwrecked mariners cast upon the beaches.  Also known as humane houses or charity 
houses, houses of refuge were more often located in isolated areas where a volunteer crew could 
not be mustered in order to facilitate a speedy rescue.  Despite the fact that these buildings often 
saved lives, their isolation and lack of supervision consistently caused them to be vandalized, 
looted, and thus were often in a state of disrepair (Shanks and York 1996:3).  While the 
Massachusetts Humane Society was not the only early life-saving organization in the United 
States during the early 19th century but it was by far one of the most organized.  
 The development of a federally funded life-saving station in the United States slowly 
evolved from a series of major catastrophes and legislative action spanning nearly fifty years.   
Prior to 1848, the bulk of the nation’s maritime services focused upon constructing aids to 
navigation through the United States Light House Service, inspecting of watercraft by the 
Steamboat Inspection Service, and maintaining aids to navigation by the Bureau of Navigation 
which were established in 1716, 1838, and 1848 respectively (Krietemeyer 2000:8).  Other than 
the previously mentioned volunteer organizations, life-saving services were not provided for in 
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any way until the United States Revenue Marine and the United States Navy began patrolling 
wreck prone areas during the winter seasons in 1831 and 1837, respectively (Noble 1987:2; 
Mobley 1994:13; Bennett 1998:3).  While locally funded rescue efforts had been established, the 
United States had yet to form a centralized, federally funded, life-saving service. 
 It was only after a June 1846 report to the Secretary of the Treasury reviewing and 
commending the British life-saving program that the United States federal government took an 
active interest in funding a shore-based life-saving service.  A law was enacted on March 3, 1847 
providing the first federal appropriation for a life-saving service (Blair and Rives 1847:510-511).  
Congressman Robert McClelland of Michigan, who was chairmen of the House Committee of 
Commerce, filed a motion for funding in the amount of five thousand dollars (Mobley 1994:14).  
These funds, however, were not used for their intended purposes and were eventually awarded to 
the Massachusetts Humane Society, which had by this date maintained sixteen boathouses and 
several houses of refuge along the coast of their state.  While this funding was considered the 
first federal funding of a life-saving service in the United States, the issue had not yet produced a 
large amount of interest in the federal government.     
    It was not until 1848 when William A. Newell of New Jersey, a member of the United 
States House of Representatives, witnessed the horrors of a shipwreck when no assistance was 
available, was the plight of those in peril upon the sea brought clearly to the attention of the 
federal government (Bennett 1998:5).  On August 14, 1848, Newell successfully lobbied for the 
appropriation of money to be spent for life-saving equipment to be employed along the New 
Jersey coast.   The bill served as the establishment of a federally funded, shore-based life-saving 
service in the United States and would award the state of New Jersey ten thousand dollars “for 
providing surfboats, rockets, cannonades, and other necessary apparatus for the better 
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preservation of life and property from shipwrecks… between Sandy Hook and Little Egg 
Harbor” (Newell 1848:1087-1089).  While this bill was signed into law only a few days later, 
these initial appropriations provided little in terms of immediate relief for wrecked sailors along 
the coasts.   
While these first stations where constructed along the New Jersey shoreline, they served 
as the model for the development of a national life-saving service.  The new responsibility for 
outfitting, administration, and maintenance of these stations fell to the Department of Treasury 
who in turn tasked Captain Douglas Ottinger of the United States Revenue Marine (USRM) with 
the task of creating a sustainable service.  Captain Ottinger was to cooperate with the Board of 
Underwriters of New York to purchase life-saving equipment for the New Jersey coast.  
Operating under the direction of the USRM, the Massachusetts Humane Society also requested 
and received funds to construct life-saving stations (Noble 1987:4).  Despite the newly acquired 
federal funding, difficulties regarding the organization and manning combined with widespread 
corruption within the department greatly hindered the development of a competent service.   
By May 1849, eight standardized stations were completed along the New Jersey coast 
and equipped with a boat on a wagon, a mortar apparatus with its lines, powder and shot, a small 
covered lifeboat, a stove, and fuel (Means 1987:1).  Despite these facilities, no funds had been 
appropriated for the payment of professional crews and volunteer crews were mustered as 
needed.  Once operational, these stations were left unmanned and ran much like a volunteer fire 
department (Bennett 1998:6).  In addition to the lack of funding, no standards regarding the 
manning, training, drill, or inspection had been established eventually rendering several of the 
stations inoperable.   
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 Despite the lack of supervision, a second appropriation of twenty thousand dollars was 
made by Congress for more life-saving stations along the New Jersey coast between Little Egg 
Harbor and Cape May (Blair and Rives 1848:693).  These stations had some early successes.  On 
the night of January 12, 1850, one of the New Jersey life-saving stations responded to the wreck 
of the immigrant ship Ayrshire and saved 201 of the 202 passengers (Bennett 1998:6).  This 
particular wreck showed the great potential of an established and well-trained shore-based life-
saving service.  That same year, after proving their value during the wreck of Ayrshire, lifeboat 
stations were built along the coasts of Rhode Island, Georgia, Florida, Texas, and the Carolinas 
(Means 1987).   
While the establishment of volunteer life-saving stations provided some hope for rescue 
for sailors wrecked along these coasts, the facilities, training, and staffing of the stations were 
woefully inadequate for year-round operation.  Weather, vandalism, and theft quickly rendered 
many of the boathouses, which were visited only in the event of an emergency, utterly 
ineffective.  Two particularly disastrous wrecks along the New Jersey coast, Powhattan on April 
16, 1854, resulting in a loss of more than two hundred and New Era that claimed two hundred 
thirty lives in November of that same year were a direct result of these inadequacies (King 
1996:195).  The high loss of life associated with both wrecks could be directly attributed to 
either the neglect or loss of government owned life-saving equipment and the relatively long 
distances between boathouses along the coast. 
These two disasters marked a landmark year for the development of the USLSS.  By 
1854, the Life-Saving Service was operating fifty-five stations on the coasts of the Atlantic, the 
Gulf of Mexico, and the Great Lakes (King 1996:194).  The fact that both of these disasters were 
directly caused by the theft and disrepair of government equipment led Congress to appropriate 
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additional funds to the Service to hire one superintendent each for the Long Island and New 
Jersey coasts while hiring a keeper for each station at a rate of two hundred dollars per annum 
and totaled $24,185 for salaries and contingencies (Means 1987; Bennett 1998:6).  Despite the 
presence of paid keepers at each of the stations, most keepers were hired based on political 
affiliation rather than knowledge and skill.  In addition to charges of corruption, keepers were 
also still required to muster a volunteer crew in the event of an emergency often leading to 
chaotic attempts at rescue  (Noble 1987:5).  Funding was also made available to expand the 
station network by closing the distances between the existing stations, thus allowing for more 
routine communication between stations, the establishment of patrol areas, and the potential for 
mutual assistance amongst stations.    
The act of 1854 served as a milestone for the United State’s life-saving program as it 
marked the first time the federal government provided appropriations for paid employees to staff 
the stations.  This was in marked contrast to the government’s previous policy of simply 
providing money for the construction and outfitting of stations without further appropriations for 
maintenance, refitting, or supervision.  While hiring was completed in 1856, another 
appropriation was made in 1858 for $26,440 to purchase self-bailing lifeboats and provide 
updated life-saving equipment.  This work was not complete before the outbreak of the 
American Civil War, which effectively ceased all interest in developing an independent federal 
life-saving organization (Rives 1859:1639-1641).   Despite the distraction of a major war, 
routine appropriations continued to fund the Service, which was continuously able to employ 
fifty-four keepers since the development of the semiprofessional (i.e. paid) Service in 1857 
(Means 1987; Mobley 1994:22; Bennett 1998:6). 
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 Federal interest in developing a shore-based life-saving service was not revived again 
until well after the end of hostilities when a series of violent storms again littered the coasts of 
the eastern seaboard with bodies and debris.  Congressman Newell, the same congressman who 
had lobbied for the original appropriations for the establishment of a life-saving service in 1848, 
helped convince Congress to provide $10,000 in 1866 for new stations and equipment along the 
New Jersey shoreline.  Despite receiving these appropriations, the New Jersey state legislature 
attempted to gain even more funding to hire crews at the stations (United States Congress 
1866:Appendix 261-262).  While this measure failed, a substitute bill championed by 
Representative Charles Haight and Senator John P. Stockton eventually provided for the hiring 
of six experienced crewmembers at alternating stations along the New Jersey coasts with a salary 
of forty dollars per season (Means 1987).  This bill, passed in 1870, provided funds to hire crews 
during the winter storm season each year at alternate stations (United States Congress 
1870:4679-4680). 
After yet another series of disasters leaving the bodies of both the passengers and crews 
of several vessels strewn along the eastern seaboard, public confidence in the Life-Saving 
Service began to wane.  It was determined that multiple instances involving loss of life resulted 
from the poor organization, mismanagement, and the overall corruption of the Service.  In 
February 1871, responding to building public pressure for change, newly appointed chief of the 
Treasury Department’s Revenue Marine Division Sumner Increase Kimball made the 
reinstitution of an effective life-saving service his primary responsibility.  
Sumner Kimball was appointed to a post in the Treasury Department in 1861 where he 
later became chief of both the Treasury’s Revenue Marine Division—including the Steamboat 
Inspection Service, Marine Hospitals, and life-saving stations.  Kimball, who undoubtedly 
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realized the daunting nature of his task, later stated while writing of the stations at the time of his 
assignment that,  
Before 1871 there was probably no other arm of the public service so little held in 
esteem, as there was none more withered and feeble… it was an unconsidered trifle- its 
central habitat the corner of an office at the seat of government, its coast existence a thin 
line of weather-broken huts upon the beaches of Long Island and New Jersey- huts 
scantily furnished with poor equipment and only one of every two provided with men 
(USLSS 1882:47). 
 
After appointing Captain John Faunce of the USRM to conduct a nationwide inspection 
of the Life-Saving Service, Kimball was ready to institute several sweeping changes to better the 
Service.  Employing his own political clout, on April 20, 1871 Kimball gained a Congressional 
appropriation of $200,000 to build several stations and staff them with trained keepers year 
round (United States Congress 1871:231).  Kimball worked to establish a set of regulations for 
the Service and standardized the crews, funding, and construction of stations while initiating a 
complete overhaul of the old Service.  Committees were established to review, develop, and test 
new life-saving apparatus.  Boards were also convened to review the performance, fitness, and 
competency of each member of the Service in order to identify and remove incompetent or 
unqualified members awarded positions due to political affiliation or favoritism.  Kimball also 
made a pronounced effort to intertwine the roles of the USRM into that of the Life-Saving 
Service in order to better facilitate efficiency between the services.        
On January 11, 1873, new regulations dictated that the life-saving stations of the Service 
be organized into districts managed by civilian superintendents while remaining under the 
jurisdiction of an inspector of the USRM (USRM 1873:22).  This change allowed for the unique 
opportunity for a government entity to have the input of a civilian contractor while maintaining 
appropriate discipline through the use of military supervisors.  This relationship also reduced the 
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potential for corruption and favoritism by acting as a check and balance system within the 
Service.   
That same year, another $100,000 was awarded to the Secretary of the Treasury to 
conduct research on potentially extending the network of the Life-Saving Service (USRM 1873).  
This came, as the U.S. Army’s Storm Signal Service, which provided important weather 
bulletins to passing vessels, was assigned to some life-saving stations.  While the number of life-
saving stations grew along the North Carolina coast, problems plagued the  Service along the Tar 
Heel coast.  By 1871, the distances between some stations had been reduced enough (generally 
two to three miles) to allow communications via signals between strings of closely situated 
stations (United States Congress 1873: 1270; Means 1987).  While some stations were close 
enough to facilitate this network, this was certainly not the case on all coasts.  Where a constant 
network of stations may be needed in one locale, it might not necessarily be true for another.  
Deciding exactly where to place these new stations was difficult due to the fact that while 
records pertaining to the loss of vessels had been in existence for years, they were generally 
limited to monetary values for the collection of customs duties or later insurance payouts for 
cargoes lost in transit (Bennett 1998:7).  The exact locations of wrecked vessels were rarely 
documented and often only known by locals who may have witnessed the wreck during the 
rescue of its crew or the salvage of its cargo.   
This, however, changed when Kimball went to Congress and pushed through several 
significant pieces of legislation.  The first, passed on March 3, 1873, established a committee 
headed by Kimball to examine the coastlines of the United States for suitable locations for future 
life-saving stations based upon the experiences of insurance underwriters, ship owners, captains, 
and local mariners.  The second, passed on June 20, 1874, acted as a substantive law that 
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required the masters of U.S. vessels to report all incidents of grounding, foundering, capsizing, 
stranding, fires, explosions, and all other maritime mishaps that may occur.  This act also 
enabled the secretary to bestow gold and silver life-saving medals for specific acts of heroism 
(Bennett 1998:7).  These two acts were important in that they required the collection of data 
pertaining to maritime mishaps that could then be utilized by the Secretary of the Treasury to 
determine potential locations for future life-saving stations.   
The resulting reports were used to create the first Annual Report of the United States Life-
saving Service that was published by the Department of the Treasury annually after 1876.  These 
reports however, were more than the dry regurgitation of statistics and expenditures so 
commonly produced by the Government Printing Office.  Kimball hired a talented journalist by 
the name of William D. O’Conner to write vivid and exciting accounts of the rescues of the Life-
Saving Service in a direct attempt to garner public interest and support (Shanks and York 
1996:11).  These documents remain one of the principal primary source documents on the Life-
Saving Service to date.   
By 1874, the number of stations increased and expanded to the shores of Maine, Virginia, 
and the North Carolina Outer Banks while appropriations for pay and supplies remained constant 
(Mobley 1994:27).  While the Service grew both in size and responsibility, the USLSS was not 
officially organized as an independent entity within the Treasury Department until 1878 when 
two major disasters, the wrecks of USS Huron and Metropolis, exemplified the need for an 
established and well-trained network of life-saving stations along isolated portions of the coast. 
The Development of the USLSS on the North Carolina Coast 
 Since the arrival of European settlers in the sixteenth century, North Carolina has been 
well known for its dangerous shoreline.  The North Carolina coast consists of a string of wave-
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dominated linear barrier islands interrupted by a few tidal inlets and separated from the mainland 
by broad shallow bays (Davis 2004:162).  These narrow islands were formed as a part of the 
wave action created by the presence of the north bound Gulf Stream just off the North Carolina 
coast.  Early explorers traveling to the Americas quickly determined that these currents acted as 
natural trade routes facilitating shipping.  Ships could travel southward along the coasts of 
Europe and Africa where they could cross the Atlantic Ocean to the West Indies along the 
Equatorial Current and move up the east coast of America along the Gulf Stream (Stick 1952:2-
3).  The same logic was used after colonization where southbound shipping traffic, rather than 
relying on dead reckoning and risking heavy seas, would often use southbound long shore 
currents while navigating extremely close to land to both avoid the northbound current of the 
Gulf Stream and to aid in navigation.  These currents also contributed to the constantly shifting 
shoals located along the North Carolina coast jutting miles into the Atlantic Ocean acting like 
natural ship traps along the coast.   
As shipping traffic grew along these trade routes, wrecks become an increasingly 
common occurrence.  As the number of vessels wrecked along the shifting shoals and isolated 
barrier islands of the North Carolina Outer Banks increased, the area quickly earned its nickname 
“the Graveyard of the Atlantic.”  Wrecks became so common along the North Carolina coast that 
they significantly influenced the culture of the individuals residing there.  Many of the current 
residents of the North Carolina coast can trace their ancestry back to a shipwrecked sailor lucky 
enough to be cast upon the beach only to later start a family in the area (Stick 1952:3).   
North Carolina Wrecking Culture 
Prior to the mid-twentieth century, the North Carolina Outer Banks were sparsely 
populated with only about 1200 individuals in 1850, many of whom living only on what could be 
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taken from the sea (Stick 1958:154).  While this most often meant what could be caught from the 
sea for sustenance, those living in the isolated portions of the Outer Banks also participated in 
the act of  “wrecking.”  The term wrecking most often refers to an act by an individual on the 
shore who attempts to cause a shipwreck in order to profit from its wreckage or more often the 
act of salvaging or recovering cargo from the sea (Bathurst 2005:xvi).  While admiralty laws and 
other general mandates of the sea have been in place for centuries governing the law of finds and 
salvage, shipwrecks in desolate areas were often seen as a divine opportunity for locals to 
acquire both manufactured goods and raw materials that were often rare or impossible to find 
otherwise.  This activity has been recorded throughout the world but is most common in isolated 
portions of the coast near major shipping lanes were the population is both sparse and generally 
poor (Barthurst 2005:23).   
In her work on the wrecking culture of England, Bella Bathurst identifies several 
common characteristics of the areas in which there is a clearly identifiable wrecking culture.  
Bathurst notes that both individuals and communities participate in wrecking due to a 
combination of poverty, necessity, and the ability to do so; all of which can be seen as a direct 
result of living in an isolated area with limited resources.  Furthermore, Bathurst states that a 
wrecking culture often develops as a direct result of the perception of what is “lost” at sea.  
Shipwrecks, jettisoned cargo, and even the clothing of a corpse washed ashore, can all be seen as 
being “lost to the sea.”  These items, at least in terms of ships and cargo, are most likely insured 
and would cause little harm to the owner if salvaged by local wreckers as the items have most 
likely been written off as a total loss.  The occasional corpse washed ashore often appeared, with 
no clear indication from what vessel they originated.  In both circumstances, wrecking would 
appear to be a victimless crime, if a crime at all, while the items collected could be considered 
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both vital essentials and priceless luxuries.  These anonymous gifts of the sea were often a vital 
supplement to an otherwise sparse income of people along the coast of England (Bathurst 
2005:26). 
The isolated barrier islands of the North Carolina Outer Banks fostered a wrecking 
culture similar to that described by Bathurst on the English coast.  The poor, isolated fishing 
communities of the Outer Banks often turned to the sea to supplement their otherwise meager 
existence.  Early attempts to limit locals’ participation in wrecking often met resistance.  As 
early as 1678, the Lord Proprietors of Carolina appointed several individuals to “looke after, 
receive and recover all wrecks, ambergrice [a byproduct of the digestive system of a sperm 
whale] or any other ejections of the sea” but those appointed were often unable to seize control 
over many of the ships and cargoes cast upon the shores of North Carolina (Stick 1952:4).  
The uproar caused by wrecked vessels, whether accidentally driven ashore or 
intentionally mislead to its fate, eventually caused both state and federal governments to become 
involved.  This government action initiated along the North Carolina coast was the development 
of the Lighthouse Service, which was run by colonial governments from 1716 to 1789 and by the 
federal government under the Treasury Department after 1789 (Krietemeyer 2000:8).  The 
construction of North Carolina’s first lighthouse at Bald Head Island (also known as Cape Fear) 
in 1794 marked the federal government’s first attempt to actively warn mariners of risks along 
the North Carolina coast (Hairr 2004: 10).  By 1823, lighthouses stood at several dangerous 
points along the shoreline including Cape Hatteras, Ocracoke Inlet, Cape Lookout, and Cape 
Fear (Mobley 1994:13).  While this measure may have saved countless lives, it reduced the 
opportunities for locals to profit from wrecks cast upon the shore and further exemplified the 
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often strenuous relationship between those living along the North Carolina coast and any form of 
regulatory government.   
By 1800, wrecks were so common along the North Carolina coast that the state was 
compelled to establish a number of wreck districts.  Each of these districts were led by a state, 
and later a county-appointed commissioner or agent who was in charge of all property found 
ashore as the result of a maritime mishap.  These individuals were then placed in charge of 
determining ownership of the said goods, and was in charge of organizing an auction, also 
known as a “vendue,” in which the cargo or other goods were sold and a share would each go to 
the original owner (if known), the individual(s) finding or salvaging the goods, and the agent 
(Stick 1952:4; Mobley 1994:9). 
These early systems, while considered necessary by the state to limit what many 
merchants and insurance agents considered the criminal destruction and looting of ships and 
could also be considered the first intrusion of outside government onto the otherwise self-
sustaining residents of the Outer Banks.  Where discoveries of shipwrecked goods were once 
considered “finders keepers,” many along the North Carolina coast may have viewed these 
systems as a means of government encroachment upon and profit from the highly valuable 
commodities plucked from the sea.  Both the Lighthouse Service and the vendue system, while 
often considered unpopular, were the only real forms of government intervention along the North 
Carolina coastline until well into the mid-nineteenth century.  This relationship between the 
federal government, life-saving, and risk mitigation in shipping became more complex 
throughout the late-19th and early-20th centuries. 
Local residents of the North Carolina Outer Banks, also known as “Bankers,” were 
rumored to drop a casket on the way to burial if they heard the cry “ship ashore!” to reap what 
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they considered the bounty of the sea.  Many often risked their lives to save others in the raging 
surf or graciously offered their homes to those cast upon the shores with little more than the 
clothes on their backs.  While residents of the North Carolina Outer Banks may have attempted 
to save the lives of those cast ashore during a storm, the same respect was not always extended to 
their personal possessions.  Those pulled unconscious from the raging surf were often 
resuscitated only to find that their pockets had been picked clean by their saviors (Mobley 
1994:11).  An article from an issue of the Harpers New Monthly Magazine (1860), provides a 
look into the dual perception of the wrecking culture along the North Carolina Outer Banks in 
1860, 
A wilder country than the Banks cannot well be imagined.  Where it widens to four or 
five miles there is a little tillage; but generally speaking, nature has but few 
encroachments on her primeval rule to complain of.  The men may be sweepingly 
described as combining the vocations of farming, fishing, and wrecking.  Their ideas of 
meum and tuun [mine and thine, i.e. a distinction of private property] have been accused 
of some slight confusion on the subject of stranded property.  But by all accounts they are 
sounder on this point than the coast-people of Cornwall and Wales.  Their kindness and 
hospitality to wrecked seamen is unfailing and unlimited.  Instances have been told us of 
the surrender for weeks together, of a shoreman’s whole house to a company of such 
unfortunates without the prospect of compensation.  Formerly, practices were attributed 
to a portion of the Bankers slightly inconsistent with this description.  Nags Head derives 
its name, according to the prevalent etymology, from an old device employed to lure 
vessels to destruction.  A Banks pony was driven up and down the beach at night with a 
lantern tied around his neck.  The up-and-down motion resembling that of a vessel, the 
unsuspecting tar would steer for it.  Other means of increasing the wreck harvest were 
resorted to.  But the march of moral improvement, let us hope, has abolished them all.  
The latest explorers of Arabia report that the Christian virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity 
are popularly recognized even in connection with wrecking, and that the eye of faith- 
though churches are still scarce- is turned upward in a better spirit than that of expressing 
trust in an easterly gale.   
Our own impression is, that Bankers may be found farther inland and farther north 
who make more money out of wrecks, of one kind or another, and are every way less to 
be trusted than those of Arabia.  We throw out the idea for what it is worth, and shall be 
delight to know that no one of our readers has cause to coincide our opinion.    
 
These early and often-contradictory representations of the local inhabitants of the North 
Carolina Outer Banks make it difficult to judge how correct any one representation may be, and 
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furthermore, what, if any consequence this culture may have with the development of the USLSS 
along the North Carolina coast.  Early in her work, Bathurst identified several major difficulties 
in studying the idea of wrecking.  First, the act of wrecking is an illegal activity and those 
involved would not want to incriminate themselves by discussion of their experiences.  Second, 
many of those who could be accused of wrecking, hardly consider it a crime, but rather an 
opportunity to acquire vital supplies that could not otherwise be obtained.  It is, therefore, 
understandable that the vast majority of what we know about this culture along the North 
Carolina Outer Banks is both fragmentary and often contradictory in nature.  While there is 
evidence of both the Banker’s hospitality in providing shelter for shipwrecked sailors and 
robbing the bodies of nameless corpses washed ashore in the night, it can be reasonably argued 
that the local inhabitants of the North Carolina Outer Banks can be credited with being the first 
life-saving entity along the North Carolina coast.  While their motives were often far from 
altruistic, Bankers responding to the call of ship ashore made the effort to save the lives of the 
passengers and crew before attempting to salvage anything from the vessel (Mobley 1994).   
As shipping traffic along the east coast of the United States increased, North Carolina 
witnessed its fair share of maritime disasters.  The steamships Home (1837) and Pulaski (1838) 
both wrecked along the North Carolina Outer Banks resulting in a high loss of life (Stick 
1952:23-41; Mobley 1994:17-20).  While local residents came to the aid of those washed ashore, 
they could do little more than pluck survivor’s near lifeless bodies from the surf and provide 
them with food and shelter from their most modest means.  Despite the fact that the wreck of 
Home caused Congress to pass legislation that required all sea going vessels to carry enough life 
preservers for everyone on board, it did not initiate many other changes in regards to life-saving 
in North Carolina.  These two disasters, along with the increasing number of wrecks occurring 
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along the Carolina coast, exemplified the need for an established and well-trained shore-based 
life-saving system.  This wrecking culture, common along the North Carolina Outer Banks, 
paved the way for the adoption of more organized federal attempts to establish shore-based life-
saving system along the coast of the state in the 1870s     
The Establishment of the USLSS in North Carolina 
 It was not until well after the end of the American Civil War that the federal government 
focused interest in life-saving operations along the North Carolina coast.  A series of particularly 
disastrous wrecks in 1870 combined with increasing public criticism forced the federal 
government to reevaluate its meager provisions for establishing a life-saving organization.  
Despite North Carolina’s well-known reputation for being one of the most dangerous stretches of 
along the eastern seaboard, construction on the area’s first life-saving stations did not begin until 
1873 after Congress appropriated $100,000 for the establishment of new life-saving stations 
upon the coast of the United States (USRM 1873).  Of the twenty-one stations created through 
this bill, seven were to be located along the North Carolina coast and included stations at Jones 
Hill, Caffey’s Inlet, Kitty Hawks’ Beach, Nag’s Head, Trent Woods, Chicamacomico, and Little 
Kinnakeet.  One element differentiating these stations from those previously constructed along 
the coast of the northeastern United States was the fact that they were to be interconnected with 
telegraph lines.  The Act of March 3,1873 appropriated $30,000 for the connection of the storm-
signal system of the Signal Service within the life-saving stations in both New Jersey and North 
Carolina.  Kimball believed that the ability for the stations to communicate both with one another 
and with passing vessels would facilitate increased communication and, therefore, make it easier 
to disperse information regarding storms, shoals, and potential dangers to shipping (USRM 
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1873:20-22).  Construction of these stations, which began as early as April 1874, was complete 
and ready for use in December (Means 1994: 27). 
 By the time the first stations were being constructed along the North Carolina coast, the 
Service itself had undergone a massive reorganization under the leadership of Sumner Kimball.  
Kimball had implemented several sweeping mandates meant to reestablish the Service as a 
competent force, which included establishing standardized equipment, work routines, and 
operating procedures.  These original mandates were published within the Life-Saving Service’s 
section of the Annual Report of the Chief of the Revenue Marine Bureau for the Fiscal Year 
Ending June 30, 1873.  These regulations dictated the conduct of daily life for all involved in the 
Service and further established a series of standards that guided the growth and development of 
the Service along the North Carolina coast. 
Methodology of the Life-Saving Service along the NC Coast 
   The first life-saving stations along the North Carolina coast were small, utilitarian 
structures built by local contractors to federal standards set by the Service.  The stations were 
originally staffed by six surfmen and one keeper who lived and worked in the station during what 
was known as the “active season” in the area.  Along the North Carolina coastline, the active 
season lasted from the first of December to the first of March each year.  Keepers employed at 
the stations were paid an annual salary of two hundred dollars while surfmen, who only worked 
during the active season, were paid a salary of forty dollars per month.  While actually 
employing salaried surfmen was a recent development in the service, the pay for keepers had 
remained unchanged from when pay was first authorized in 1854.  Keepers were employed year-
round to both maintain their stations and summon assistance for those shipwrecked along the 
coast throughout the year.  In the event of a shipwreck, surfmen could be recalled at any time 
72 
 
throughout the year in which they were required.  Surfmen were paid an additional three dollars 
for on such occasions.  While this new system was greatly improved from previous attempts to 
compensate members of the Service, the salaries were considered low given the danger of 
rescuing those in peril upon the sea.  Low pay and a lack of pension were often blamed for the 
Service’s inability to recruit and retain highly skilled watermen that were often invaluable in 
facilitating rescues along the coast (Sherman 1878:3).   
 It was not long after its establishment along the North Carolina coastline that the Service 
actively began to standardize equipment, drills, and standard operating procedures in an effort to 
become a more efficient force.  Daily work routines were established dictating training, watch, 
and drill schedules.  Surfmen maintained diligent watch along the coast throughout all hours of 
the day.  At night and during times of inclement weather, two surfmen would depart their station 
and walk along the shore in opposite directions to both warn away vessels near shore and to 
locate and report vessels wrecked in the surf.  To ensure accountability, each surfman would 
walk along the beach until meeting another surfman from the adjoining station and exchange 
tokens, or checks to prove that they had indeed walked their beat.  Stations that were located on 
stretches of coastlines where it was impossible to reach another station, either due to distance or 
geographical limitation, utilized a device similar to a punch clock to ensure accountability.  Each 
surfman would carry a set of Coston flares to either warn vessels of their proximity to shore, or 
signal to them that help was on the way (FIGURE 4.1) (Mobley 1994:35).   
 If a shipwreck were reported, the patrolman would burn a red Coston light (a predecessor 
to the modern flare gun) to inform the vessel in distress their succor was at hand.  The surfman 
would then immediately return to the usually quiet life-saving station, which sprang to life on the 
report of the wreck.  It is at that time that, depending on the condition and location of the vessel 
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in distress, that the keeper would decide which shore-based life-saving method could best 
facilitate a safe and effective rescue. 
 
FIGURE 4.1. Armed with only a lantern and flares, surfmen of the USLSS constantly patrolled 
the desolate, storm-ravaged beaches of the North Carolina coastline searching for wrecks and 
warning vessels from danger (Merryman 1880:326). 
The keeper’s decision often depended on several factors including the sea state, the condition of 
both the vessel and the crew, and the condition of his crew and their equipment.  Conditions 
along the North Carolina coastline generally compelled life-saving crews to prefer a number of 
rescue techniques dictated by the specific instances of each wreck occurrence.  One of the 
greatest limiting factors in facilitating a shore-based rescue along the North Carolina coast was 
the distance between those in peril and dry land.  While many of the wrecks along the North 
Carolina Outer Banks occurred within a couple hundred yards from the beach, others were lost 
74 
 
on shifting shoals of the “Graveyard of the Atlantic” that often extended well into the open ocean 
(Stick 1952:2-3). 
A station’s access to and training with various life-saving apparatus also affected how the 
crew rescued victims of shipwrecks.  The USLSS was limited to two main methods of 
facilitating a shore-based rescue.  The first, and the most popular along the North Carolina Outer 
Banks involved throwing a line to a vessel, and then using one of several apparatus to physically 
carry survivors from ship to shore hoisted safely above the waves.  In 1874, a small mortar or 
rocket was used along the North Carolina coast to cast a line to a vessel in distress with mixed 
results.  While both methods were somewhat inaccurate and limited in effective range, they 
could generally reach vessels stranded within three hundred and fifty yards from shore (USRM 
1873: 29-30).  Once the whip line was fired over a stranded vessel, its crew would haul in the 
whip line until receiving a heavier cable and a tally board attached with directions to the crew in 
both French and English (FIGURE 4.2).  Mariners were also directed what to do in case of 
shipwreck through documents published by the Life-Saving Service (USLSS 1881:231-237).  
Once connected to the wrecked vessel, life-savers would haul each of the crewmembers 
to shore on one of three different devices.  The first, a boatswain’s chair, was simply a piece of 
wood attached to two pieces of line in which an individual could sit.  This device, while 
traditionally used for performing shipboard work, was not suitable for performing rescues in 
rough weather as those in the boatswain’s chair could easily be knocked out by waves or floating 
debris only to be lost forever to the turbulent surf below.  A modified version of the boatswain’s 
chair was developed in which a large pair of breeches were sewn into a rig that could be pulled 
between ship and shore (FIGURE 4.3).   
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FIGURE 4.2.  An image from a popular contemporary publication showing the process of 
securing a line and establishing communications between shore-based rescue personnel and 
mariners on board a vessel in distress (Merryman 1880:331). 
 
FIGURE 4.3.  An image portraying a shipwreck survivor being conveyed to shore using a 
breeches buoy (Merryman 1880:332). 
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This device, known as a breeches buoy or more commonly referred to as simply “the apparatus” 
was lightweight, simple to use, and favored amongst life-savers along the North Carolina coast. 
A third apparatus, known as a life-car, resembled a covered metal boat and could rescue 
multiple survivors while keeping them dry and could also be used for salvaging luggage and 
other cargo that would be destroyed if exposed to the elements. Despite these advantages, the 
life-car was often deemed too heavy for use along the North Carolina coastline where the long 
distance between stations prohibited such a heavy instrument from being carried along the beach 
for any distance (Mobley 1994:39). 
If wrecks were located beyond the limit of the Life-Saving Service’s guns, rescue was 
attempted by boat (FIGURE 4.4).  The Life-Saving Service used two main boats for rescue.  The 
first, known as the lifeboat, was thirty-six feet in length and weighed too much to be easily 
launched or recovered.  Due to its size and weight, the lifeboat usually had to be launched and 
recovered from deeper and calmer waters in bays, rivers, and lakes using a marine railway or 
some other kind of launch.   
  
FIGURE 4.4.  Image showing the use of a USLSS surfboat during a rescue  (Merryman 
1880:333). 
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 It was because of its limitations, that North Carolina life-savers preferred the surfboat over the 
life boat as it was slightly smaller and light enough to be pulled along the beach and launched 
through the breakers directly opposite of a stranded or wrecked vessel (Mobley 1994: 40-47). 
The Life-Saving Service along the North Carolina coast operated in this manner for a 
number of years.  Soon after its establishment in the state, advancements in technology and the 
refinement of methods would greatly increase the efficiency of the Life-Saving Service.  While 
the new stations in the Tar Heel State barely had the opportunity to prove themselves at sea when 
another issue threatened to crumble the organization from within.      
Politics in Life-Saving 
 
 Allegations of political corruption and favoritism within the ranks of the Service were a 
constant issue for the fledgling Life-Saving Service along the North Carolina coast in the mid-
1870s (Mobley 1994:48-52).  Positions within the early life-saving service were often awarded 
due to political affiliations to individuals who saw the post simply as a means of supplemental 
income during the harsh winter months.  Individuals granted these positions were often 
unqualified or unfit to hold the position awarded.  These inexperienced men would often hinder 
rescue attempts and cost the lives of both their fellow crewmembers and the shipwrecked sailors 
they were attempting to rescue.   
 This issue was addressed in the first publication of the Annual Report of the Operations 
of the United States Life-Saving Service for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1876.  This 
publication contained the results of the service’s annual inspection of both the keeper and crew 
of each life-saving district to determine their competence and eligibility for service.  This report 
found the life-saving stations on the North Carolina coast to be suffering from the appointment 
of several incompetent members to the USLSS and quickly cited the meager pay of both the 
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keepers and surfmen as the primary difficulty in recruiting and retaining competent individuals.  
This report found that two of the ten keepers had no nautical experience whatsoever while many 
of the surfmen were either incompetent or physically unqualified to hold their position.  At one 
station, there were reportedly only two crewmembers who were fully qualified for service 
(USLSS 1876:27).  While the service’s annual report for 1877 later praised the area for making 
improvement, the report stated that,  
The temporary control of its affairs gained by petty local politicians, whose aim was to 
subordinate the service to their personal ends; their method being to endeavor to pack the 
stations with their own creatures, without the slightest respect to use or competency.  The 
success of these maneuvers would at once involve the utter ruin of the service; for what 
stranded crew, clinging to the shrouds of a vessel going to pieces in the breakers, could 
hope for succor in the hour of their bitter extremity, from life-saving stations recruited 
from the cross-roads grocery?  It would be indeed an evil day when the wrecked sea-farer 
could look for help only to the puppets of local politics, involving the paralysis of its 
strong arm of deliverance for imperiled mariners, proceeded from any representative man 
in our State or national politics, nor from any aspirant of whatever party complexion, for 
any office of elevation or consequence (USLSS 1877:34-36). 
 
 The annual report for 1877 also stated that its attempts to identify and replace unqualified 
crewmembers granted due to political affiliation had been largely successful.  Despite this 
proclamation, continued political corruption, inexperience, and the appointment of unqualified 
crewmembers to the stations of the North Carolina Outer Banks often hindered rescue attempts 
and multiplied the numbers of lives lost along the state’s coast.  These factors were most likely 
the case in the loss of the entire crew of the Jones Hill life-saving station when their surfboat 
capsized while attempting to rescue sailors from the Italian bark Nuova Ottavia, which wrecked 
along the North Carolina coast in 1876 (USLSS 1876: 11-14).  The loss of life associated with 
this particular wreck reflected the inexperience and disorganized nature of many of the stations 
along the North Carolina coast.  Unfortunately, the following years would bring several disasters 
79 
 
that would thrust the inefficiency of the North Carolina life-saving service into the national 
spotlight and act as a catalyst for reform within the service as a whole.     
The Wrecks of USS Huron and Metropolis 
On the night of November 23, 1877 the United States warship USS Huron ran aground in 
a heavy fog near the Nags Head life-saving station.  The officers of the USS Huron had mistaken 
their course and wrecked on the beach after striking a shoal in heavy seas.  As the raging surf 
pummeled the ship, its crew attempted desperately to lighten the vessel and signal anyone on 
shore.  While USS Huron grounded only two miles from the Nags Head life-saving station, the 
station was closed as USS Huron had wrecked during the off-season and would not be in 
operation for another week (Mobley 1994:57).  By sunrise, the survivors huddled on what little 
remained of USS Huron as it was slowly torn apart by the surf.  As survivors struggled to swim 
to shore they were greeted by locals who, when asked why they had not gained access to life-
saving equipment and come to their aid, responded that the station was locked and they did not 
want to break into it with out official permission (Mobley 1994:57).  Survivors notified the local 
life-saving crew and attempted to help their fellow crewmembers after breaking into the Nags 
Head station.  Unfortunately, by the time the Nags Head crew could be mustered and their 
equipment brought to the site of the wreck, no remaining survivors could be seen on board the 
vessel.  While the crew of the station was able to revive several sailors found washed upon the 
beach, the losses were substantial.  Of the 132 men USS Huron set sail with, only 34 survived 
the ordeal (USLSS 1877:123) 
The steamer Metropolis, formerly the Federal gunboat Stars and Stripes during the 
American Civil War, had been refitted for merchant trade by 1878 (USLSS 1878: 87).  With a 
dubious history and rumored to be un-seaworthy, Metropolis was fully laden with cargo and 215 
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passengers from Philadelphia bound for Brazil (Mobley 1994: 67).  After departing Philadelphia, 
weather conditions quickly worsened off the coast of North Carolina.  A massive wave swept the 
smokestack, several lifeboats, and other items from the deck and water quickly entered many 
portions of the ship extinguishing the engine fires and filling the hold.  With his vessel 
effectively disabled, Captain J.H. Ankers set sail for the Currituck Beach Lighthouse.   
 Ankers beached Metropolis just before dawn the morning of 31 January 1878.  Several 
survivors of the wreck were able to swim through the breakers and successfully made it to the 
beach where they immediately regrouped and attempted to find help.  
Members of the Jones Hill life-saving station located the wreck just after 0800 and were able to 
report the find to Keeper John G. Chappell a mere two hours later.  Upon hearing the report of 
the vessel in distress, Chappell quickly mustered his crew and left for the wreck site (USLSS 
1878: 81).  
 Facing horrendous conditions, the crew of the Jones Hill life-saving station were able to 
make it to the site of the wreck an hour later and had began firing their line throwing mortar by 
noon (USLSS 1878: 82).  Despite the crew’s ability to arrive on site and become operational 
relatively quickly given the conditions, a series of mishaps and a general lack of preparation 
greatly hindered life-saving attempts.  After exhausting all of the shot for the mortar without 
successfully connecting a line to the wreck, the men of the life-saving station could do little more 
than attempt to save those who tried to swim to shore while the steamer broke apart in the surf.  
The chaos that arose as dozens of survivors attempted to swim through the surf was described in 
the investigation of the wreck as, “It was one of terror and wild confusion, of struggling heroes 
and perishing victims in the greedy seas, while the air was filled with encouraging shouts and 
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despairing shrieks…” (USLSS 1878: 84).  Despite the crew’s best efforts, 85 of 215 passengers 
died in the raging surf.   
 The wrecks of USS Huron and Metropolis, occurring only weeks apart, marked a major 
turning point in the development of the USLSS.  The high loss of life combined with the 
inadequacies of the current life-saving service warranted drastic changes in the funding, 
organization, and operation of the life-saving stations established along the United States 
coastline.  Negative publicity plagued the life-saving service after the disasters.  Newspapers 
throughout the country issued reports charging crews of the USLSS with incompetence and 
negligence of duty (FIGURE 4.5).  In response to these allegations, an inspector from the USRM 
investigating the wreck of Metropolis reported a witness stating,  
As near as I can find out the life-saving men did all that human beings could do in  trying 
to save life and care for the living.  They ran great risk in hauling people out of the surf, 
the fragments of the wreck striking them with great force in the rough sea.  I was 
informed by the citizens who were at the wreck that the life-saving men worked 
faithfully.  I was also informed by the life-saving men that the citizens all worked 
faithfully in saving lives, carrying those saved to their own dwellings, and furnishing 
clothing for the naked.  The life-saving men deserve much honor and praise for their 
bravery in risking their own lives to save those about to perish.  I will say that there were 
only two men who spoke against the Life-Saving Service: one was the captain, and 
another who had charge of the passengers (USLSS 1878: 85). 
 
  
FIGURE 4.5.  Cartoons depicting reactions to the disaster of the USS Huron and the need to 
increase funding to life-saving operations (Harpers Weekly 1877, 1878). 
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Despite the commendable investigation findings, public outcry demanded reform as the 
United States Senate passed a resolution on 6 February 1878 demanding an explanation of the 
poor performance of the life-saving crews responsible for responding to the wrecks of both USS 
Huron and Metropolis (Sherman 1878).  In response to this request, Secretary of the Treasury 
John Sherman issued a letter reviewing the condition and state of efficiency of the life-saving 
service along the North Carolina coast.  This document cited several deficiencies in the service 
along both the Outer Banks and throughout the country.  Sherman specifically cited the extreme 
distance between stations along the Outer Banks as a primary factor in the disasters of USS 
Huron and Metropolis.  A distance of more than ten miles often separated stations along the 
North Carolina coast.  This distance, almost double that of stations along similar stretches of 
coast from Cape Cod to Delaware, was seen as a hindrance to life-saving crews who could not 
cover their assigned patrol area within a suitable time.  If those on patrol did in fact locate a 
wreck in the surf, they would then be forced to make the lengthy trip back to the station to alert 
the crew of their station.  The entire crew would then trek back to the site of the wreck pulling 
the life-saving cart, which contained all apparatus and ordnance required to facilitate a shore-
based rescue.  This task was both physically and mentally exhausting, and was often made more 
complicated due to the rigors of constant patrolling and making multiple rescues during storms 
and rough weather (Sherman 1878).   
As a result of his findings, Sherman made several recommendations.  First, he argued that 
the service should augment the number of stations along the North Carolina coast so that the 
distance between each station would average four to five miles apart.  Second, he argued for the 
construction of five additional stations located anywhere between the southernmost station along 
the Outer Banks to Cape Fear in the southeast corner of the state.  Next, he proposed to increase 
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pay for keepers from $200 to $500 per annum while also conferring upon them the power of 
inspector of customs.  This increase in both pay and responsibility would help attract and retain 
well-qualified and competent keepers to the service.  Sherman also advocated the increase of 
life-saving crews from six members to eight.  This increase would allow for an individual to 
remain on station to both safeguard government property and prepare the station for the care of 
survivors in the event of wreck.  Finally, Sherman advocated extending the “active storm season” 
in which the stations were fully manned from September 1 to May 1 of each year, or longer as 
necessary (Sherman 1878:3-4).   
Utilizing many of the recommendations Secretary Sherman made for improving 
efficiency along the North Carolina coastline, Congress unanimously approved the act of June 
18, 1878 establishing the USLSS as an independent entity.  The act provided five important 
organizational features, the most important of which was that the service was no longer 
considered a part of the Revenue Marine, but rather an independent entity supervised by a 
General Superintendent.  Furthermore, this act specified that the coastal stations were to be 
staffed from the first of September to the first of May each year, extending the active season for 
the service to four months.  Stations along the coasts of the Great Lakes would be open from the 
opening of ice-free navigation to its close, unless otherwise specified by the Secretary of the 
Treasury.  The pay of keepers, a constantly cited reason as to why the service consistently had 
difficulty in obtaining and retaining competent individuals, would be raised from two hundred 
forty dollars per annum (only forty dollars more than what keepers received when they were first 
paid in 1854) to four hundred dollars per annum.  The provision also provided for the 
employment and pay of volunteer lifeboat crews on the Great Lakes at a rate of three dollars per 
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day of training and no more than ten dollars for each occasion of performing their duty (USLSS 
1878:52-61).   
While the act of June 18, 1878 affectively established the United States Life-Saving 
Service as an independent entity under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury, the act 
continued to utilize officers of the USRM as inspectors of stations and investigators of incidents 
involving loss of life.  This acted as an important check to ensure impartial review of the Service 
and as yet another system of checks and balances.  This act also allotted for the funding of 37 
more stations, increasing the Service’s total number to 139 and greatly expanding the network of 
USLSS stations along the coasts of the United States.  These stations, along with a number of 
unmanned houses of refuge, were organized into eleven separate districts each with independent 
chains of command (USLSS 1878:11-12).   
In addition to the provisions made with the official establishment of the USLSS, eleven 
stations were constructed along the North Carolina coast in 1878, reducing the distance between 
stations along the northern Outer Banks to five miles of one another while extending the network 
of life-saving stations from Virginia to just south of Cape Hatteras (Mobley 1994:82).  In 
addition to the construction of more stations along the North Carolina coast, the adoption of a 
new type of line throwing device better facilitated rescues using the breeches buoy or life car. 
The Lyle gun, championed by Lieutenant D.A. Lyle of the United States Army Ordinance 
Department, increased the effective range of shore-based life-saving operations up to 695 yards 
(USLSS 1878:45).  Despite these improvements, some more isolated areas, were still in dire 
need of support.  The numbers of stations along isolated portions of coast were still too few to 
facilitate the most effective network for rendering assistance to mariners as morbidly exemplified 
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in the wrecks of both USS Huron and Metropolis occurring within miles of one another on the 
North Carolina Outer Banks.  
The Golden Age of the USLSS Along the North Carolina Coast 
 
 The 1880s brought the continued establishment of USLSS Stations along the North 
Carolina coast.  Stations were constructed both in an effort to expand the tight network of 
stations already in operation along the Outer Banks as well as establishing stations along other 
areas of the coast previously neglected by the Service.  Stations were built at Cape Hatteras in 
1880, New Inlet in 1882, Ocracoke (later renamed Hatteras Inlet Station) and Cape Fear in 1883, 
Oak Island in 1886, and Cape Lookout in 1888 (Mobley 1994:99). 
 In addition to the increase in the number of stations along its shores, new technologies 
greatly increased the capabilities of the Life-Saving Service along the North Carolina coast.  In 
1880, members of the USLSS began utilizing draft horses to pull the cumbersome wreck carts to 
the site of a shipwreck.  Surfmen also used these animals to ride while on patrol.  This measure 
greatly increased the speed at which Life-Saving crews could respond to wrecks.  That same 
year, the Women’s National Relief Association, a volunteer humanitarian group, begin supplying 
life-saving stations with clothing for the survivors of wrecks.  Prior to their involvement, 
clothing for those recovered from the sea was provided by the benevolence of either local 
citizens or the very surfmen who plucked the survivors from the sea (USLSS 1880:41-43).  In 
1882, pay was again increased for both keepers and surfman, while a board on Life-Saving 
Appliances was formally established to seek out, test, evaluate, and recommend new equipment 
for the USLSS (USLSS 1882:40-46).  After December 1, 1882 life-saving stations along the 
North Carolina coast began utilizing a seventh surfman during the winter months while 
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telephone service was extended to these stations sometime after 1885 (USLSS 1883:12, 
1885:34).     
 The 1890s marked the peak of USLSS operations along the North Carolina coast.  
Additional stations were built at Portsmouth in 1894 and Core Banks (later renamed Atlantic) in 
1896.  The period between 1893 and 1899 tested the Service as an average of one vessel per 
week ran aground along the North Carolina coastline (Mobley 1994:104, 117).  After the turn of 
the century, advances in navigation, decreased shipping traffic, and the increased use of small 
gasoline engines greatly reduced the number of wrecks serviced by the men of the USLSS.  Only 
three more stations were built along the Old North State’s coast, Ocracoke and Fort Macon in 
1904 and Bogue Inlet in 1905.  The Service was combined with the United States Revenue 
Marine to form the United States Coast Guard in 1915.     
Conclusion   
 
 The development of the United States Life-Saving Service as an independent entity can 
be traced, not through a single catastrophe, but rather, through a series of disasters and events 
that slowly garnered public support for government action.  The early history of the service can, 
therefore, be interpreted as a legislative history spanning nearly three quarters of a century.  
Slowly evolving from the privately funded, volunteer group dedicated to assisting those in peril 
at sea, the Massachusetts Humane Society initiated a movement that would eventually result in 
the nation’s first federally funded shore-based live-saving service.   
The disasters of USS Huron and Metropolis, both occurring off the North Carolina coast 
and having mass casualties, spurred a public outcry that eventually served as a catalyst for the 
development of the USLSS as an independent entity.  This granted the USLSS more 
responsibilities and a larger budget to expand and upgrade its existing network of life-saving 
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stations.  This increase in the number of stations, combined with the application of constantly 
advancing technologies, facilitated an expanding network of Life-Saving installations along the 
North Carolina coastline.  As this growing network of stations became more efficient, the 
amount of shipping traffic, and therefore wrecks, drastically increased just before the turn of the 
century.   
It was not until after that time, that wrecking losses along the North Carolina coast began 
to lessen.  Many historians attribute the consolidation of the USLSS into the United States Coast 
Guard (USCG) to three main factors, advancements in marine technology, pay and personnel 
issues, and the progressive political movement.  Advancements in navigational technology such 
as shipboard radios and radar, aids to navigation, as well as an increase in the use of powered 
vessels for merchant traffic greatly reduced the number of local coasting and large sailing vessels 
cruising within site of the North Carolina coast.  In addition to the fewer number of vessels 
wrecking along the coasts, the Service constantly dealt with retaining competent individuals with 
comparatively low wages of government civil servants.  This issue was exasperated by the fact 
that the service had never incorporated any kind of retirement program, forcing older members to 
work till death and further stagnating job mobility for younger surfmen.  Finally, the progressive 
political movement seeking the reduction of federal agencies in order to promote efficiency of 
the United States government pushed for the end of the USLSS.  Now viewed as too small a 
government entity to operate independently, the Service was eventually combined with several 
other organizations to form the USCG in 1915 (United States Congress 1914; McKinnon 2010).  
While many stations along the North Carolina coast continue to operate to this day, the legacy of 
the USLSS began to fade into the annals of history.
  CHAPTER FIVE: IDENTIFYING NATIONAL AND REGIONAL TRENDS 
 
 As the United States Life-Saving Service evolved throughout the mid-19th century, its 
accident analysis procedures greatly improved through the development and utilization of 
standardized forms and record keeping practices.  These measures drastically increased the 
Service’s ability to accurately maintain records that could then be used in future risk analysis.  
Between 1876 and 1915, the USLSS published a compilation of statistics collected by the 
Service each fiscal year through the Annual Reports of the United States Life-Saving Service.  It 
was through the Service’s annual reports that trends in shipping disasters were identified and 
recorded each year.  While this compilation was published for general readership, the USLSS 
utilized the records in their own decision-making processes. 
 In order to understand the potential role of risk in the development of the USLSS along 
the North Carolina coast, one must first ascertain a working knowledge of both the types of 
information gathered by the Service and how the USLSS used this information in its decision-
making process.  Once these elements have been identified, the same information used by the 
USLSS in the past can be reexamined to identify trends that may have not necessarily been 
visible or apparent.  This chapter will examine the role of risk in the development of the USLSS 
through a detailed statistical analysis of the records maintained in the Service’s Annual Reports.  
This portion of the statistical analysis will examine the documents maintained by the USLSS to 
identify trends occurring on national and regional (district) levels within the organization.  The 
data for this analysis has been culled directly from the annals of the Annual Reports of the United 
States Life-Saving Service and will focus on specific elements identified as potential indicators of 
risk in the development of the Service.  While there is often a gap between the occurrence of a 
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disaster and when it is reflected in USLSS records, this data can still be utilized as a starting 
point in establishing major national and regional patterns that are helpful in identifying local 
trends not reflected in the general records of the Service. 
The overall objective of this chapter is to compare national and regional figures 
maintained by the USLSS to determine any general patterns or specific correlations.  These 
patterns will provide a dataset to be used when making comparisons to local wrecking patterns 
within the study area in Chapter Six.  This analysis will also provide evidence of the nature of 
USLSS operations along the North Carolina coastline and will help to determine whether or not 
the USLSS operated in a proactive or reactive capacity.  This distinction will provide valuable 
insight into the effects of risk identification and management on local wrecking patterns in the 
vicinity of Oregon Inlet and will assist in making generalized observations regarding risk and 
maritime disasters along the North Carolina coast. 
For the purposes of this study, data recorded by the USLSS that could be considered 
indicative of risk can be organized into three main categories. The first dataset to be considered 
for this study introduces what some may consider the traditional indicator of risk in society.  
Financial indicators have been used for centuries as one of the universal measures of risk, but the 
question of what specifically can be learned about the USLSS from a comparative analysis of its 
finances and its effects on operations is still unanswered.  The second and perhaps most sobering 
dataset that could be used to identify any correlation between risk and the development of any 
observable patterns in the USLSS are the records pertaining to the loss of life within the 
operations of the Service.  While it may be thought that the human element of historical study is 
lost through statistical analysis as it reduces the loss of life to a simple entry onto a spreadsheet.  
This dataset has the potential, however, to identify trends that can shed light onto the thought 
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processes affecting the organization and operation of the USLSS and will include information 
regarding the losses of life, number of lives imperiled in maritime disasters, and the monetary 
cost of human life. The third and final organizational dataset compiled for the use of this study 
includes information regarding the physical operations of the USLSS and its effects along the 
nation’s shores.  
National and Regional Trends 
 
 Between 1876 and 1915, the USLSS systematically collected, analyzed, and distributed 
detailed statistics of all disasters occurring within their jurisdiction.  This data was organized to 
represent the statistics of disasters occurring on both regional and national scales.  Information 
regarding shipwrecks, maritime disasters, and other mishaps were collected on the national level 
to track both domestic and international trends in maritime disasters occurring within the 
operations of the USLSS.  Information regarding regional disaster patterns was also maintained 
for each USLSS district.  These districts were established by the USLSS and served as the 
smallest organizational unit of the Service for the purposes of accident analysis and record 
keeping.   
While the USLSS often collected extremely detailed information regarding individual 
wrecks, the statistical data collected for analysis by the Service were relatively simple.  Despite 
this, the analysis of even this basic information yields a great amount of diagnostic information 
regarding the identification of trends or patterns in maritime disasters.  This information was 
often used by the USLSS in future decision-making and risk management schemes.  For the 
purposes of this study, a cursory review was conducted of the statistical data collected by the 
USLSS in order to identify any trends or correlations with statistical information collected from 
the study area.  It should be noted however, that while there are undoubtedly numerous ways to 
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analyze the statistical records maintained by the USLSS, analysis for the purposes of this study 
focuses on identifying patterns or trends within national and regional datasets that may be 
indicative of risk. 
Funding and Financing the USLSS 
 
 For centuries, one of the most widely accepted measures for risk lay not in a qualitative 
measure, but a quantitative one through finances.  The evolution of the barter system and the 
creation of currencies and market-based societies used potential financial loss, and the 
subsequent development of insurance, as the ultimate measure of risk in society.  Therefore, it is 
only appropriate that the measure of risk in the USLSS start with a discussion of the 
organization’s finances.  For the purposes of this survey, all figures utilized for analysis will be 
done with 2011 adjusted dollar amounts as converted through the website 
https://measuringworth.com.  While the USLSS received routine funding after its reorganization 
in the 1870s, only those appropriations and expenditures reported in the Service’s Annual 
Reports will be included in this study.  Examination of these statistics yields some interesting 
initial observations (FIGURE 5.1).   
First, unlike many federal agencies today, the USLSS consistently operated within their 
budgets, utilizing nearly all funds appropriated to it for the first half of its existence.  It was not 
until 1893 that figures for the amount of funds appropriated to the Service and the amount used 
each fiscal year begin to slowly yet consistently diverge.  Following 1893, the USLSS operated 
with a consistent and constantly increasing excess of funding.  This excess allowed for more 
discretionary spending in terms of development of new technology, the construction of new Life-
Saving stations, and the dissemination of safety and security information to both the maritime 
community and the general public. 
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FIGURE 5.1.  Reported appropriations and expenditures of the USLSS between 1876 and 1915 
as reported in the Service’s Annual Reports.  All values have been adjusted to the 2011 USD. 
While the results of this over-funding took several years to be reflected throughout the Service’s 
operations and statistics, some effects could be seen as little as five to ten years after any major 
fluctuation.  On the national scale, several examples of this trend can be observed in FIGURES 
5.2 and 5.3.  These two figures show the number of vessels considered total losses and the 
number of individuals who sought shelter from the USLSS respectively. This data was monitored 
throughout the Service’s existence and could be considered influential input into the USLSS 
decision-making processes. 
FIGURES 5.2 and 5.3 show trends in both vessels totally lost as well as the number of 
individuals seeking shelter that gradually increase until about the turn of the century when 
funding levels increase creating a surplus and the trends noticeably decrease.   
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FIGURE 5.2.  Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the number of vessels 
considered total losses occurring within the operations of the Service between 1876 and 1915. 
 
FIGURE 5.3.  Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the number of individuals 
requiring shelter from the Service between 1876 and 1915.   
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These figures do not begin to increase again until after 1910 when a significant decrease in 
funding combined with the increased availability and popularity of small gasoline powered craft 
resulted in an increase in both the numbers of vessels considered total losses and the numbers of 
individuals seeking shelter sharply increase once again (USLSS 1909:17-18).  This trend is 
particularly noted in the number of individuals seeking shelter after 1907 (FIGURE 5.3). 
This trend can also be noted, while not as drastically, in several other datasets comparing 
the amount of appropriations received by the USLSS and the amount of property and lives 
imperiled throughout the existence of the Service (FIGURE 5.4). In most statistics comparing the 
amount of appropriations received by the USLSS to imperilments (i.e. property and lives 
endangered and saved by the actions of the USLSS) it can be noted that both the appropriations 
and the amount of property and lives imperiled gradually increase.  
 
FIGURE 5.4.  Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the total value of property 
imperiled within the operations of the Service between 1876 and 1915.   
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While the amount of appropriations consistently and gradually increases over time, the amount 
of imperilments, do so erratically.  This pattern is not as well defined, however, in figures 
comparing appropriations received by the USLSS and the amount of property and lives lost 
within the operations of the Service (FIGURE 5.5). 
 
FIGURE 5.5.  Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the number of lives lost 
within the operations of the USLSS between 1876 and 1915. 
 
This is an important differentiation to be made as the distinction sheds light on the concept of 
risk management within the USLSS.  It can be observed that the rate of increase in lives lost, 
while erratic, is minimal in comparison to those describing the amount of property and lives 
imperiled nationally.  This means, that with the exception of the massive losses of life occurring 
in the 1878-1879 season (effects of the disasters of USS Huron and Metropolis), the number of 
actual losses occurring within the operations of the USLSS did not increase as rapidly as the 
number of imperilments and is indicative of some level of success in the Service’s rescue and 
recovery efforts.  This trend is also indicative of what could be described as a culture of 
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maintenance within the USLSS in which the level of actual operational losses experienced 
through the value of property (FIGURE 5.2) and number of lives lost (FIGURE 5.5) are 
maintained at a relatively minimal level regardless of the number of imperilments (i.e. potential 
losses).   
It is interesting to note that the patterns described above are present in regional/district 
datasets encompassing the North Carolina coastline (FIGURES 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8).  These 
regional datasets, while dominated by more extreme spikes generated by fluctuations in regional 
disaster activity, closely mirror those patterns observed in national datasets.  With the exception 
of a couple of major disasters in 1878, 1879, and the hurricane of 1899, none of the major peaks 
in disaster activity occurring along the North Carolina coast are observable in national figures.  
Yet regional trends, which will be described in greater detail when discussing local datasets, 
generally appear to be similar throughout the entire organizational structure of the USLSS. 
 
FIGURE 5.6.  Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the number of vessels 
considered total losses within the district encompassing the North Carolina coast  
between 1876 and 1915.   
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FIGURE 5.7.  Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the total value of property 
imperiled within the district encompassing the North Carolina coast between 1876 and 1915.   
 
FIGURE 5.8.  Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the total value of property 
lost within the district encompassing the North Carolina coast between 1876 and 1915.   
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An organization’s appropriations and expenditures may serve as a traditional measure of 
risk in modern societies, but it provides an incomplete view of the nature and effects of risk 
within the USLSS as an organization and the subsequent effects on national and regional 
shipping patterns.  Further analysis will examine another measurement of risk in the USLSS, by 
putting a figurative face on the study of risk through the study of datasets regarding losses of life 
within the operations of the Service.   
Loss of Life 
 
 While the study of the Service’s finances may be viewed as the traditional measure of 
risk in many capitalistic societies, the reality of the losses of life within the Service held equal 
importance in the development of the USLSS and can act as yet another indicator of the effects 
of risk determination.  The examination of human losses within the operations of the USLSS 
should start with a discussion of the most important component of maritime societies, the vessel 
itself.  To this day, ocean-going vessels are considered one of the largest and most sophisticated 
machines ever to be produced by human kind (Pérez-Mallaína 1998:63).  As such, the loss of any 
vessel, whether it was a large ocean-going steamship or a small family owned yacht, often 
commanded the attention and concern of both the general public and the maritime community 
and are therefore at the forefront of many reports detailing the efficiency of the USLSS.  As 
“floating societies,” the individual vessels in distress upon the coastlines of the United States 
constituted the ultimate representation of what could be lost plying the waters in search of 
pleasure or profit. 
 As the number, size, and purpose of the vessels navigating the oceans often dictates the 
type of individuals on board them, some analysis must be conducted prior to any examination of 
the individuals on board the said vessels.  The dataset in FIGURE 5.9 represents the number of 
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vessels requiring assistance from the USLSS to those resulting in total losses (wrecks).  The 
distinction between these two datasets is of particular importance.  Vessels requiring assistance 
simply refers to a vessel that required direct assistance (regardless of whether or not it was 
requested) from the USLSS but did not necessarily constitute a complete wreck or total loss.  
These vessels were often those that had become temporarily disabled, those seeking shelter or 
pilots, navigation advice, or information in which the vessels would utilize the services of the 
USLSS to safely conduct their business or be saved from potential disaster.  For the purposes of 
this analysis, only information recorded in the USLSS Annual Reports including vessels 
requiring physical assistance from the USLSS stations to prevent impending disasters has been 
included.   
In contrast, vessels that are considered to be total losses are those where the vast majority 
of the vessel itself and/or cargo could not be saved by the USLSS.  These vessels may remain 
preserved in the archaeological record to this day.  FIGURE 5.9 shows the relationship between 
the number of vessels requiring assistance from the USLSS and the number of those vessels 
considered total losses between 1876 and 1915.  The number of vessels considered total losses 
fluctuates rhythmically year to year as number of total losses increases soon after the 
establishment of the Service into the 1890s and subsequently decreases just after the turn of the 
century (FIGURE 5.9). In contrast, the number of vessels requiring assistance from the USLSS 
gradually increases until about 1907 when an increase in the availability and popularity of small 
gasoline powered launches combined with a reduction in funding caused a drastic increase in the 
number of vessels requiring assistance. 
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FIGURE 5.9.  A comparison of the number of vessels requiring assistance from the USLSS and 
the number of those vessels considered total losses within the operations of the USLSS between 
1876 and 1915. 
As the number of vessels requiring assistance drastically increases after 1907, the number 
of vessels considered total losses slightly decrease after 1900.  This may be due to an increase in 
the number of small gasoline powered recreational craft being used throughout the United States 
just after the turn of the century.  These vessels are generally smaller and, therefore, easier to 
rescue from danger or salvage while they carry fewer passengers and less cargo. The issue was 
deemed so significant that the USLSS began to explicitly address the problem in their Annual 
Reports in 1909 noting that, “In view of the numerical importance which accidents to gasoline 
boats have attained, it is deemed proper to devote space in this report as shown by reports 
submitted by the keepers of life-saving stations” USLSS 1909:18).  It is feasible to predict that, 
at least nationally, most datasets pertaining to losses will slowly increase until about 1907 after 
which time the number of vessels, cargoes, and lives imperiled will drastically increase 
(FIGURE 5.10) while data on losses will rise only slightly (FIGURE 5.11).   
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FIGURE 5.10.  A comparison of the number of vessels requiring assistance and the number of 
lives imperiled within the operations of the USLSS between 1876 and 1915. 
This pattern is indicative of an increased reliance on the USLSS by the maritime community.  In 
contrast to the drastically rising number of imperilments recorded by the USLSS, the modest 
number of losses indicates an increased capability of the Service to save lives and property while 
maintaining what may have been considered acceptable losses for the time. This ability of the 
USLSS to maintain a measure of efficiency (in limiting or maintaining losses of vessels, life, and 
cargo to what may have been considered a politically or publicly acceptable level) helps facilitate 
a level of comfort within society regarding risk and the role of the USLSS.  
This trend is interestingly not as well defined in regional datasets. FIGURE 5.12 
compares the number of vessels requiring assistance (imperiled) and the number of vessels 
considered total losses. While each set of figures vary erratically over the years, they both 
gradually increase until about 1912 when they very obviously diverge from one another. 
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FIGURE 5.11.  A comparison of the number of lives lost and the number of vessels considered 
total losses within the operations of the USLSS between 1876 and 1915. 
 
FIGURE 5.12.  A comparison of the number of vessels requiring assistance and the number of 
those vessels considered total losses occurring within the operations of the district encompassing 
the North Carolina coastline between 1876 and 1915.  
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This is contrary to the pattern in national datasets in which figures for total losses, while erratic, 
continue to rise over time.  Furthermore, FIGURE 5.13 examines the losses of vessels and lives 
along the North Carolina coastline.  While the number of lives lost within the district remains 
relatively constant, the number of vessels considered total losses drastically decrease after 1910.  
This may be due to the possibility that the vast majority of the maritime public along the sparsely 
populated North Carolina coastline often earned their livelihoods from the water.  These 
experienced small boat operators included the local watermen, fishermen, and just about anyone 
else living or working along the North Carolina coast.   
 
FIGURE 5.13.  A comparison of the number of lives lost and the number of vessels considered 
total losses within the district encompassing the North Carolina coast between 1876 and 1915. 
As such, it is argued, that the skill and knowledge of local mariners negated the risk 
involved with operating small craft in the area.  In comparison, individuals in more urban areas 
such as the Northeastern United States or along the Great Lakes who may have been more 
financially secure than individuals living in eastern North Carolina, were now able to purchase 
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and operate a small gasoline powered craft with little to no boat handling experience.  This lack 
of experience led to an increase in accidents in these areas that were reflected in national 
statistics. 
Operations 
 As the USLSS proved itself as an efficient and independent service throughout the late 
1870s and early 1880s, its influence slowly grew to encompass more and more of the nation’s 
coastline. As the maritime community increasingly utilized the Service, the United States 
government routinely increased the amount of funding available to the fledgling organization.  
The USLSS quickly used the funds to develop its ever-expanding network of life-saving stations 
along the coasts, riverbanks, and lakeshores of the United States.  The number of operational 
life-saving stations along the coasts of the nation is a reliable measure of both the tempo of 
operations over time and a physical manifestation of the role of risk in the development of the 
USLSS.  The resulting increase in presence along the nation’s shores generated an increase in 
interaction between the USLSS and the maritime community whether they were recreational day 
sailors or transatlantic merchant vessels.     
 Given the consistent and gradual rise in the amount of appropriations awarded to the 
USLSS throughout its existence, it can only be expected that this trend would result in an equally 
consistent increase in the number of life-saving stations built throughout the Service’s existence.  
On the national scale, the construction of life-saving stations represents one of the most 
consistent trends found in data recorded in the Annual Reports.  When this dataset is compared 
with the number of vessels requiring assistance within the operations of the USLSS, a trend is 
observed that is consistently represented throughout nearly all datasets concerning the 
construction of life-saving stations throughout the nation (FIGURE 5.14).   
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 As would be expected, the number of life-saving stations built throughout the history of 
the USLSS rapidly increases early in its development and becomes more gradual as the Service 
matures over time. In direct contrast, the number of vessels requiring assistance increases slowly 
during the early development of the Service but begins to rapidly increase as the USLSS became 
a well-established organization. This pattern is indicative of two distinct relationships. 
 
FIGURE 5.14.  A comparison of the number of USLSS stations built and the number of vessels 
requiring assistance within the operations of the USLSS between 1876 and 1915. 
The first, and perhaps most obvious of the two, is that the number of vessels requiring assistance 
is dependent upon the number of life-saving stations.  In other words, as the number of life-
saving stations increased over time and the network of stations expanded along the shores of the 
United States, it is only logical that the number vessels receiving assistance from these stations 
would also increase over time.   
Alternatively, the data represented in FIGURE 5.14 could be indicative of a pattern of 
increased reliance on the USLSS by maritime communities across the nation.  Toward the end of 
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the USLSS in the early twentieth century, the Service had become a well-established network 
spanning the nation’s coast.  This network of Life-Saving stations became known in the maritime 
community as a source of information regarding weather and local navigation, a source of 
shelter, and perhaps most importantly a savior from the rages of an angry sea.  This increased 
sense of security may have provided individuals with less maritime experience, who would have 
not dared to try their unskilled hands going to sea without the possibility of a speedy rescue, the 
confidence to attempt to ply local waters in small recreational craft.   
While this greatly contributed to the rapid increase in the number of vessels requiring 
assistance towards the latter portion of the operational history of the USLSS, it did not 
necessarily deter individuals from utilizing recreational watercraft as the well-established USLSS 
stations dotting the nation’s coast ensured relative safety from the tidal currents and unexpected 
squalls.  Along the North Carolina coast, data regarding operational tempo through the 
construction of life-saving stations reveal an interesting trend (FIGURE 5.15 and FIGURE 5.16).  
While there are no observable correlations between the construction of life-saving stations and 
most other disaster data, a specific correlation was identified between the number of stations 
built and both the number of total losses and the number of lives imperiled along the North 
Carolina coast. 
FIGURE 5.15 clearly shows how the number of lives imperiled within the district 
gradually increase over time.  This particular dataset, however, is dominated by a series of 
significant spikes followed by an immediate return to levels at or below average. These peaks 
occur relatively routinely throughout the history of the USLSS on the North Carolina coast and 
correlate with both peaks in data regarding the number of vessels requiring assistance and 
increases in the number of life-saving stations built within the district (FIGURES 5.15 and 5.16). 
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FIGURE 5.15.  A comparison showing the specific correlations between the number of USLSS 
stations and the number of lives imperiled within the district encompassing the North Carolina 
coast between 1876 and 1915. 
 
FIGURE 5.16.  A comparison of the number of USLSS stations and the number of vessels 
considered total losses within the district encompassing the North Carolina coast between 1876 
and 1915. 
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Specific events that may have contributed to this pattern are noted in FIGURE 5.15 and are listed 
below. 
1. An increase in the number of USLSS stations built in response to the disasters of 
USS Huron and Metropolis  
2. The disasters of USS Huron and Metropolis in the 1877-1878 season. 
3. An increase in the number of stations built immediately after the passage of the 
1882 USLSS bill. 
4. A spike in the number of lives imperiled during the 1889 season.  The number of 
USLSS stations increases both before and after this peak, which dramatically 
decreases after the wreck of the steamship Strathairly in 1891.   
5. A spike in the number of lives imperiled during the 1897-1898 season 
immediately after several new stations are built in the area.  The number of lives 
imperiled dramatically decreases after the destructive 1899 hurricane season. 
6. A spike in the number of lives imperiled occurring during the 1903 season after 
which a number of USLSS stations are constructed along the North Carolina 
Coast. 
7. An increase in the number of lives imperiled as small, gasoline powered craft 
become more popular.    
 
TABLE 5.1 shows the specific correlations of these three datasets.  (It can be argued) that 
these datasets represent an ideal example of the reflexive characteristics exhibited throughout the 
USLSS in the cause and effect relationship formed between these datasets. Here, it can be noted 
that each year in which a large number of vessels lost were recorded within the annals of the 
USLSS Annual Reports and, once broadcast throughout the maritime community, altered the 
public’s perception of risk and safety on board the vessels plying the waters off the United 
States.   
Number of 
Peak  
Increase in the 
Number of Total 
Losses 
Increase in the Number 
of Lives Imperiled 
Increase in the Number 
of LSS Stations 
1 1877 1878 1878 
2 1889 1889 1889 
3 1895 1897 1894 
4 1900 1903 1904 
5 1911 1914 NA 
TABLE 5.1.  A table showing the correlation between each peak in both the number of total 
losses and the number of lives imperiled and the correlating increases in the number of USLSS 
stations built along the North Carolina Coast between 1876 and 1915. 
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This was reflected in the Service’s records through a marked decrease in the number of lives 
imperiled (i.e. the number of people) on board vessels requiring assistance in a given fiscal year. 
The USLSS subsequently reacted to the increased perception of risk by increasing the number of 
life-saving stations in areas deemed either too dangerous or otherwise under-staffed based on the 
number of vessels wrecking there in the past. 
Each of these processes usually progressed within a relatively short time period, usually 
occurring within a couple of years.  While there is lag time associated with the collection, 
analyzing, and dissemination of disaster data, it is interesting to note that the time between an 
increase in the number of vessels considered total losses and the number of lives imperiled 
gradually increases over time.  This may be indicative of the general public’s growing 
complacency regarding the acceptable level of risk in maritime transportation.  It is this 
relationship that exemplifies the reflexive nature of the USLSS and the effects of risk in the 
development of regional wrecking patterns. 
These specific correlations in multiple datasets indicate that this pattern, while possibly 
not as well defined in other datasets, is not an isolated occurrence.  One of the ebetween the 
peaks in the number of lives imperiled on board vessels in distress and the corresponding 
increases in the number of USLSS stations along the North Carolina coast.  In all but one 
circumstance (1897), there was an increase in the number of USLSS stations built either during 
or immediately following a spike in the number of lives imperiled.  This would imply that the 
vast majority of the increases in the number of life-saving stations (and therefore an increase in 
the tempo of regional operations) are reactive rather than proactive along the North Carolina 
coast.   
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Conclusions 
 
After 1876, the USLSS collected, analyzed, utilized, and disseminated quantifiable data 
for use in policymaking, contingency planning, and public outreach/education.  These large and 
complex datasets collected during this process were recorded and published in the Service’s 
Annual Reports of the Operations of the United States Life-Saving Service and widely distributed 
to the maritime community.  These documents provided detailed information regarding 
operations of the Service and were organized by both district and Service-wide figures to identify 
larger trends and patterning that could be used in future decision-making in a process that could 
be described as reflexive monitoring. 
These reports serve as a starting point in any and all statistical analysis of the records of 
the USLSS for a particular locale.  While much of the information provided in the Annual 
Reports is well beyond the scope that would be required for a local (as opposed to 
district/regional or national) survey, the data provided within the publications provide solid 
evidence of patterning and trends occurring at the national and regional levels that may not be 
present or easily observable when researching smaller local datasets.  Similarly, broad trends or 
patterns identified by the USLSS (and ultimately utilized in the Service’s accident 
analysis/decision-making processes) may not have been able to identify patterns in local areas as 
the objectives of the USLSS usually required analysis on larger scales.   Chapter 6 will examine 
the statistics extracted from the records of the USLSS while identifying local trends and patterns 
in the disaster activity occurring within a 15-mile radius of Oregon Inlet, NC.
CHAPTER SIX: LOCAL WRECKING PATTERNS 
 
 While the United States Life-Saving Service routinely collected and analyzed shipping 
data on both national and regional scales, it did not specifically analyze shipwreck activity for 
particular localities.  Given the fact that the USLSS formed a network of Life-Saving facilities 
along the majority of the nation’s coastline, it may have not been vital given its mission to 
analyze local wrecking patterns.  Despite this oversight, there is evidence of patterning in local 
datasets that is unique and not necessarily representative of recorded national or regional trends.  
Furthermore, the importance of local wrecking patterns, and what they can tell us about the 
influence of risk on shipping, cannot be understated as it provides invaluable insight into the 
small maritime communities doting the North Carolina Outer Banks.  Without succumbing to 
historic presentism (i.e. applying modern thought processes to historic situations), a general 
understanding of the circumstances influencing the concept of risk within a particular maritime 
community can be gained through the study of local datasets.   
This chapter will examine the wrecks occurring within a fifteen-mile radius of Oregon 
Inlet, North Carolina and will focus on identifying local patterns in comparison to national and 
regional trends while determining the role of risk in the development of these local patterns.  As 
in the last chapter, much of the raw data used for analysis was culled directly from the annals of 
the Service’s Annual Reports.  While the USLSS did not specifically examine wrecking patterns 
on the local level, wreck statistics were recorded on the regional level and information on the 
disasters occurring at any particular locale can be extracted from this data.  In addition to the 
Annual Reports, even more information was located in local USLSS records.  One of the most 
helpful of these documents included copies USLSS Form 1806, also known as a “wreck report,” 
that were completed by the keeper of a USLSS station after each wrecking incident.  Information 
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included in this form was often much more detailed than the data recorded in national 
publications and contained specific information pertaining to the location and cause of the wreck.  
A final major contributor to this portion of statistical analysis included the daily entries made in 
station logbooks relating to each of the recorded wrecks.  These entries included even more 
positional information and often recorded the evolution of a wreck from its actual discovery by 
USLSS personnel to its final destruction or salvage. 
 For the purposes of this study, the statistical analysis of local wrecking patterns can be 
organized into three sections.  The first portion of this chapter will examine the raw data 
pertaining to wrecks occurring within the study area.  While this is only a discussion of data as 
extracted from USLSS documents, it is important to note that it is extracted from larger 
(regional) datasets and has, therefore, never been analyzed on such a small scale.  By extracting 
and reorganizing this data, it is possible to ascertain the types, sizes, cargoes, and ages of vessels 
wrecking within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet, as well as the number of individuals imperiled, 
rescued, or killed on board said vessels.  This information provides an invaluable insight into the 
vessels traversing (and wrecking) within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet between 1876 and 1915 
while providing a snapshot of the maritime culture of the North Carolina coastline during the late 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.  The next portion of the chapter will examine local 
datasets for any trends or patterning occurring over time.  This section will be very similar to the 
previous chapter in which datasets involving the Service’s finances, the losses of life, and the 
operations of the USLSS are all examined as potential indicators of the effects of risk within the 
United States Life-Saving Service.  The third and final portion of this chapter will discuss the 
effectiveness and overall efficiency of the USLSS stations operating within the vicinity of 
Oregon Inlet while identifying any chronological patterning associated with it.   
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Shipping and Wrecking Along the Northern Outer Banks 
 
 In order to grasp what effects risk may have played on both the development of the 
USLSS and wrecking patterns along the North Carolina Outer Banks, one must first develop a 
basic understanding of the number and types of vessels wrecked in a given area as well as their 
approximate age, size, rig, and other diagnostic features.  The examination of this type of data 
not only provides valuable insight into the constitution of local maritime trade, but also 
establishes a baseline to be compared to other temporal patterns identified on local, regional, and 
national trends.  Within the study area, there were 133 instances of vessels requiring assistance 
from the USLSS between 1876 and 1915.  Of these 133 rescues, 45 (about 34%) resulted in total 
losses in which the majority of both the vessel and cargo could not be saved.  While these vessels 
represent what may still be found remaining in the archaeological record, only two vessels, USS 
Huron (1877) and Strathairly (1891) have been located and positively identified.  
While the data regarding vessels in distress were directly extracted from the annals of the 
USLSS Annual Reports, the Service documented many of the vessels requiring assistance in 
greater detail.  Of the 133 reported instances of vessels requiring assistance from the USLSS, 
108 of these (about 81%) were recorded in daily log books kept at each station while 45 were 
documented on USLSS Form 1806 for the records of the Service.  It is from these records that 
general statements can be made regarding the types of vessels traversing the waters in and round 
the vicinity of Oregon Inlet.  Before examining local datasets for patterns reflecting the effects of 
risk in wrecking occurrences, it is important to have a basic understanding of both the types of 
vessels and events compromising USLSS operations in the area.  Through historical research, 
information regarding the type/rig, size, cargo, nationality, number of individuals on board, as 
well as classifications for wrecking incidents could be collected.  
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Vessels and Cargo 
 
 Historical research provided diagnostic information for each vessel requiring assistance 
from the USLSS in the vicinity of Oregon Inlet. Schooners comprised the majority (57%) of the 
vessels wrecked within the study area followed by sloops, sailboats, and steamships (comprising 
12%, 8%, and 7% of the vessels wrecked respectively).  The other vessels (comprising 16% of 
the total vessels requiring assistance) within the immediate area are made up of an assortment of 
small vernacular craft and working boats (FIGURE 6.1) of relatively recent construction 
(FIGURE 6.2). 
 
FIGURE 6.1.  Composition of vessels requiring assistance within the research area by type/rig as 
compiled from various primary source documents, n=133.   
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While the majority of the vessels requiring assistance within the research area were 
schooners, this does not necessarily mean that they were of the larger ocean-going variety.  47% 
of the vessels requiring assistance were less than 50 tons in displacement while the remaining 
53% of the vessels requiring assistance were equally dispersed by displacement from 50 to more 
than 1000 tons (FIGURE 6.3).  Of course, this has major implications when discussing registered 
and insured vessels.  Between 1876 and 1915, vessels registering more than 5 gross tons were 
required to be registered as they are today to, “provide conclusive evidence of nationality for 
international purposes, provide for unhindered commerce between the states, and admit vessels 
to certain restricted trades such as fisheries” (USCG 2008).  Vessels displacing less than 5 gross 
tons usually consisted of small personal sailboats, skiffs, and rowboats that, while not registered 
for documentation, were included in the routinely recorded statistics of the USLSS (USLSS 
1907:13). 
 
FIGURE 6.2.  Composition of vessels requiring assistance within the research area by vessel age 
as compiled from various primary sources, n=133.  
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FIGURE 6.3.  Composition of vessels requiring assistance within the research area by tonnage as 
compiled from various primary source documents, n=133. 
 
While USLSS records regarding the vessels within the study area are less than complete, 
historical research indicates that 63 or 47.3% of the vessels requiring assistance were in fact 
registered.  Of these, very few were actually recorded as being insured in USLSS wreck reports.  
Of the 133 vessels requiring assistance within the research area, only five vessels (3.7%) were 
insured.  Of these few vessels, only three (2.2% of the 133 vessels requiring assistance) are 
recorded as having insured cargo. This could mean that while large oceangoing vessels 
frequently passed the beaches on either side of Oregon Inlet, the majority of the vessels utilizing 
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the inlet (and therefore wrecking) were often smaller coasting vessels and personal craft.  Those 
larger oceangoing vessels requiring assistance from the USLSS were often transient craft simply 
passing through the area.     
While it is assumed that more vessels operating in the area were in fact insured given the 
size and value of vessels sailing along the North Carolina coast, it is interesting to note that the 
USLSS station crews reporting to the scene of a maritime mishap did not record this information.  
An example of this can be seen in the case of Samuel W. Hall, which wrecked near 
Chicamacomico in 1897 and was a total loss.  The vessel, displacing 322 tons, was a moderate 
sized ocean-going schooner that was registered and insured through the American Lloyd’s 
Insurance Underwriters (American Shipmaster’s Association 1897:808).  Despite the fact that 
this vessel was insured, the individuals from the Chicamacomico Life-Saving Station responding 
to the disaster recorded the vessel as not being insured (USCG 1898).        
After the introduction of the standardized USLSS Form 1806 “Wreck Report” in 1876, 
determining whether or not a vessel or its cargo was insured was included as a standard question 
to be answered following a disaster and, therefore, a component of the USLSS accident analysis.  
Despite this, recording whether or not a vessel and its cargo was insured would seemingly be an 
important observation to be made when determining the role of risk in shipping, it was not often 
collected in the field.  This fact could be indicative of several potential observations regarding 
risk, the role of the USLSS, and maritime operations at the time.  While the USLSS crews within 
the research area did not often record whether or not a vessel or its cargo was insured, it may 
simply be due to the fact that this task was done at higher levels of accident analysis within the 
Service.  Another reason may have been that it was simply not important enough to record for 
the purposes of the USLSS.  The amount of insurance on a vessel and its cargo, which may often 
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be thought of as what modern risk analysis deems a key risk indicator (KRI), may have not been 
considered as a characteristic indicative of risk in the USLSS at the time (Institute of Operational 
Risk 2010:2). 
Given the large amount of wrecks occurring off North Carolina’s Outer Banks, it is often 
assumed that some of the wrecks occurring in the area were a result of insurance fraud.  There is, 
however, very little evidence of this found within the USLSS Annual Reports nor within the 
statistics they contain.  Therefore, the task of determining the occurrence, prevalence, and effects 
of insurance fraud on shipping along the North Carolina coast is well beyond the scope of this 
survey. 
While the historical record provides an immense amount of information detailing the 
vessels operating within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet and provides an insight into the local 
maritime culture of the area, it produces an incomplete representation of its effect on the cultural 
seascape.  Although it may be assumed that the majority of the vessels operating within the 
vicinity of Oregon Inlet would be carrying the goods and commodities vital to life on the Outer 
Banks, this was not the case.  Historical research indicated that while many vessels did in fact 
carry locally produced goods, supplies, and seafood throughout the region, the majority (37.6%) 
of the vessels requiring assistance were traveling in ballast with no cargo at all (FIGURE 6.4).  
Other types of cargo routinely carried on board vessels within the study area included lumber 
(12%), coal (6.7%), fish (3.7%) and general merchandise (3.7%).  Additional types of cargo 
carried by vessels in the area are represented relatively evenly, while in much smaller numbers, 
throughout the dataset (FIGURE 6.4). 
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FIGURE 6.4.  Composition of vessels requiring assistance within the research by cargo type, 
n=133
 120 
Nationality and Locality 
 
 Whether a vessel is cruising along the Outer Banks or navigating the ever-changing inlets 
and shallow sounds, plying the waters in and around the North Carolina coast has always been a 
dangerous task.  As such, local knowledge is vital for safe navigation.  It can therefore be argued 
that determining both the nationality and homeport of the vessels requiring assistance from the 
USLSS is of vital importance in order to understand the role of risk in local wrecking patterns. 
While not surprising, American flagged vessels make up the largest majority (121 vessels or 
90.9%) of vessels requiring assistance in the area.  The 12 remaining vessels are divided nearly 
evenly amongst four other countries, and are of unknown origin (FIGURE 6.5). 
 
FIGURE 6.5.  Composition of vessels requiring assistance within the research area by 
nationality/flag status, n=133. 
While identifying the nationality (or flag) of a vessel is useful in identifying trends in 
regional and international shipping, it offers relatively little information regarding the potential 
influence of local knowledge on the decisions made by the masters and crews in the operation of 
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their vessels.  It is for this reason that a greater understanding of the concept of locality should be 
examined.  By recognizing what areas a vessel routinely operated in, it can be assumed that the 
owners, masters, and sailors on board these vessels hold a reasonable working knowledge of the 
area.  Local knowledge of area waterways could hold significant influence in the effects of risk 
on a particular crew and thus greatly affect their decision-making processes in navigating the 
areas in and around Oregon Inlet. 
While the potential benefits of local knowledge in navigating shallow inland and near 
shore areas of the coast cannot be underestimated, determining the capacity of local knowledge 
is a difficult task.  For the purposes of this study, a vessel and its crew are assumed to have a 
working local knowledge of the area if the vessel they are operating is owned within a 30 mile 
radius of Oregon Inlet, North Carolina.  This distance mirrors the average amount of coastline 
required to be memorized for current USCG boat crewmembers operating along the North 
Carolina coast (USCG 2011).  Vessels owned outside of this local classification, but still within 
the state of North Carolina could be considered regional in that they most likely know the nature 
of navigating North Carolina’s near shore waterways, but may or may not have personal 
experience in the navigation of Oregon Inlet.  For the purposes of this study, all other U.S. 
flagged vessels operating within the study area are considered domestic in that they most likely 
have limited local knowledge of the area and typically only traverse the area while in route to 
other ports of call.  
Utilizing these classifications, of the 133 vessels requiring assistance within the research 
area, the majority (52%) of vessel traffic can be considered domestic in nature.  Only about a 
quarter of the vessels (23%) could be considered local vessel traffic while even fewer (16%) are 
from the state of North Carolina (FIGURE 6.6).  This means that while the vast majority of 
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vessels requiring assistance within the research area were small coasting schooners (FIGURES 
6.1 and 6.2) most were owned and routinely operated from outside the state and, therefore, had 
less working knowledge of the area.  This proves that local knowledge played a significant roll in 
wrecking occurrences and could hold considerable influence on the effects of risk on local versus 
domestic or foreign shipping operating within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.6.  Vessels requiring assistance within the research area by locality, n=133. 
Passengers and Crew 
 
While much can be learned from the discussion of the vessels plying the waters off the 
North Carolina coast, one must not forget to discuss the men and women on board these vessels.  
Through the examination of the numbers of both individuals working on board vessels and those 
utilizing them for transportation can be indicative of the effects of risk on those plying the waters 
of the Graveyard of the Atlantic.  FIGURE 6.7 shows the total number of people on board each 
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vessel while FIGURE 6.8 shows the crew-passenger ratio of those on board.  The number of 
individuals onboard the identified vessels requiring assistance in the vicinity of Oregon Inlet 
averaged seven people while the vast majority of the vessels usually had fewer than ten persons 
on board. 
 
FIGURE 6.7.  Vessels requiring assistance within the research area by the total number of 
individuals on board, n=133.   
While this information is important in telling the average potential workload of USLSS stations 
within the research area when making rescues, it fails to make any 
distinction between the number of crew and the number of passengers on board these vessels.  
This distinction is extremely important when discussing the possible effects of risk on local 
maritime traffic for several reasons.  It should be noted that vessels operating within the vicinity 
of Oregon Inlet had very few if any passengers on board (FIGURE 6.8).  The majority (57.1%) 
of the vessels requiring assistance had no passengers on board while only a small percentage 
(7.5%) carried any passengers at all.  
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FIGURE 6.8.  Composition of vessels requiring assistance within the research area by the 
numbers of passengers and crew on board, n=266. 
This could be because most personal craft operating within the area usually only had enough 
space for one to two individuals at the most and the vast majority of the disasters experienced by 
these vessels occurred where any passengers on board could make it to shore on their own often 
without the assistance of USLSS crews.   
 While most of the vessels in distress had very few if any passengers on board, the same 
could not be said regarding the number of crewmembers on board these same vessels.  In 
contrast to the number of passengers on board, the majority (65.4%) of vessels in distress within 
the research area had crews remaining on board when the USLSS rendered assistance.  Of these 
vessels, 60.1% had between 1 and 10 crewmembers.  This trend could indicate that while the risk 
associated with navigating the waters off the North Carolina coast may have been enough to 
keep recreational vessels and passengers off the water, it may not have created enough concern 
to derail the pursuit of profit.  
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Wrecking Incidents 
 
A final series of observations can be made from existing USLSS data regarding the cause 
and nature of maritime mishaps occurring within the research area.  For the purposes of this 
study, the classifications for both the nature and cause of maritime disasters were extracted 
directly from USLSS annual reports.  These classifications were then applied to the vessels 
requiring assistance within the research area.  FIGURES 6.9 and 6.10 show the results of this 
classification scheme.  The two most common types of disaster occurring within the research 
area are identified as stranding and foundering.  The Service defines stranding as, “disasters 
resulting from running aground, striking a rock, reef, bar, or other natural object, although the 
vessel may have foundered as a result of such a catastrophe” (USLSS 1877:86).  Foundering was 
described as, “[disasters] which resulted from the leaking or capsizing of vessels, but not those 
which resulted from collision, stranding, or striking any sunken wreck, or against piers, snags or 
ice” (USLSS 1877:80).  Given the coastal bathymetry of the area, stranding (occurring in 53% of 
all cases), was the most common type of disaster occurring within the research area by a wide 
margin.  Very few (about 10%) vessels foundered just off the coast while the remaining 37% of 
the vessels requiring assistance within the research area experienced some other type of disaster 
(or the type of disaster was not recorded).   
While the majority of disasters occurring within the research area were of a single type, 
the cause for these disasters were slightly more varied. Local weather dominates the causes of 
disasters being cited as the primary reason for a vessel to require assistance from the USLSS in 
39 out of 133 cases (just over 29%).  The remaining 51% of the vessels examined are divided 
between other or unknown causes of disaster (7% and 44% respectively). 
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FIGURE 6.9.  Vessels requiring assistance within the research area by disaster type, n=133. 
 
FIGURE 6.10.  The causes of disaster for each vessel requiring assistance within the research 
area, n=133. 
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Maritime activity in the vicinity of Oregon Inlet 
 
 The waters within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet, North Carolina bore witness to the 
development, expansion, and transition of several maritime cultures and traditions during the late 
19th and early 20th centuries.  While the information recorded by the USLSS concerning vessel 
mishaps at the time can never fully describe the area’s unique maritime culture, it at least 
provides invaluable insight into its most basic operations.  As such, several generalizations and 
observations can be made regarding the vessels requiring assistance from the nearby USLSS 
stations.   
 While much of this information regarding typical vessel traffic along the Eastern 
Seaboard of the United States around the turn of the century may be found in most maritime 
history texts, the information extracted here provides a more detailed look into the development 
of local maritime culture that was greatly affected by the dynamic environment in which it 
developed.  As such, this cursory overview of shipping and wrecking occurring within the 
vicinity of Oregon Inlet provides a unique local dataset to be examined over time to determine if 
any relationships between the two exist.  While this portion of the chapter detailed more 
qualitative data concerning typologies and classifications, the next section will introduce 
temporal datasets similar to the previous chapter.  These datasets will be examined for potential 
patterns in shipping along the North Carolina coast.   
Changes in Local Patterns Over Time 
 
 As was the case regarding both national and regional patterns, examining records 
concerning the general operations of a particular locality over time can yield invaluable insights 
into that area’s maritime culture.  The following section will analyze the same types of datasets 
as identified in the previous chapter that could be potentially indicative of the effects of risk in 
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the development of the USLSS on the local scale.  While this information was not specifically 
analyzed by the USLSS during its operations, the data could be easily extracted from previously 
existing regional datasets and could reflect patterning unique to an individual locale. 
Funding and Financing the USLSS 
 
 Unlike the consistent amount of appropriations that helped continuously establish and 
expand the network of USLSS stations along the coasts of the nation, the vast majority of 
funding received by individual USLSS stations was in the form of lump sums for one time 
construction or improvement projects as well as for routine maintenance.  A pattern has been 
identified in both national and regional datasets in which there is a marked difference in 
operational statistics between times in which the USLSS were considered to be over and under-
funded (FIGURE 5.1).  This divide symbolizes a shift into a time (after about 1893) in which the 
USLSS was, if only slightly, over-funded.  This excess of funding allowed the Service to invest 
more money in new technologies, better life-saving equipment, and increased salaries for its 
employees; all of which greatly increased the efficiency of the USLSS and eventually led to a 
marked decline in the number of vessels requiring assistance throughout the United States.  An 
example of this can be seen in the budget for the 1898 fiscal year as reported in the Service’s 
Annual Report.  Here, it was reported that there was an amount of money, “unexpended at the 
beginning of the fiscal year from [the] appropriation of 1897” in the amount of $39,519.49 or 
$1,110,000 in today’s currency (USLSS 1899:340).  Rather than the “spend it or lose it” mantra 
of modern government spending, the USLSS redirected the unexpended funds in the upgrade and 
maintenance of the Service spending $6,799 ($190,000 adjusted) on life-saving apparatus, $5.75 
($161 adjusted) on books, charts, stationary, and advertising, $15.13 ($423 adjusted) on freight, 
packing, storage, and telegraphing, $11,688 ($327,000 adjusted) for the rebuilding, repair, and 
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improvement of stations, and $5.00 ($140 adjusted) for station sites.  The utilization of excess 
funds served as a way for the Service to reinvest funds into areas it deemed weakly funded or 
overly vital in a given fiscal year.    
Just as in regional (district) datasets, there is no information regarding the appropriations 
made to individual districts or individual stations.  This was most likely considered both 
impractical and unnecessary as each district received a standardized amount of funding based on 
the number of USLSS districts operating within its area of operations.  Individual stations 
received additional funding for both the construction of new facilities as well as the maintenance 
and improvement of older structures as needed.  As such, the dates and amounts of the vast 
majority of this mundane work (including painting, repair/replacement of older buildings, and 
routine maintenance) are not particularly relevant for the purposes of this study.  Despite the lack 
of differential funding to individual stations, there is still something to be said of funding in 
general.  This is particularly useful in determining if patterns identified in both national and 
regional datasets are indicative of a transition of the USLSS from an under-funded to (even if 
only slightly) over-funded entity.   
After only a brief examination of several graphs comparing the amount of appropriations 
awarded to the USLSS (as a national entity) and various datasets detailing local wrecking 
incidents it can be noted the similarities in patterns exist.  Figures comparing the amount of 
appropriations received by the USLSS and local wrecking statistics (FIGURE 6.11 and FIGURE 
6.12) show the number of wrecks gradually increases until a point correlating with the transition 
from under-funding to over-funding of the service.  It is just after this transition that disasters of 
all types generally shrink in numbers until the end of the data range at which time wrecking 
incidents begin to increase once again. 
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FIGURE 6.11.  Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the number of vessels 
requiring assistance within the research area between 1876 and 1915. 
 
FIGURE 6.12.  Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the number of persons 
sheltered at stations located within the study area between 1876 and 1915. 
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Though this pattern does generally correlate with those observed in both national and 
regional datasets, it is not identical (see FIGURE 5.3).  Wrecking occurrences appear to fluctuate 
more in the study area (most likely due to the effects of local weather/wrecking events) and peak 
in the mid-1890s. While these patterns are not identical to one another, several important 
observations concerning the two can be made.  For example, the rhythmic pattern observed in 
local data reiterates the concept of cyclic risk management and Giddens’s concept of reflexive 
self-regulation being present in USLSS datasets. The trend line observed in FIGURE 6.11 and 
6.12 may display a pattern indicative of reflexive self-regulation in that the utilization and 
success of the USLSS (as observed through the number of vessels requiring assistance and the 
success in saving lives or property) could, through the compilation and dissemination of loss 
data, influence the perception of risk amongst the local maritime community.  This could in turn 
affect the number of vessels making the decision to navigate the waters in and around Oregon 
Inlet, NC. 
Further evidence of both cyclic risk management and reflexive self-regulation 
independent of funding levels may be observed in several other local datasets pertaining to the 
amount of appropriations received by the USLSS and the value of vessels  
requiring assistance within the study area (FIGURE 6.13 and FIGURE 6.14). These graphs 
exhibit a very obvious pattern of peaks over time in 1878, 1891, 1902, and 1914 averaging 12 
years between spikes.  In comparison, peaks identified when trend lines were applied to 
FIGURES 6.11 and 6.12 indicate spikes occurring in 1879, 1897, and 1914 averaging an increase 
in vessels requiring assistance occurring about every 18 years.  This observation is important in 
that it shows that there is evidence of both cyclic risk management and reflexive self-regulation 
in use throughout both the USLSS and the greater maritime community. 
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FIGURE 6.13. Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the value of vessels 
requiring assistance within the study area between 1876 and 1915. 
While this pattern in wrecking activity is interesting, it is important to note that these figures all 
pertain to potential losses (imperilments) and not actual losses suffered in the vicinity of Oregon 
Inlet.  As in both national and regional datasets, there is a marked difference between observed 
patterns in potential losses versus actual losses in a given area (FIGURES 6.14 and 6.15).  While 
it would appear that data relating to potential losses is very cyclic or reflexive in nature, the same 
cannot be said about data pertaining to actual losses.  As observed in both national and regional 
datasets, figures regarding actual losses in a particular area do not appear to fluctuate much over 
time. 
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FIGURE 6.14. Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the total value of property 
imperiled within the study area between 1876 and 1915. 
 
FIGURE 6.15. Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the estimated value of 
property lost within the study area between 1876 and 1915. 
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Rather, these figures appear to level off and remain relatively constant throughout the history of 
the USLSS.  This is indicative of the success of the USLSS of maintaining a consistently low 
level of losses (of both vessels/cargo and lives) despite significant fluctuation in the numbers of 
vessels requiring assistance and a gradually increasing reliance on the Service (FIGURE 6.15 
and 6.16).  While this observation regarding the differences in patterning between potential and 
actual losses can be identified when analyzing the finances of the Service, it is much more 
prevalent when examining data regarding the loss of life within the operations of the USLSS 
within the research area. 
 
FIGURE 6.16. Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the total number of lives 
lost within the study area between 1876 and 1915. 
Another theory regarding the oscillation of wrecking activity may actually involve trade 
patterns.  It could be argued that trade patterns off the North Carolina coast are cyclic in nature 
and wrecking activity is merely a byproduct of the ebb and flow of trade.  While an interesting 
possibility, additional statistical information would be required to make this determination and 
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would be beyond the scope of this study. While cyclic trade patterns may be partially to blame 
for wrecking patterns along the North Carolina coast, trade has little to do with the success and 
failures of the USLSS and the Service’s effect on the perception of risk amongst the maritime 
community. 
Loss of Life 
 
 Examining loss of life occurring within the study area provides several interesting 
observations.  With the exception of the 1877-1878 season (the dramatic peak in the number of 
lives lost can be directly attributed to the loss of USS Huron within the study area in 1877) there 
are relatively few lives lost within the operations of the USLSS stations located within the 
research area (FIGURE 6.17). 
 
FIGURE 6.17.  A graph comparing the number of lives lost to the number of lives imperiled 
within the operations of the USLSS in the research area between 1876 and 1915. 
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This peak, along with one other very small spike occurring in 1891 (attributed in part by the 19 
lives lost on board the steamship Strathairly) are the only marked peaks in losses of life 
experienced within the research area between 1876 and 1915 (USLSS 1893:149).   
FIGURE 6.17 compares the number of lives lost with the number of lives imperiled within the 
study area.  Once again, it can be observed that while the data involving actual losses are 
relatively low and consistently maintained, numbers of potential losses tend to be much larger 
and vary according to other factors.  In this particular case, as was observed in national and 
regional datasets, the number of lives imperiled within the research area gradually increases until 
about the turn of the century (FIGURE 6.18). 
 
FIGURE 6.18.  Appropriations received by the USLSS compared with the number of vessels 
requiring assistance within the research area between 1876 and 1915. 
 
Here, as in national and regional datasets, the number of lives imperiled slowly increases 
over time (with the exception of a few peaks and valleys due to local variations in weather, other 
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wrecks in the area, and other temporary factors effecting wrecking patterns) until the turn of the 
century when surplus funding allowed the USLSS to pour more money into life-saving 
technology while expanding and improving upon its network of USLSS stations along the 
nation’s coasts.  It was only after the introduction of small, affordable gasoline engines did 
wrecking instances begin to increase once again.  While this pattern is not as profound as those 
found in national or regional datasets, it is present nonetheless. 
Furthermore, FIGURE 6.17 reveals another interesting pattern relating to loss of life 
along the North Carolina coastline.  Years in which lives were lost within the operations of the 
USLSS stations in the study area seem to occur in groups where the number of lives lost 
gradually decrease over time.  Here, it can be noted that lives are lost within the study area 
during several distinct time periods throughout the history of USLSS operations within the study 
area (TABLE 6.1).  When measured from the temporal median of each time period, the time 
between each period of loss of life averages 11 years.  This pattern again supports the previously 
identified patterns of both cyclic risk management and reflexive self-regulation in that each time 
period in which lives are lost within the research area is followed by a period of several years in 
which there is zero wrecking incidents involving a loss of life.  This insinuates that individuals 
operating in the vicinity of Oregon Inlet would become aware, either through local knowledge 
networks or efforts made by the USLSS, of the increased danger of a particular location as 
indicated with the increased deaths in the area and alter their activities to an extent that reduced 
accidental deaths in the area for a certain amount of time, averaging about 7.6 years.  This time 
period may have been long enough for mariners utilizing Oregon Inlet to either forget about 
previous losses, trust in the relative safety provided by the USLSS, or simply become more 
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complacent regarding the known dangers of the area which eventually led to more wrecking 
incidents and increased loss of life in the research area.   
  Additionally, the percentage of lives lost in regards to the total number of lives imperiled 
is dramatically reduced by at least two-thirds during each successive time period.  This means 
that while shipping traffic in the vicinity of Oregon Inlet was gradually increasing over time (as 
evidenced by the increasing number of individuals imperiled within the operations of the 
Service), the number of lives lost consistently decreased over time.  This could mean that even 
during periods in which lives were lost in the vicinity of Oregon Inlet, the severity of these losses 
decreased over time.  The one exception to this pattern is the final period in which there was a 
recorded (albeit slight) increase in the loss of life.  This variation in the pattern may be indicative 
of several possible changes in the shipping/maritime culture of the area.  First, this variation 
could be a result of an increase in small boat traffic due to a rise in the availability/popularity of 
gasoline engines.  Second, the slight increase in the percentage of lives lost within the research 
area may occur simply because the losses for the Oregon Inlet area may have been deemed 
socially acceptable given all (known, perceived, or manufactured) risk associated with that 
locale.     
Time Period Number of Lives Lost/Imperiled Percentage of Lives Lost 
1878-1882 109/181 60.20% 
1889-1891 41/196 20.90% 
1895-1900 13/223 5.80% 
1912-1914 8/96 8.30% 
TABLE 6.1.  A chart representing the time periods in which there were recorded losses of life 
occurring within the operations of the USLSS in the research area between 1876 and 1915. 
This concept of socially acceptable levels of risk coincides with the previously mentioned 
maintenance patterns identified in other datasets.  While there are extreme peaks and valleys 
associated with most of the datasets pertaining to actual losses examined for the purposes of this 
study, they decrease to lower, more consistent levels over time.  These levels may be considered 
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the socially acceptable level of losses for that time and may therefore be representative of a 
quantifiable figure of acceptable risk for a given type of loss.  The final dataset examined in the 
course of this study details the operation tempo of the Service within the study area and provides 
further evidence of utilization of reflexive self-regulation in the development of the USLSS both 
within the research area and along the North Carolina coastline.      
Operations 
 
 While the development of both national and regional life-saving networks gradually 
expanded, this was not the case within the immediate vicinity of Oregon Inlet.  The northern-
most portions of the Outer Banks were considered some of the most dangerous sections of the 
North Carolina coast.  As such, the area was the site of the state’s first USLSS stations in 1874.  
Of the six USLSS stations located within the research area, the stations at Nags Head, Oregon 
Inlet, and Chicamacomico were part of the original construction of life-saving stations in 1874.  
Two stations were built at Bodie Island and Pea Island in 1878 as a response to the catastrophic 
wrecks of USS Huron (1877) and Metropolis (1878).  New Inlet station was built following the 
passing of the Life-Saving Service Act of 1882.   
 Due to the relatively small size of the research area (in comparison to the remainder of 
the North Carolina coastline) and the staggered construction of stations in the area, the number of 
stations located in the research area peaked in 1882.  Station growth after this point remained 
stagnant throughout the remainder of the USLSS presence near Oregon Inlet and did not change 
until well after the combination of the USLSS with the USRM in 1915.  This presents a radically 
different dataset than those examined on national or regional patterns and (at least after 1882) 
remains unchanging.  This has implications regarding what can be inferred regarding the 
physical role of the life-saving stations along the shoreline.  While the construction of each of the 
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stations within the research area correlates with a major event along the North Carolina coastline, 
the fact that the number of stations remains unchanging after 1882 in spite of a highly fluctuating 
number of losses would seemingly indicate that the physical presence of USLSS stations in the 
vicinity of Oregon Inlet would have little to no effect on local wrecking patterns.  Given the 
small size of the research area, this is most likely not the case.   
One of the recommendations made after disasters of USS Huron (1877) and Metropolis 
(1878) was that the distance between stations on isolated wreck prone stretches of coasts be 
reduced to 4 to 5 miles (Sherman 1878:3).  The construction of several stations in 1878 
following these wrecks along with the construction of one additional station in 1882 (after the 
passage of the Life-Saving Service Bill) reduced the distance between each station in the 
research area to an average of three miles.  This was approximately the same distance 
recommended in the 1878 report on improving the USLSS along the North Carolina coast and 
was deemed sufficient given the physical conditions found along the Outer Banks.  This is in 
contrast to both national and regional datasets in which the number of stations rapidly grew in 
the early years of the Service only to slow down as the USLSS continuously expanded its 
network along the coasts and lakeshores of the United States well into the 20th century.     
 While it may be assumed that if there were in fact a relationship between the 
number/presence of USLSS stations and wrecking patterns, there would be a direct correlation 
between the number of stations and the number of wrecking incidents within the research area 
(i.e. more stations in more locations means more rescues throughout the Service). This, however, 
was not the case as evident in FIGURES 6.19, 6.20, and 6.21. 
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FIGURE 6.19. A comparison of the number of USLSS stations and the number of vessels 
requiring assistance within the research area between 1876 and 1915. 
 
FIGURE 6.20. A comparison of the number of USLSS stations and the number of lives 
imperiled within the research area between 1876 and 1915. 
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Here it is observed that while the number of stations located within the research area remains 
constant after 1882, the number of vessels requiring assistance fluctuates considerably over time.  
This means that while each individual dataset is greatly affected by other variables, the number 
of stations along the coastline has no effect on wrecking patterns that are visible through 
statistical analysis.  It may very well be that, through additional geospatial analysis, patterns 
relating to the number/presence of life-saving stations may in fact bear some effect on local 
wrecking patterns (Chapter 7). 
 
FIGURE 6.21. A comparison of the number of USLSS stations and the number of lives lost 
within the research area between 1876 and 1915. 
Effectiveness of the USLSS Along the North Carolina Outer Banks 
 
When working with the compiled figures of the USLSS, it is often easy to forget that the 
graphs and statistics collected by the Service are representative of the destruction, confusion, and 
chaos generated by a maritime catastrophe and the figures studied today are often only a part of 
the remaining evidence of the lives of men, women, and children lost to the sea.  Despite this 
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grim reality, much can be learned about both the perception of risk in the USLSS and the local 
maritime community through the study of these losses.   
It would seem that the most reasonable method to measure the efficiency of the USLSS 
would be through a type of cost benefit analysis in which the amount of funding received by the 
Service is compared to the number of actual losses in order to gain a better understanding of the 
(fiscal) importance of losses over time.   
 
FIGURE 6.22.  A chart comparing the amount of appropriations received by the USLSS and the 
value of each life lost (amount of appropriations/number of lives lost) within the operations of 
the Service between 1876 and 1915.  
Unfortunately, it is only feasible to perform such an analysis on the national scale due to the way 
in which the USLSS distributed its funding amongst individual districts.  FIGURE 6.22 shows 
the approximate value of life as determined by dividing the amount of appropriations by the 
number of lives lost each fiscal year nationally between 1876 and 1915.  Figures from this 
simple cost benefit analysis are sporadic and relatively inconsistent as both the amount of 
funding received and the number of lives lost within a rapidly increasing USLSS network greatly 
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fluctuated from year to year.   Unfortunately, analyses such as these can provide relatively little 
information concerning the efficiency or effectiveness of local stations within the research area. 
Local patterns can be identified through additional analysis that examines the overall 
efficiency of the Service within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet while identifying patterns relating to 
the effectiveness of the USLSS locally.  Perhaps the most telling measure of the efficiency of the 
USLSS within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet can be found in the comparison of imperilments or 
potential losses with actual losses.  FIGURE 6.23 shows a comparison of the estimated amount 
of property saved and lost within the research area between 1876 and 1915.  
 
FIGURE 6.23.  A comparison of the estimated amount of property saved and lost within the 
research area between 1876 and 1915.  
While the USLSS continued to develop their life-saving network along the North Carolina coast, 
the men of the USLSS stationed within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet often suffered considerable 
losses of property within their respective area of operation.  Of the $2,742,387 ($67,967,050 
adjusted) worth of property (both vessels and cargo) imperiled within the research area between 
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1876 and 1915, the USLSS crews stationed within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet were only able to 
save 53.6%. 
It is interesting to note the pattern displayed when examining the percentage of property 
lost each year (FIGURE 6.24).  Here, it can be noted that there is an observable divide within the 
dataset where the vast majority of the vessels requiring assistance within the research area suffer 
losses of either less than 40% or more than 80% of their total estimated value.  This most likely 
correlates with vessels that were either not damaged at all or suffered damage/loss to cargo only 
(wrecking incidents in which up to 40% or less of their total value of property is lost) and those 
wrecking incidents in which the vast majority (80% or greater) of both vessel and cargo were 
lost. 
 
FIGURE 6.24.  A graph showing the percentage of value lost (of those imperiled within the 
operations of the USLSS operating within the research area) for each fiscal year between 1876 
and 1915. 
When a polynomial trend line showing the number of major fluctuations is applied to this 
particular dataset, a familiar pattern is observed which mirrors patterns found in most other 
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datasets dealing with potential losses.  This pattern is relatively consistent in that there are a 
number of peaks occurring every 10-20 years apart with marked decreases in between each peak 
and is similar to that described in both Crook’s cyclic risk management and Giddens’s ideas 
regarding reflexive self-regulation. 
When an analysis similar to those performed in FIGURES 6.23 and 6.24 is conducted on 
datasets relating to the efficiency of the USLSS operating within the research area and the 
number of lives lost, a very different pattern is observed.  Of the 1024 individuals imperiled 
during the operations of the USLSS within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet, only 173 (about 16.9%) 
lost their lives (FIGURE 6.17).  This implies that the crews of the USLSS stations operating 
within the research area were considerably more efficient at saving lives rather than property 
imperiled at sea.  Furthermore, it would appear that the number of lives lost in the operations of 
the Service within the research area may have been considered a much more important indicator 
of success along the North Carolina coastline as it is the only figure relating to losses that is 
consistently reduced (as a percentage) over time.  FIGURE 6.25 shows the percentage of lives 
lost for each fiscal year between 1876 and 1915.  This graph displays the same information 
recorded for FIGURE 6.24 regarding the percentage of property lost but exhibits a radically 
different pattern in which losses are gradually reduced over time. While this pattern was 
originally identified in regards to the cyclic trend in which lives were lost in clusters of disaster 
activity (FIGURE 6.16 and TABLE 6.1), it was not necessarily indicative of such a consistent 
pattern as observed in FIGURE 6.25. The percentage of lives lost peaks relatively early in the 
recorded history of the USLSS operations within the study area (peaking in 1878 when 73.6% of 
the individuals imperiled in wrecking incidents perished) and is gradually reduced until the 
number of lives lost during any given fiscal year averages around 12%. 
 147 
 
FIGURE 6.25.  A graph showing the percentage of lives lost (of those imperiled within the 
operations of the USLSS operating within the research area) for each fiscal year between 1876 
and 1915.  Only years in which there is a recorded loss of life are recorded. 
The fact that this pattern is so consistent means that, at least for the USLSS crews operating 
within the research area, the loss of life represented the ultimate measure of success for the 
Service.  The dramatic difference in the percentage of property lost and lives lost may be 
indicative of the different measures of success for each the USLSS and local mariners who may 
have used different factors in determining acceptable levels of risk in their operations.   
Conclusion 
 
According to USLSS loss data, the most common vessels wrecking within waters near 
Oregon Inlet were American flagged schooners traveling in ballast with an average crew of 
seven people.  These vessels were generally smaller coasting or working boats. Of these, the vast 
majority of the registered vessels were either not insured at the time of their mishap or the 
information was not recorded by the USLSS.  While many of these vessels may have been 
smaller recreational craft (and hence unregistered), uninsured, and carrying little if any cargo, 
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very few passengers remained on board long enough to require evacuation from the USLSS.  The 
vast majority of the passengers on board these vessels were able to safely arrive on shore only to 
have the USLSS assist the crew in getting their vessels safely underway once again.  In terms of 
wrecking, the shallow inlets and shifting shoals common to North Carolina’s Outer Banks 
ensured that the majority of disasters occurring within the research area involved strandings 
while the area’s unpredictable and often severe weather can be pinpointed as the most common 
cause of disasters occurring along the coast. 
 While historical research and the compilation, analysis, and examination of historic data 
begin to describe the measurable components that would have affected the concept of risk 
amongst both the USLSS and local mariners operating within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet, the 
effects of risk on the landscape are not apparent.  Through the statistical analysis performed in 
the previous two chapters, one can begin to identify apparent patterns in wrecking, but cannot 
always necessarily identify why these vessels wrecked in a particular area, or how a number of 
wrecks in a particular location altered the maritime landscape of an area and in turn the concept 
of risk associated with that particular locale.  In order to determine these spatial relationships, 
information regarding wrecking incidents must be entered into a geographic information system 
(GIS) in which geospatial relationships and patterns can be identified.  Chapter 7 will examine 
the patterns and trends identified through geospatial analysis of wreck data and will seek to 
determine the effects of risk on the development of the wrecking landscape developed within the 
operations of the USLSS in the vicinity of Oregon Inlet between 1876 and 1915. 
CHAPTER SEVEN: 
 X MARKS THE SPOT; GEOSPATIAL ANALSYSIS OF HISTORIC DATA 
 
 This study has so far identified numerous patterns potentially indicative of the effects of 
risk in both the development of the USLSS along the North Carolina coast and its subsequent 
effects on local wrecking patterns.  While these patterns have been identified within the 
historical statistics compiled by the USLSS, more information can be derived from these datasets 
through the utilization of modern geographic information systems (GIS) to perform geospatial 
analysis.  The importance of geospatial analysis in archaeology is well documented (Clark 1976; 
Ebert 1992) but has only recently been applied to interpret multiple maritime archaeological sites 
or assess space within maritime contexts (for example Duncan 2000, 2004; Kimura 2005; 
Wagner 2010; Bright 2012).  The relatively recent application of GIS technology to historical 
maps have enabled both historians and archaeologists alike to gain a better understanding of 
historical events while providing an invaluable tool for future interpretation and management of 
related archaeological sites (Knowles 2002:2).   
 By mapping the estimated locations of vessels requiring assistance along with the 
development of the USLSS network along the North Carolina coast, one can begin to identify 
what could be described as an “area of operations” detailing both the USLSS assets and the 
rescues performed within the research area.  This map can then be queried through a number of 
geospatial analyses in order to identify patterns indicative of the local effects of risk on wrecking 
occurrences within the research area.  This chapter will discuss the construction of a GIS system 
in which the historical locations of vessels requiring assistance as well as the development of the 
USLSS network within the research area are mapped.  This process will essentially define the 
unique seascape created through the establishment and development of the USLSS and the 
vessels they assisted within the research area.     
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 Once the GIS representing the USLSS seascape is created, several analyses will be 
performed to identify patterns indicative of risk behavior within the research area.   While this 
particular GIS could be analyzed in numerous ways, geospatial analysis for the purpose of this 
study will focus on attributes that could be indicative of risk and include the concept of locality 
(see Chapter 6), losses, and diagnostic information for each vessel.  These analyses will focus on 
both spatial patterns (wreck density, the extent(s) of USLSS operations, and distances from 
shore/USLSS stations) as well as temporal patterns (changes in wreck densities/extents over time 
in comparison to the development of the USLSS network throughout the research area).    
Defining the USLSS Seascape: Risk Mitigation and Wrecking Patterns 
 
 The primary objective of this study is to identify the role of risk in the development of the 
USLSS and its subsequent effects on local wrecking patterns.  While some may argue that this 
can be performed through historical research alone, examination through geospatial analysis 
reveal additional avenues of study.  Shortly after their construction along the Outer Banks, 
USLSS stations quickly worked to establish both a physical and social presence.  Starting in 
1874, the small brightly colored stations built along the North Carolina coast became a beacon 
on what could only be described as otherwise desolate strips of sand that formed the Outer 
Banks.  These initial stations were later described by the Service as, 
…deliberately placed, by elaborate selection, at the worst points that exist for shipping, at 
where liability to shipwreck is greatest, and where consequently there is the greatest 
possible hazard to seafarers, especially when tempest adds its own peculiar perils to the 
perils of the fatal bar or the bad surf and undertow; yet it is under these worst conditions 
that fatality, through the efforts of the life-savers, has been so rare and deliverance so 
frequent. (USLSS 1882:47-48)   
 
It was from these original stations that a life-saving network began to form. While the 
establishment of these original stations represents the initial government funded life-saving 
efforts along the North Carolina coast, it was soon deemed insufficient given the potential for 
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wrecks in the area.  It was only after the disasters of Nuova Ottavia (1875), USS Huron (1877) 
and Metropolis (1878), each occurring along the North Carolina coastline with a high loss of life, 
did the life-saving network begin to expand.  
 Shortly after establishment of the USLSS as an independent entity in 1878, station 
locations began to be marked on local charts and referenced in both Pilot Guides and literature 
distributed by the U.S. Treasury Department through its Custom Houses to the maritime 
community (USLSS 1881:81).  Stations were originally noted on charts simply by their station 
number as prescribed by the USLSS but difficulties in maintaining a consecutive numbering 
system and confusion amongst the maritime community forced the USLSS to name the stations 
according to their geographic location (FIGURE 7.1 and FIGURE 7.2). 
 
FIGURE 7.1.  Detail of an 1880 chart showing the position for the Oregon Inlet life-saving 
station (Chart image courtesy of NOAA Office of Coast Survey Historical Map and Chart 
Collection). 
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FIGURE 7.2.  Detail of an 1881 chart showing the position of the Pea Island life-saving station.  
Note the (T) designating that the station was capable of telegraph/telephone communications.  
(Chart image courtesy of the North Carolina Maps Collection) 
Vessels could initiate ship to shore communication via the use of the newly adopted international 
code of signals adapted for use from the United States Navy (USN) for general maritime 
communication (USLSS 1877:51-52).  As the technology became available, both telegraph and 
telephone lines were installed at stations along the North Carolina coast.  This new technology 
allowed for the immediate receipt of weather reports, communication between stations for 
mutual assistance in the event of disaster, and direct communication with USLSS command, 
which could call for additional assets from the USRM or USN in the event of a major 
catastrophe.  The addition of telegraph and telephone communications made the stations along 
the North Carolina coast invaluable sources of information to mariners passing within sight of 
them.  The USLSS station’s ability to communicate on the national telegraph/telephone system 
was deemed such a vital addition for the maritime community that charts noted which stations 
had the capability to do so (FIGURE 7.2). 
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 Once these systems were in place, vessels cruising just off the coast could then, using the 
newly developed international signal code, initiate communications with USLSS stations along 
their route in order to get information regarding posted weather bulletins, surf conditions, and to 
communicate with adjacent stations via telegraph or telephone (USLSS 1877:51-52).  An 
example of this type of exchange can be found in the communication between a steam tug 
attempting to salvage a recently wrecked vessel and the Nags Head station on December 1, 1883, 
in which the tug requested information regarding the local weather, surf conditions, and wreck 
survivors housed at the station, and further communication with the station in Kitty Hawk 
(USCG 1883). 
In addition to the benefit of this new technology, the USLSS made attempts to 
communicate with the maritime community through the creation and dissemination of standard 
publications explaining the purpose, extent, and methods of the Service.  These publications 
culminated in the development of a standard pamphlet entitled, “Instructions to Mariners in Case 
of Shipwreck” in 1881 (USLSS 1881:231).  These instructions were developed by the USLSS 
with the intent of, “simplifying [shore-based rescues] and making deliverance swifter and surer 
for wrecked seafarers.”  The instructions continue to describe, 
…, a hand-book has been prepared during the year and distributed copiously through the 
several custom-houses to masters and owners of vessels, giving instructions how 
mariners may help themselves and those endeavoring to save them in case of shipwreck.  
This hand-book is printed on paper which will best resist the damp and wet incident to 
voyaging, and is bound in a size and form convenient to be carried on the person in a 
breast-pocket.  It contains all essential general information in regard to the situation and 
character of the life-saving stations, their equipments and appliances, their signals, the 
nature extent of their constant patrols upon the beaches by night and in thick weather; 
secondly, plain instructions for co-operation with the life-saving crews as soon as they 
appear abreast of a wreck, these instructions being accompanied with wood-cuts to show 
how to set up the hawser and hauling-lines on board; and finally, a list of all life-saving 
stations on our coasts, with their latitude and longitude, showing the localities in which 
life-saving aid may be looked for (USLSS 1881:81). 
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The dissemination of this information throughout the customs houses in major ports of call 
ensured that the vast majority of the ocean-going maritime community had the opportunity to be 
well-versed in the role and limitations of the USLSS along the nation’s coastline. 
 The establishment of one additional life-saving station at New Inlet following the passing 
of the Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Life-Saving Service in 1882 marked an end to the 
construction of new stations within the established research area.  While there were 
advancements implemented by the Service to decrease the response time of those responding to a 
disaster (such as the use of horses to pull life-saving apparatus and the introduction of motorized 
lifeboats), there were no major additions or alterations that would affect the operational range of 
the Service along the coasts after 1882.  This, combined with other information regarding the 
area’s aids to navigation (ATON) allows for the production a map of what could be referred to as 
the Service’s area of operations within the research area.   
 While the idea of dividing maritime space for the purposes of military operations is not 
new, the interpretation of maritime cultural spaces is a relatively new concept.  Westerdahl 
(1992:5) defines a maritime cultural landscape as one that “signifies human utilization 
(economy) of maritime space by boat, settlement, fishing, hunting, shipping and its attendant 
subcultures such as pilotage, lighthouse, and seamark maintenance.”  For the purposes of this 
study, establishment and development of the United States Life-Saving Service along the North 
Carolina Outer Banks could be considered an “attendant subculture.”  This subculture constitutes 
what Duncan (2000) may consider a cultural seascape in which risk plays a prominent role.  By 
mapping the extent of this potential seascape in a geographic information system (GIS), one may 
acquire a better understanding of risk in the development of the wrecking patterns in the vicinity 
of Oregon Inlet.   
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The concept of interpreting maritime cultural space through the utilization of GIS is, 
however, a relatively new concept.  In his 2006 thesis, Jun Kimura examined the spatial meaning 
of shipwreck patterning in the coastal waters of South Australia.  In his work, Kimura studied the 
distribution of 218 shipwrecks in relation to natural and artificial factors, specifically the 
development and use of lighthouses and other forms of ATON within his research area. FIGURE 
7.3 shows a map in which the maximum visible ranges of both the Bodie Island Lighthouse (lit 
in 1872 and the only official aid to navigation in the research area) and each USLSS station 
located in the vicinity of Oregon Inlet, NC between 1876 and 1915.   
Each of these locations was determined through a combination of historical and 
archaeological research as detailed in Chapter Three.  Buffer zones were placed around these 
features to represent the maximum visible range that mariners in the vicinity could see each 
landmark. It was calculated that given the approximate height of the stations, they should be 
visible and more importantly be able to see a distance of about 10 nautical miles to sea in the 
best visibility conditions (Krietemeyer 2000:388-389).  The Bodie Island Lighthouse, due to its 
height and light, could be seen at a distance of 18 nautical miles (National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration 1880).  It should be noted that these distances are approximate and 
represented the potential visibility under the best conditions.  Visibility was often reduced by the 
height of the lookout, thick weather, and the lookout’s physical capabilities.  Regardless, these 
distances provide a measurable extent of both the operations of the USLSS operating within the 
research area and the risk seascape it produced. 
FIGURE 7.3 shows this extent, along with the approximate positions of each of the 133 
vessels requiring assistance from the USLSS within the research area between 1876 and 1915. 
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FIGURE 7.3.  Extents of the “risk seascape” represented as the maximum visible range of all 
USLSS stations and ATONs within the research area.   
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Also included in this map are polylines expressing the dates that both telegraph and telephone 
lines became operational in the area.  These stations often provided vital daily assistance for the 
maritime community serving as local landmarks and communication outposts for passing 
vessels.  
 One observation is immediately apparent.  Of the 133 vessels requiring assistance from 
the USLSS between 1876 and 1915, all are located within the maximum visible ranges of either 
a USLSS station within the research area, a USLSS station outside the research area in which 
mutual assistance was provided, or the Bodie Island Lighthouse.  There are three vessels 
requiring assistance located just beyond the visible range of the Chicamacomico Station.  These 
three vessels, General S.E. Merwin, Whillie H. Child, and Zaccheus Sherman, wrecked just south 
of the Gull Shoal Station in 1901, 1911, and 1913 respectively.  These rescue operations, while 
wrecking just outside of the maximum visible range of the USLSS stations located within the 
research area, occur well within site of the Gull Shoal Station (just beyond the established 
research area).  These wrecks serve as examples of the effects of increased cooperation and 
mutual assistance amongst an increasingly interconnected network of life-saving stations along 
the North Carolina coastline.  While both the locations of these vessels as well as the maximum 
visible ranges of the stations are approximate, it can easily be argued that this area represents the 
maximum extent of USLSS operations between 1876 and 1915 in the research area.    
 Due to the physical visibility of the individual USLSS stations along the North Carolina 
coastline and the vital component they played in day-to-day shipping activities the stations 
should be considered vital components of the area’s cultural landscape.   The stations often 
served as a means to disseminate weather and surf reports, shelters for those coming ashore 
during storms, local landmarks, communication outposts, and the means to disseminate 
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important weather and surf reports.  The fact that the Service’s AOR (essentially being within 
sight of shore) was a “safety zone” in which vessels in distress could be guaranteed assistance 
upon discovery could mean that the AOR served as considered a risk landscape.                            
 Once the extent of what could be described as the United States Life-Saving Service’s 
risk seascape could be effectively mapped, additional geospatial analysis could be performed.  In 
order to determine the potential role risk has played in shaping wrecking patterns over time, 
geospatial analysis focused on identifying trends and patterns in the centrality, density, and 
extent of disaster activities over time.  While this particular dataset could be undoubtedly studied 
in numerous other ways, these analyses provide a basic understanding of the evolving patterns of 
disasters within the research area.   
Analyzing the Seascape: Geospatial Analysis 
 
 Once the USLSS seascape created in the vicinity of Oregon Inlet had been defined, 
additional geospatial analysis was then performed in order to determine any changes in local 
wrecking patterns.  This involved a combination of geospatial analysis that examined the 
evolution of geographic datasets over time.  For the purposes of this study, temporal groups were 
formed for events occurring between 1876 and 1880, 1881 and 1890, 1891 and 1900, 1901 and 
1910, and lastly between 1911 and 1915.  By mapping smaller elements of the seascape such as 
the mean centers of activity, event densities, and the extents of wrecking activity, analysis can be 
performed to identify and measure changes in disaster activity over time.    
Density 
 
 In order to determine any patterns in disaster activity throughout the study area, one must 
first examine the general location of each disaster and identify any clusters or patterns through 
density analysis.  FIGURE 7.4 shows the approximate historical location of each disaster 
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occurring within the operations of the USLSS in the research area between 1876 and 1915.  This 
illustration, though useful in ascertaining the overall extents and nature of disaster activity 
occurring within the research area, does little to show actual concentrations or patterns within the 
data. 
FIGURE 7.5 shows a density map of the vessels requiring assistance from the USLSS 
between 1876 and 1915.  In this particular map, darker shades of red and purple indicate areas of 
higher wrecking densities. The rendering of event data in this manner facilitates the rapid 
identification of clusters of disaster activity also referred to as “hot spots.”   Upon initial 
observation, it is very clear that there is a heavy concentration of vessels requiring assistance in 
the immediate vicinities of both Oregon and New Inlets.  This was expected, as both Oregon 
Inlet and New Inlet were the only navigable waterways leading into the Pamlico Sound and the 
many inland waterways of eastern North Carolina.  What was not expected, however, was the 
high concentrations of events occurring in the immediate area around the station at 
Chicamacomico.  There are several possible reasons for the increased level of activity occurring 
in the vicinity of the Chicamacomico station.  First, there are a number of shoals located in the 
area just area just off the beach at Chicamacomico known as Wimble Shoals (FIGURE 7.6). 
These shoals are described as, 
Consist(ing) of a number of ridges extending out from and lying off the shore to a 
distance of 4 miles with depths ranging from 3.5 to 6 fathoms.  The northern end of these 
shoals are about 13.5 miles to the southward of Bodie Island Lighthouse and bear E. by 
S. from the northern end of the Chicamicomco Woods.  The spot with 3.5 fathoms over it 
lies about 2 and 2/3 miles from the shore, and there are several spots with 4 fathoms over 
them inshore (United States Coast and Geodetic Survey 1895:34). 
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FIGURE 7.4.  Approximate historical positions of each disaster occurring within the operations 
of the USLSS in the research area between 1876 and 1915. 
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FIGURE 7.5.  Densities of disaster activity occurring within the research area between 1876 and 
1915.  Darker reds and purples are indicative of higher event density.   
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FIGURE 7.6.  Detail of a chart (1880) showing the location of Wimble Shoals in relation to the 
Chicamacomico life-saving station.  (Chart image courtesy of North Carolina Maps Collection) 
 
In an effort to avoid a time consuming detour into deeper waters or to stay within sight of 
USLSS stations, many masters may have chosen to navigate a course closer to shore in an 
attempt to pass between the shoal and shore as was recommended for Platt shoals located just to 
the north off Bodie Island.  This maneuver may have been a costly trade off for the masters of 
vessels who may have made the decision to sacrifice the relative safety of deeper water in the 
pursuit of quicker sailing times and profit by relying on the USLSS for their salvation in the 
event of disaster.  
A second hypothesis regarding the high concentration of vessels requiring assistance at 
the Chicamacomico station stems from the concept of the local knowledge and perceptions of 
that particular station.  Officers of the United States Revenue Marine (USRM) routinely visited 
stations in each district to perform drills, conduct inspections, and distribute supplies.  These 
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officers would arrive at each station either via a USRM vessel or over land (USCG 1881a, 
1881b, 1881c, 1885).  While many of the stations document an occasional visit or delivery of 
supplies via a USRM vessel, the Chicamacomico routinely received visits and supplies from no 
less than three vessels (USRM sloop Alert, USRC Hamilton, and USRC Stevens) and often acted 
as a distribution point for supplies to other stations in the area (USCG 1882, 1886, 1888).  The 
Chicamacomico station was also one of the only stations in the research area to be issued and 
utilize motorized surfboats (Chicamacomico was issued one Beebe-McLellan Motorized Surf 
Boat in 1911) (Wilkinson and Dring 2009).  It is possible that, due to the consistent presence of 
large USRM vessels anchoring off its position, that the Chicamacomico station could have been 
perceived by local mariners as a operations center for the USLSS that may have had access to 
more supplies and better equipment than other stations in the area.  This perception, when 
combined with the position of Wimble shoals, would have meant that experienced masters in the 
area would have had to make a conscious decision to navigate between the shoals and shore and 
rely on the presence of the Chicamacomico station for assistance should the need arise.  
 Further analysis of this data yields interesting insight concerning the number of disasters 
occurring within a given distance from shore (FIGURE 7.7).  When the information from the 
map displayed in FIGURE 7.7 is represented graphically, a familiar pattern is immediately 
apparent (FIGURE 7.8). FIGURE 7.8 displays the same rhythmic or cyclic patterning observed 
in previously examined historic and statistical datasets in which there is a rapid increase in the 
maritime community’s reliance upon the Service early in its existence.  The increase in reliance 
can be seen in this particular data by the increasing number of vessels requiring assistance within 
2 miles of a USLSS station (45% of the disasters between 1876 and 1880 and 66% of the 
disasters between 1880 and 1890 occur within this distance). 
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FIGURE 7.7.  Disaster activity occurring within the research area organized by the events 
distance from a USLSS station. 
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FIGURE 7.8.  A graph showing the number of disasters occurring within a given distance of a 
USLSS station over time.  All distances are in miles. 
This change shows a transition in disaster activity that would suggest that as the 
locations, extents, and capabilities of the USLSS along the North Carolina coast became well 
known amongst the maritime community, vessels in distress would attempt to navigate as close 
to individual stations as possible in order to better their chances for discovery and rescue.  As the 
proficiency of individual stations increased over time, an increasing number of disasters began to 
occur between 2 and 4 miles of each station.  This trend reflects the maritime community’s 
increased trust placed in the Service as their success records increased over time.  At the same 
time, the number of vessels in distress within the immediate vicinity (less than .5 miles) of a 
station increases during this time period and shows that there is a definite association between a 
vessels proximity to individual USLSS stations and the possibility for salvation.
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Centrality 
 
 One way the movement in disaster activity can be tracked is through recording any shift 
in the mean center of vessels requiring assistance from the USLSS between 1876 and 1915. In 
order to view any change in the center of activity over time, vessels requiring assistance were 
organized temporarily into five groups spanning the duration of USLSS activities in the area.  
The mean center of each group of disasters along with the mean center of all disaster activity was 
then determined and added to a map showing change over time.  FIGURE 7.9 maps the 
movement of the mean centers of disaster activity over time. Here, it can be noted that that while 
the extent of disasters occurring within the operations of the USLSS spans the 15 mile radius of 
Oregon Inlet, the mean centers of activity are located just south of the inlet and on the sound side 
of the barrier island chain that forms the North Carolina Outer Banks.  The number of vessels 
requiring assistance in Pamlico Sound combined with the number of mishaps occurring along the 
curved shoreline of the Outer Banks shifted the mean centers of activity into the sound. 
Very little change occurs in the mean centrality of the datasets between 1876 and 1900 shifting 
only slightly over time.  This is not surprising given the vessel densities discussed above and the 
locations of the two navigable waterways in the research area, (Oregon Inlet and New 
Inlet/Loggerhead Inlets are located immediately north and south of these centers respectively).  
What is surprising, however, is the rapid shift of the centers of activity to the south after 1900.   
Loggerhead Inlet closed to navigation in 1870 and had completely disappeared from local charts 
by 1911.  New Inlet remained open until about 1945, its shallow depth and narrow channel 
limited its use to only the smallest of coasting vessels (Riggs et al. 2009:47-48).  The closing or 
limited use of the only southern inlets in the research area would presumably force the mean 
centers for disaster activity further north.  This, however, was not the case.  
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FIGURE 7.9.  Movement in the mean centers of wrecking activity between 1876 and 1915. 
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Between 1900 and 1910 the mean center of activity shifted 1.53 miles to the south-southeast.   
This trend continued between 1910 and 1915 as the center of activity shifted an additional 2.83 
miles in the same direction just to the south of the New Inlet station. 
There are several possible hypotheses as to why this shift takes place.  The first relates to 
the closing of New and Loggerhead Inlets.  As these inlets narrowed and closed, they became 
more dangerous to navigate and therefore the site of more wrecks.  The high number of wrecks 
in the vicinity of these two inlets can be seen in the previously discussed density maps.  The 
second possible explanation for the southern shift in the mean center of activity may lie in the 
increase in disaster activity centered around the Chicamacomico life-saving Station.  While the 
exact reasons for this shift in activity may never be known, these two possible explanations show 
how risk could have played a direct role in wrecking patterns in the area.   
Convex Hull Analysis 
 
 A final method of determining change in wrecking patterns over time involves mapping 
the extents of disaster activity and determining the minimum area of each dataset.  This can be 
accomplished through a process known as convex hull analysis.  The term “convex hull” refers 
to the smallest convex polygon that encloses a group of objects such as points (ESRI 2012).  
Convex hulls, also known as convex envelopes or convex polygons, function as a minimal 
feature containing all points of another feature.  This has often been likened to placing a number 
of thumbtacks onto a board and wrapping a rubber band around the outermost tacks so that all of 
the tacks are enclosed by a single rubber band (Brimicombe 2003:75).  Once a convex hull 
polygon has been formed around each dataset, the area of that polygon can be utilized to 
determine any increase or decrease in the areas in which disasters are occurring (FIGURE 7.10).  
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FIGURE 7.10.  Convex hull polygons representing the extents of disaster activity between 1876 
and 1915.   
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FIGURE 7.10 shows the convex polygons created for each of the disaster datasets.  This figure 
shows a very distinct pattern in the fluctuation in the extents of disaster activity over time. 
The area of each polygon represented in FIGURE 7.10 can be seen in TABLE 7.2 and 
shows the computed area of each polygon (in square miles) along with the number of disasters 
occurring during each time period and the number of wrecks per square mile per year in each.  
While each polygon is similar in shape, their size and disaster densities form a bell curve which 
peaks at the mid-point of USLSS operations in the area in the 1890s.  Given the relatively little 
observed change in the shape of these polygons, it can be argued that the overall extent of 
disaster activity does not change over time but fluctuates with disaster activity.  
 
Date Range 
Area of Polygon (Sq. 
Miles) Number of Disasters 
Disasters per Sq. 
Mile/Year 
1876-1880 104 9 0.021625 
1880-1890 179 26 0.01453 
1890-1900 319 57 0.17817 
1900-1910 312 29 0.09355 
1910-1915 120 12 0.02 
TABLE 7.1.  A table showing the computed area and the number of disasters per square mile for 
each polygon displayed in FIGURE 7.10 
Conclusions 
 
 By entering historic data into a geographic information system, additional geospatial 
analysis was performed that identified previously undiscovered datasets and ultimately shed light 
on the complex relationship between the perception of risk, the USLSS, and local wrecking 
patterns.  By utilizing GIS, patterns were observed that were not necessarily apparent in any 
other dataset.  These patterns reveal a great deal regarding the role of risk and the development 
of the USLSS along the North Carolina Outer Banks and its subsequent effect on local wrecking 
patterns.   
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 One of the most profound observations made throughout this analysis involved the 
grouping of vessels requiring assistance in the immediate vicinity of several of the life-saving 
stations.  While high densities of disasters were expected near stations immediately adjacent to 
navigable waterways (Oregon Inlet and New Inlet), concentrations were not expected near land 
locked stations.  Disaster activity seemed to center on each of the USLSS stations in the research 
area.  This pattern may be a product of the relationship that was eventually established between 
the USLSS and the maritime community in which individual life-saving stations were often used 
as landmarks and sources of information.  While the Life-Saving stations along the North 
Carolina coast formed a virtual network of lookouts patrolling the shores, in the event of disaster, 
mariners began to associate the stations with salvation and purposely attempted to beach their 
vessels as close to a station as possible to ensure their rescue.  Nowhere was this particular 
pattern observable than in the density of disaster activity around the Chicamacomico Life-Saving 
station. 
 The disaster activity in the vicinity of the Chicamacomico Life-Saving station offers an 
example of one of the many roles risk played in the development of the USLSS along the North 
Carolina coast and the Service’s subsequent effects on wrecking patterns.  While the station was 
not located near a vital navigable waterway into the sounds of eastern North Carolina, a well-
documented shoal located just off the beach at that station forced mariners to decide between 
navigating a safer course further out to sea around the shoal or assuming the riskier course 
between the shoal and shore in order to save time and money on their journey.  Prior to the 
establishment of the USLSS in the area, the risk of wrecking upon the desolate Outer Banks 
without any outside assistance would have meant nearly certain death.  The establishment of a 
federally funded shore-based Life-Saving Service began to change this.  As the Service 
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developed over time, mariners came to trust in the fact that, should the need arise, the USLSS 
was there to assist them.  As this trust in the USLSS increased, more and more mariners made 
the conscious decision to navigate the more treacherous route between Wimble Shoals and the 
coast.  While many made this journey without mishap, as more vessels made the decision to 
navigate this area, an increasing number required immediate assistance from the USLSS.  
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
 
The development of the United States Life-Saving Service as an independent entity can 
be traced, not through a single catastrophe, but rather, through a series of disasters and events 
that slowly garnered public support for government action.  The early history of the Service can, 
therefore, be interpreted as a legislative history spanning nearly three quarters of a century.  
Slowly evolving from the privately funded, volunteer group dedicated to assisting those in peril 
at sea, the Massachusetts Humane Society initiated a movement that would eventually result in 
the nation’s first federally funded shore-based life-saving service.   
 The primary objective of this study was to identify the effects of risk on the USLSS and 
its subsequent effects on local wrecking patterns.  In order to objectively identify and measure 
what could otherwise be described as a feeling or an emotion, a non-traditional research strategy 
was required.  By taking a broad, generalist approach to studying the development and operation 
of the USLSS along North Carolina’s Outer Banks, this study allowed for an examination of the 
Service from an alternate perspective.  This perspective, incorporating the statistical analysis of 
historical data and geospatial analysis in a geographic information system within the framework 
of select socio-cultural theories regarding risk, allowed for the study of data that is not 
traditionally analyzed in the historiography of the Service.  By entering the information into a 
GIS, disaster data that was routinely documented in the form of tables and statistics are easily 
visualized and can then be used in further analysis.  This visualization and subsequent analysis 
identified trends in shipping and disaster that would not otherwise be apparent through 
traditional research and can at least be partially explained through the application of Giddens’s 
and Crook’s theories regarding risk and risk management.  
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General Observations 
 
The first and perhaps most important observations made in this study is the fact that 
many local patterns were yet undiscovered within larger datasets maintained by the Service. 
Conversely, local datasets would reflect trends observable in national and regional datasets, this 
was not always the case.  This is due to the fact that regional events such as major wrecking 
incidents, weather, population, and USLSS presence all affect local wrecking patterns more so 
than those same events affect national trends.  This is important if for no other reason than the 
realization that the current historiography and academic works on the USLSS, while useful in 
explaining overall trends and patterns, are not necessarily complete or accurate for particular 
locales.  Records of the USLSS do, however, contain specific information regarding losses for 
the vast majority of the nation’s beaches and coasts.  This research demonstrated that these 
records can potentially reveal datasets vital to ascertaining a better understanding of the maritime 
communities across the nation.     
A second observation involves the establishment and maintenance of acceptable levels of 
risk throughout the Service’s statistical records.  A trend was identified in which there was an 
overall increase in the number of vessels, lives, and property imperiled as shipping traffic 
increased throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  What was not expected, however, 
were the correlating patterns regarding actual losses in those same categories, which remained 
relatively constant.  This means that once the USLSS became established as an organized 
efficient entity, they were able to maintain a relatively stable level of losses establishing what 
could be considered for the time, an acceptable level of risk associated with shipping and 
maritime traffic.  This idea of acceptable risk is reflected throughout the history of the USLSS 
and can be clearly observed in datasets reflecting physical losses, which remains low.  Datasets 
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reflecting vessels, lives, and property imperiled, however, rises with the increase in shipping 
traffic over time.  This observation is important as it may identify a measurable indicator of risk 
within the USLSS.   
A final pattern observed in nearly all datasets were examples of what Giddens may 
identify as reflexive self-regulation in which “casual loops have a feedback effect in system 
reproduction, where that feedback is substantially influenced by knowledge which agents have of 
the mechanisms of system reproduction and employ to control it” (Giddens 1986:376).  The 
concept of reflexive self-regulation perfectly describes the process used by the USLSS in which 
their relationship with the maritime community affected wrecking statistics through the 
organization, rescue, and educational capabilities of the Service.   
While these datasets provide confirmation of several of the relationships between 
national and regional patterns, the USLSS did not see the need to pursue analysis of local 
datasets.  Provided the overall scope of the Service’s mission and goals, this is not unexpected.  
However, based on the datasets observed here, differences between local versus national and 
regional trends are pronounced.  Through the analysis of local datasets similar to that conducted 
by the USLSS with national and regional data, a unique insight can be gained into both the 
nature of wrecking patterns as well as the role of risk in the development of those patterns in any 
given locale. 
Measuring Risk-Statistical Analysis of Local Wrecking Patterns 
 
Perhaps the most telling measure of the efficiency of the USLSS within the vicinity of 
Oregon Inlet can be found in the comparison of imperilments or potential losses with actual 
losses.  It was noted that while the USLSS continued to develop their life-saving network along 
the North Carolina coast, the men of the USLSS stationed within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet 
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were often unable to prevent considerable losses of property within their respective area of 
operation.  Of the $2,742,387 worth of property (both vessels and cargo) imperiled within the 
research area between 1876 and 1915, the USLSS crews stationed within the vicinity of Oregon 
Inlet were only able to save $1,469,572 (about 53.6%).  
  While the efficiency of the USLSS in the saving of property from disaster is less than 
outstanding, it is interesting to note the pattern displayed when examining the percentage of 
property lost each year (FIGURE 6.24).  Here, it can be noted that there is an observable divide 
within the dataset where the vast majority of the vessels requiring assistance within the research 
area suffer losses of less than 40% or more than 80% of their total estimated value.  This most 
likely correlates with vessels that were only slightly damaged versus those that were considered 
total losses.  When further analysis was conducted on this particular dataset, a familiar pattern 
was observed which mirrors trends found in most other datasets dealing with potential losses.  
This pattern is relatively consistent in that there are a number of peaks in losses occurring every 
10-20 years apart with marked decreases in between each peak.   
This pattern is similar to that described in Crook’s cyclic risk management in that there is 
an observable rhythmic pattern in which periods experiencing high losses are immediately 
followed by a rapid decline as the community reacts to those losses by altering their behavior and 
participating in less risky behavior. This pattern can also be explained using Giddens’s ideas 
regarding reflexive self-regulation.  Through the collection, analysis, and publication of the 
organization’s statistics, the USLSS created a self-serving method in which the Service could 
evaluate and modify its practices in order to improve its own efficiency.  At the same time, the 
publication and dissemination of this material to the maritime community, the general public 
became participants in this loop.  The publication of statistics relating to disasters along with 
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other attempts by the USLSS to educate the maritime community created a structure in which 
those plying the waters within the influence of the USLSS could be considered by Giddens to be 
“knowledgeable actors” that, through their actions, contributed input back into the feedback 
systems established by the USLSS and thus, altered the societal structure in which they operate.         
 When a similar analysis is performed on datasets concerning the numbers of lives lost in 
the research area, a drastically different pattern is observed.  Of the 1024 individuals imperiled 
during the operations of the USLSS within the vicinity of Oregon Inlet between 1876 and 1915, 
only 173 (about 16.9%) lost their lives.  This implies that the crews of the USLSS stations 
operating within the research area were considerably more efficient at saving lives rather than 
property imperiled at sea.  Furthermore, it would appear that the number of lives lost in the 
operations of the Service within the research area may have been considered a much more 
important indicator of success along the North Carolina coastline as it is the only figure relating 
to losses that is consistently reduced (as a percentage) over time.  The percentage of lives lost 
peaks relatively early in the recorded history of the USLSS operations within the study area 
(peaking in 1878 when 73.6% of the individuals imperiled in wrecking incidents within the study 
area perished) and is gradually reduced until the number of lives lost during any given fiscal year 
averages around 12%.  The fact that this pattern is so consistent may mean that, at least for the 
USLSS crews operating within the research area, the loss of life represented the ultimate 
measure of success for the Service.  Conversely, the dramatic difference in the percentage of 
property lost and lives lost may be indicative of the different measures of success for either the 
USLSS and local mariners who may have used different factors in determining acceptable levels 
of risk in their operations.   
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Mapping the Graveyard- Geospatial Analysis 
 
One of the most profound observations made throughout this analysis involved the 
grouping of vessels requiring assistance in the immediate vicinity of several of the Life-Saving 
stations.  While high densities of disasters were expected near stations immediately adjacent to 
navigable waterways (Oregon Inlet and New Inlet), concentrations were not expected in other 
locations.  Disaster activity seemed to center on each of the USLSS stations in the research area.  
This can be explained by the relationship that was eventually established between the USLSS 
and the maritime community in which individual Life-Saving stations were often used as 
landmarks and sources of information.  While the Life-Saving stations along the North Carolina 
coast formed a virtual network of lookouts patrolling the coasts, in the event of disaster, mariners 
began to associate the stations with salvation and purposely attempted to beach their vessels as 
close to a station as possible to ensure their rescue.  Nowhere was this particular pattern better 
observed than in the density of disaster activity around the Chicamacomico Life-Saving station. 
 The disaster activity in the vicinity of the Chicamacomico station offers an outstanding 
example of one of the many roles risk played in the development of the USLSS along the North 
Carolina coast and the Service’s subsequent effects on wrecking patterns.  While the station was 
not located near a navigable waterway into the sounds of eastern North Carolina, a well-
documented shoal located just off the beach forced mariners to decide between navigating a safer 
course further out to sea around the shoal or assuming the riskier course between the shoal and 
shore in order to save time and money on their journey.   
Prior to the establishment of the USLSS in the area, the risk of wrecking upon the 
desolate Outer Banks without any outside assistance would have meant nearly certain death.  The 
establishment of a federally funded shore-based Life-Saving Service began to change this.  As 
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the Service developed over time, mariners came to trust in the fact that, should the need arise, the 
USLSS was there to assist them.  As this trust in the USLSS increased, more and more mariners 
made the conscious decision to navigate the more treacherous route between Wimble Shoals and 
the coast.  While many made this journey without mishap, as more vessels made the decision to 
navigate this area, an increasing number required immediate assistance from the USLSS. 
Application of Theory 
 
Giddens’s and Crook’s ideas concern the manner in which both individuals and systems 
within society identify, assess, and manage risk in the day-to-day life.  These theories also 
identify reflexive mechanisms in which information regarding risk can be evaluated and 
reintroduced as a component of decision-making processes.  These theories, therefore, have 
implications in describing the role of risk and the development of both the USLSS and local 
wrecking patterns along the Outer Banks.  As an inherently reflexive organization, the 
information gathered in the Service’s reports were analyzed and disseminated throughout the 
maritime community, actively molding that community’s concept of risk.  The manipulation of 
that community’s concept of risk, in turn, affected the decision-making processes of those 
navigating in the area and therefore directly influenced the development of local wrecking 
patterns. 
 In his works, Duncan (2000, 2004) utilizes both paradigms to attempt to explain the roles 
of risk in shaping a region’s maritime cultural landscape and wrecking patterns in the area.  
While Duncan’s research and the methodology he established primarily focuses on the 
socioeconomic factors affecting risk, his work represents an example of the application of a 
generalist approach that attempts to apply a wide theoretical base to both historical and 
archaeological data in order to expand our working knowledge of human decision-making.  
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Giddens’s Theory of Structuration 
Within his Theory of Structuration, Giddens argues that while individuals are constrained 
in their decision-making capabilities by various cultural, societal, and environmental conditions, 
an individual’s reaction to a situation would also contain a given amount of personal choice 
(Cohen 1987:283).  These individual agents, while maintaining the freedom to make decisions 
regarding the conduct of their day-to-day lives, do so within the constraint of both the structures 
of his or her society, and their locale.  
An example of Giddens’s Theory of Structuration can be found in the evolution of the 
USLSS along the North Carolina coast following the wrecks of USS Huron (1877) and 
Metropolis (1878).  Due to the particularly high loss of life attributed to these two wrecks, an 
investigation was ordered to determine deficiencies in the life-saving services that lead to such 
deadly disasters.  The results of this investigation cited several deficiencies in the Service along 
both the Outer Banks as well as within the national organization. The report specifically cited the 
extreme distance between stations along the Outer Banks as a primary factor in the disasters of 
USS Huron and Metropolis.  As a result of these findings, Congress unanimously approved the 
Act of June 18, 1878 establishing the USLSS as an independent entity.  The act also authorized 
the construction of several more USLSS stations along the North Carolina coastline.  This 
represents an example of how society and the structures within it are reflexive in nature and are 
in a constant process of reevaluation and evolution.  As agents act within society, structures are 
in place to gather, process, and disseminate information that will then be used in future decision-
making and thus transform the very structures that created it.        
 This study has made it abundantly clear that the USLSS was in fact a reflexive 
organization in which the collection, analysis, and dissemination of vessel mishaps and disasters 
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created a reflexive feedback system.  This system created a societal structure (the USLSS) in 
which knowledgeable agents conducted their operations within that structure (guided through 
sailing instructions, instructions to mariners in case of shipwreck, coast pilots and other 
publications).  The USLSS created a system in which disaster data was collected, analyzed, and 
disseminated amongst agents who would then use this information in their own decision-making 
processes.  The consequences of the agent’s decision-making process was invariably recorded by 
the USLSS and reintroduced as new data and thus transforming the very structure in which the 
agent operates.   
Crook’s Risk Ordering Strategies  
 
 The USLSS method of identifying, assessing, and mitigating risk echo Crook’s 
arguments that risks are best mitigated through a series of ordering and management strategies. 
Duncan (2000, 2004) utilizes Crook’s ideas regarding ordered and neo-liberal risk management 
strategies to describe the transition from pre-exploration utilization of his research area to post 
settlement phases where local communities were controlled by capital investment and, therefore, 
greatly affected by the mitigation of risk (Duncan 2004:28).  Duncan argues that the pre-
settlement utilization of his research area was characterized by the inability for structures within 
that society to assess and mitigate risk in that locale and, therefore, prohibited or discouraged use 
of the area.  Duncan identifies this process as an example of an ordered risk management 
strategy.  Duncan’s observation regarding the lack of established structures within society to 
assess risk in an area discouraged use of a particular area can be applied to the utilization of the 
waters off the North Carolina coast and the establishment of the USLSS in the area.  While the 
Coast Survey routinely surveyed the area around Oregon Inlet throughout the 19th century, the 
lack of assistance along the desolately populated Outer Banks discouraged overly risky 
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navigation in the area.  It would appear that this advice was well heeded until well after the 
establishment of the USLSS along the North Carolina coast and its capabilities became better 
known, did local mariners begin to participate in more dangerous sailing patterns.  This trend 
was particularly well noted in the vicinity around the Chicamacomico Life-Saving station and its 
relationship with Wimble Shoals as discussed in Chapter 7. 
Conversely, Duncan argues that the post-settlement use of the area, characterized by 
economic/capitalistic investment, allowed for the establishment of structures and systems such as 
lighthouses and other aids to navigation that allowed for the individual mariner to make the final 
decision regarding the acceptable level of risk in operating within the vicinity.  While the 
establishment of lighthouses and the commencement of coastal surveys along the North Carolina 
coast began much earlier in the State’s history (and therefore correlating with Duncan’s 
argument regarding post-settlement economic investment), the development of the USLSS along 
the Outer Banks represents a more realistic transition from ordered to more neo-liberal risk 
management strategies for shipping in the area.    
 It should be noted, however, that at least along the North Carolina coastline, this 
transition was not clear.  While Duncan uses Crook’s risk management strategies to identify the 
transition between pre-settlement and post-settlement utilization of the maritime landscape and 
its subsequent effect on wrecking patterns, this study has utilized Crook’s ideas to describe the 
risk management strategies used by the USLSS throughout their existence along the Outer 
Banks.  These management strategies, as developed within the USLSS, are not independent of 
one another, and do not designate any transition from one to another in terms of how the Service 
develops throughout history.  Duncan argues occurs in the transition between pre- and post- 
settlement and the influence of capitalism on the maritime landscape. Rather, it is argued that the 
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USLSS, along with other agencies regulating maritime trade and transportation, utilized a blend 
of these two risk management strategies to reduce losses.  
 Crook identified ordered risk management as being centered on the state, usually as a part 
of a broader drive for modernization, taking on the task of regulating and if possible eradicating 
risk from society.  He goes on to add that ordered risk management is characterized by the 
establishment of an active network of many actuants including the utilization of scientific and 
technical experts, updated production technologies, and advanced technology and administrative 
instruments in the analysis of risk in order to establish risk based regulations.  In contrast, Crook 
also identifies neo-liberal risk management strategies in which a structure within society 
provides information so that responsible individuals could then make informed decisions (Crook 
1999:170-171). 
 As such, the USLSS serves as a unique organization which blends both ordered and neo-
liberal risk management strategies in order to create the most efficient life-saving organization 
possible.  Areas within the research area that were deemed too dangerous for safe passage 
(Loggerhead Inlet for example) were closed to navigation.  This is an example of an ordered risk 
management strategy.  In contrast, surveyed areas that may have been dangerous such as Wimble 
Shoals were recorded and information regarding their safe navigation, along with the locations of 
nearby USLSS stations, were made available to mariners after which the decision to use the area 
was left to the individual.  This particular situation nearly matches Crook’s definition of a neo-
liberal risk management strategy (Crook 2004:14).   
Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
 
 The largest limiting factor in this thesis involved the limited geographic scope of the 
research.  While a great deal of information has been discovered regarding local wrecking 
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patterns in the vicinity of Oregon Inlet, more insight into the role of risk in the development of 
the USLSS and the subsequent effect on wrecking patterns may have been obtained through a 
district wide study encompassing the entire coast of both North Carolina and southern Virginia.  
While expanding the study to this scale would have made data collection easier and may have 
provided even more insight into the role of risk in the Service, the effort required to process the 
additional data would have been monumental.   
 The only other limiting factor in this study could be found in the lack of archaeologically 
verified positions on the vast majority of the vessels identified as total losses in the historical 
record.  If the actual (physical) positions of a portion of these wrecks were known, it would 
provide an excellent opportunity to test the accuracy of historical positions versus the actual 
known locations of shipwrecks along the North Carolina coastline.  Despite this, there may be a 
reciprocal benefit to this situation.  Given the overall lack of archaeologically verified positions 
of shipwrecks along the North Carolina Outer Banks, this research may help identify previously 
unidentified shipwrecks discovered within the research area.  Furthermore, this study could 
provide the foundation of a model in which the historic records of the USLSS could be utilized 
to develop a predictive model identifying the most probable sites of shipwrecks based on historic 
wrecking densities and their relationship with USLSS stations in the area.  This model could be 
reproduced and utilized in any area where the USLSS maintained a significant presence.  
Conclusions 
 The primary objectives of this thesis were to identify the role of risk in the creation, 
development, and evolution of the USLSS along the North Carolina coast while identifying what 
relationship the physical presents of USLSS have on local wrecking patterns.  By taking a broad, 
generalist approach to studying the development of the USLSS along the North Carolina Outer 
Banks, this study allowed for an examination of the Service from an alternate perspective.  This 
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perspective, incorporating the statistical analysis of historical data and geospatial analysis within 
the framework of select socio-cultural theories regarding risk, allows for the study of data that is 
not traditionally analyzed in the historiography of the Service.  By entering the data into a GIS, 
disaster data that was routinely documented in the form of tables and statistics were easily 
visualized and can then be utilized in further analysis.  This visualization and subsequent 
analysis identified trends in shipping and disaster that would not otherwise be apparent through 
traditional research and can at least be partially explained through the application of Giddens’s 
and Crook’s theories regarding risk and risk management.  While this thesis has established that 
there is a direct relationship between the role of risk in the development of the USLSS along the 
North Carolina coast and local wrecking patterns, it should be noted that this is not the only 
manner in which this data could be analyzed.  Rather, this work should be viewed as an example 
of the potential application of generalist approaches to historical data.
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